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Phe Ihesis examines the evolution of the -policies of 
the People fs Jtenublie of China towards J?hail°nd, PTal ysia, 
Singapore, Iidonesia pad the Philip-pines, organised in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from 1969 to 1975• 
2ze first central point of this study is an *ir sumption 
that the foreign relations of The People's Tepublic of 
Chi la Towards Southeast s^ia have been motivated by a 
dynamic interplay of t^o main factors: (1) Farxist-Leninist 
ideology and ICao J^e-tung Ph^ught, which dictate to China 
to behave as a revolutionary Dover vhich must assist the 
insurgent movements in the area in their strug fle to over-
throw the local governments; (2) national interest, vhich 
demands of China to safeguard the southern flank of her 
territory bordering on Southerst 'sia through Friendly rela-
tions, trade and ot*»er conventional inrtniments of diplomacy. 
hile the tvo main motive factors are nuTually anta-
gonistic and exclusivet the Chinere leaders are nevertheless 
at te mi ting to oring them iirco a coherent policy under Mao's 
theory of tve {hniity of op-nosites," vhich believes that it 
is -possible to reconcile these co-posing tendencies into a 
dynamic enuibrium through vhich both opnosites could be 
promoted at the same time although not to the same extent* 
la other words, the Chinese leaders conceive the dynamic 
equilibrium as a continuum between them in a mix in which 
one or the other orientation predominates in different 
•periods* Bins we might see China1 s conduct motivated in one 
period by mostly ideological considerations at the expense 
of the staire-to-state relations, then ve might see her policy 
in the middle of the continuum and suf ering from immo bill sine 
and just muddling through, or finally ?fe might see her em-
phasising friendly ties at the expense of support of revo-
lutionary movements at the other extreme -point of the spectrum* 
!fhe mechanism vhich enables Peking to move from one 
pole to the other of the spectrum is activated by the 
following elementsJ (1) the result of an internal power 
struggle within the leadership in Peking between ideologically 
radical and moderate elements, which enables the victorious 
faction to initiate nev policies; (2) Peking's assessment 
of the changing intentions and capabilities of the major 
powers in the area; (3) internal changes within the coun-
tries of the area and the changing attitudes of their 
governments towards China; (4) changing fortunes of revo-
lutionary movements operating in the area* 
'Phe second major point of this study is an assertion 
that while China's conduct toward Southeast *lsia after her 
foundation in 1949 was primarily based upon ideological 
considerations, the beginning of the seventies saw the 
national interest reasserting itself as the leading motive 
factor* Thus China talks with her neighbours in Southeast 
asia in terms of relevance of fllong historical ties," 
casting herself into the role of a benevolent "older brother11 
who is entitled to reopect and deference in exchange for 
patronage and protection* Hence the traditional echoes 
of the past are emerging ever stronger and influencing 
her postures towards the region, while the open support 
to revolutionary moevments is underplayed at the moment* 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Thesis is to undertake a study of 
foreign relations of the Peoplefs Bepublic of China (PRO) 
with the countries organised in the Association of South-
east Asian Mations (ASSAM) since the termination of her 
1 Cultural Be volution in 1969» 
The examination of the existing literature concerning 
China1s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia indicates 
that so far there is no single study available which would 
have focused upon Peking's ties with the countries of the 
ASSAM* Most of the available literature discusses China1s 
foreign policy towards the sub-continent of Southeast Asia 
as a whole, focusing mainly upon the protection of her 
national interest in global terms rather than upon the ideo-
logical motivation in her conduct, while other studies con-
cern themselves with Peking1s ties with a particular country 
of the sub-continent, treating these ties in the form of 
2 
a case study# 
Another shortcoming in the existing literature concerning 
Peking's policies towards Southeast Asia is the fact that 
its authors placed a great deal of attention upon the war 
in Vietnam and its implications for the policies of the 
major powers, particularly of China, while they ignored 
the "spill-over" effects of the war and their impact upon 
the countries neighbouring the immediate war theatre* In 
other words, an excessive attention has been placed on Peking's 
v 
relations with the continental and mainland area of South-
east Asia at the expense of studying its policies towards 
the peripheral and insular countries of the region* 
While these studies are useful in presenting us with a 
sectoral treatment of China1s policies south of her border, 
nevertheless there is a great need for a new approach which 
would present us with an overview of her aspirations precise-
ly in the countries bordering the former war theatre, i#e#, 
the countries now organised in the ASEAN. Moreoverf most of 
the available studies were written in the last decade, and 
are now by and large out date d. KLnallyf with the termina-
tion of military presence of the big powers in the area, 
there is a great need for a fresh appraisal of Peking1 s 
aspirations towards the ASEAN countries as they shape their 
own destiny in the aftermath of the Indochinese War* 
It was because of all these reasons, to close an im-
portant gap in the existing literaturef that this present 
study has been undertaken^ 
The first central point of this study is an assumption 
that the foreign relations of the Peoplefs Hepublic of China 
towards Southeast Asia have been motivated by a dynamic in-
terplay of two main factors! (1) MarxistsIjeninist ideology 
and Mao Tse-tung Thought, which dictate to China to behave 
as a revolutionary power which must assist the insurgent 
movements in the area in their struggle to overthrow the 
local governments; (2) national interest, which demands of 
China to safegurad the southern flank of her territory 
vi 
bordering on Southeast Asia through friendly relations, trade 
and other conventional instruments of diplomacy* 
While the two main motive factors are mutually anta-
gonistic and exclusivef the Chinese leaders are nevertheless 
attempting to bring them into a coherent policy under Maofs 
theory of the "unity of opposites11, which believes that it 
is possible to reconcile these op-posing tendencies into a 
dynamic equilibrium through which both opposites could be 
promoted at the same time although not to the same extent• 
In other words, the Chinese leaders conceive the dynamic 
equilibrium as a continuum between the two extreme poles, 
their policy fluctuating between them in a mix in which one 
or the other orientation predominates in different periods* 
Thus we might see China's conduct motivated in one period 
by mostly ideological considerations at the expense of the 
state-to-state relations, then we might see her policy in 
the middle of the continuum and suffering from imiaobilisime 
and just muddling through, or finally we might see her 
emphasising friendly ties at the expense of support of 
revolutionary movements at the other extreme point of the 
spectrum* 
The mechanism which enables Peking to move from one 
pole to the other of the spectrum is activated by the 
following elements: (1) the result of an internal power 
struggle within the leadership in Peking between 
radical and moderate elements, which makes the victorious 
faction to initiate new policies; (2) Peking1s assessment 
vii 
of the changing intentions and capabilities of the major 
powers in the area; (3) internal changes within the coun-
tries of the area and the changing attitudes of their 
governments toward Ohinaf (4) changing fortunes of revolu-
tionary movements operating in the area# 
The second major point of this study is an assertion 
that while China1s conduct toward Southeast Asia after her 
foundation in 1949 was primarily based upon ideological 
considerations, the beginning of the seventies saw the 
national interest reasserting itself as the leading motive 
factor. Thus China talks with her neighbours in Southeast 
Asia in terms of relevance of "long historical tiesf% casting 
herself into the role of a benevolent f,older brother" who is 
entitled to respect and deference in exchange jbr patronage 
and protection Hence the traditional echoes of the past 
are emerging ever stronger and influence her postures towards 
the region, while the open support of revolutionary movements 
is underplayed at the moment* 
In order to describe the manner in which these two main 
assertions of this Thesis are reflected in the conduct of 
China*s relations with Southeast Asia, the study organizes 
the material under the following headings: 
Chapter 1 describes the two main factors which motive 
her conduct towards Southeast Asia, 
Addressing itself to the whole range of elements which 
constitute China's traditional aspects of the national in-
terest towards the region, this Chapter deals with the 
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following topicsJ (1) question of historical continuity of 
her main values from period to period; (2) the external 
relations under the Tang %nasty based upon a concept of 
"checking the barbarians with barbarians11; (3) the external 
relations under the Ming Dynasty based upon the practice 
of lfTribute System11 as applied to her neighbours; (4) the 
external relations with Southeast Asia under the Ching 
%nasty; (5) and the policies of various diinese Govern-
ments towards the overseas diinese settled in Southeast Asia. 
Healing with the ideological factors which motive 
Peking1e conduct towards Southeast Asia, this Chapter deals 
with the theoretical concepts which call for and justify 
Peking's support to the revolutionary movements in the area. 
Chapter 11 surveysthe development of Peking's policies 
towards Southeast Asia from 1949 to 1969• This period start-
ted on a strong note in 1949 in which Peking was primarily 
interested in supporting the revolutionary movements 
in the overthrowing the existing systems in the area; in 
1955 Peking began to emphasize the national interest aspect 
in its foreign relations by promoting friendly ties with 
the local governments under the Bandung Spirit; from 1953 
to 1965 the Peking leadership muddled through a period of 
confusion and uncertainty; and between 1966 and 1969 China 
suffered a major internal convulsion under the Cultural 
ftevolution and in her ties with Southeast Asia returned to 
revolutionary fundamentalism* 
While Chapter 1 and 11 are introductory, Chapter 111 
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addresses itself to the central problem of our study$ 
i#e#f the analysis of the factors which were responsible 
for the profound transformation of the domestic as well as 
foreign policy outlooks of the Chinese leadership between 
1969 and 19719 and which in turn ushered in its present 
policies towards Southeast Asia. 
Dealing with the domestic factors, the diapter deals 
with the consolidation of the new leadership in the after-
math of the Cultural Hevolutionf and then with the power 
struggle and its main issues between the left radicals under 
M n Piao and the moderate faction under Ghou Efo-lai which 
resulted in the defeat of Idn and thus opened the way for 
a
 rapprochement with the United States after more than 
twenty years of hostility. 
Analysing the international factors which significant-
ly influenced the foreign policy making process in China, 
the Chapter deals with the implications of the -<i- on ^ootrine 
for Peking policies; the withdrawal of American military 
presence from Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the end 
of the war in fietnam; with the worsening of the Sino~ 
Soviet relations and armed confrontation of these two 
Communist powers on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers} and finally 
with the emergence of the Soviet Union as the main challenger 
of Peking1s policies in Southeast Asia* 
The last section of this Chapter surveys the responses 
of Peking to all these domestic and international developments 
and how these reflected themselves in a new set of policies 
X 
designed by the diinese towards the area of our study. 
In view of this the section, undertakes a country-by-country 
survey of relations of China with governments of the ASEAN 
countries, which started with ffping-pong diplomacy11, and 
then ranged across the whole spectrum of policy postures 
from the establishment of full diplomatic relations with 
Malaysia in 1974 to much improved but still uneasy ties 
with Indonesia and Singapore. The increasing emphasis which 
Peking is placing upon the relevance of "historical ties11 
for its present day relations with these countries is 
highlighted. 
The last Chapter of this study, Chapter 1?, focuses 
upon the big power alignments which have emerged in the 
area and Peking1 s response to thenu It explains the reasons 
which make China to insist that the Americans must maintain 
in the area a small but credible military presence; discusses 
the factors making the big powers interested in the area 
in the future; explains the essence of the Soviet plan 
on Collective Security in the area and the internationali-
zation of the Malacca Straits through which the Kremlin 
hopes to extend its influence there; explains the origin and 
purpose of Malaysia1s plan on neutralisation of the area and 
responses of the great powers to it, with a particular 
emphasis upon Peking1s reaction^ 
The Conclusion summarises and generalizes upon the 
most important findings of this study, and makes a tentative 
assessment of the possible development of Peking1s policies 
xi 
towards the area in the future. 
Concerning the material used in the preparation of 
this study, every effort has been made to draw upon the 
primary sources published in China and other countries of 
Asia, which are available at Brock University, and the 
Department of East isian Studies at University of Toronto 
and York University# In this connection 1 have translated 
from Chinese many quotations and other references used in 
this study• Moreover, because of my own translations and 
general usages of certain standard terms can not accurately 
express their meaning in Chinese, 1 have used diinese charac-
ters in the text when appropriate to avoid confusion. 
finally my many thanks to Professor Victor M# fie 
who has assisted me in the formulation of this study. 
St. Catharines, Wang~chun> Mg 
April 15, 1976^ 
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CHAPTER 1 
MAIN8 FACTORS 
DBTEHMINING TH5 P0L101S3 OP CHINA 
TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The policies of the Peoplefs Republic of China toward 
Southeast Asia are determined by a dynamic interplay of two 
main motive factors; one, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism 
and Mao Tse-tung Thought; second, the national interest. 
While the ideological factor is relatively easy to under-
stand, the national interest factor is far more complex 
because it consists of three elements. 
The first element is the need of China to safegurad 
her territorial integrity on her southern border through 
the conventional political, diplomatic and military means* 
The second element is the most inner needs of China to 
re-assert her role as a great power in the area which is 
entitled to respect and deference from her minor southern 
neighbours* These needs are the echoes of the past which are 
being increasingly evident not only in the formulation of her 
postures towards Southeast Asia but also in the style of her 
conduct in dealing with the individual countries of the area# 
These elements of her national and traditional culture, style 
and ritual are clearly evident in her conduct since 1971 in 
the form of paternalism, magnanimity and a sense of historical 
greatness, which make Peking to emphasize China1s "historical 
2 
ties" with her neighbours and their great relevance in 
the present day situation, and as possible models for the 
future« 
The third element of national interest which motivates 
China1s policies toward Southeast Asia are the 12 million 
overseas diinese who live in all countries of the area. For 
historical and cultural reasons China cannot write them off 
but must protect them because they ire re, aref and shall be 
considered as the living extension of her cultural self 
into the area. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to deal with the ideologi-
cal factors motivating the conduct of China towards Southeast 
Asia, as well as to explain the motives which in the past 
had informed her foreign policy outlook and which are having 
an ever increasing influence upon the formulation of her 
present day national interest and her emerging role of a 
"benevolent power1* in the area* The Chapter thus discusses 
the problem of continuity in .diinese history, the main 
characteristics of the Tang, Ming and diing concepts of 
foreign relations and the tribute system practised by them 
towards Southeast Asia; then it deals with the overseas 
Chinese and the protective role played by China in the past; 
and finally the ideological factors are analayzed, 
(1) THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUITY IN CHINESE HISTORY: 
Writing in 1969$ John K# Pairbank posed a question 
about the historical continuity in the Chinese foreign policy: 
3 
"If we ask the long-term question—flttiat is 
China1 s tradition in foreign policy?—-our query 
may provoke two counter-questions: M S the 
diinese empire ever have a conscious foreign 
policy? Even if it did, hasnft Mao's revolution 
wiped out any surviving tradition?"! 
Indeed, historical continuity and discontinuity in 
the foreign policy of Communist China is an extremely com-
plicated problem, and it has been said that "it is stale 
and unprofitable to argue for continuity against discontin-
2 
uity, and equally so to argue the reverse." 
Some scholars, such as Benjamin Schwartz, who disagree with 
the theory of continuity, argue that "while a traditional 
CSiinese concept of the world proved remarkably durable over 
the centuries, it has been largely discarded today.11^ Ojha 
also maintains that both tradition and Confucian ideology no 
longer constitute operational factors in foreign policy 
formulation of contemporary China.4 He says that China, due 
to her long history of being "bullied" by imperialists and 
due to her painful Japanese occupation, has became nationalist 
and that it was this experience of humiliation and suffering 
that turned her policy-makers to nationalism to seek the 
status of a big power which should be recognised by others* 
Examination of literature which denies the importance 
of traditional influences on the present policy formulation 
of China reveals that most of the works agree with Albert 
Feuerwerkerfs view: 
"Even if the embassies of Richard Nixon and Tanaka 
Kakuei to the Peoplefs Republic of China were 
not sufficient evidence to lay to rest this 
vision of a People's Middle Kingdom, it 
4 
would still be highly questionable that these 
alleged continuities from the imperial past are 
operative factors in shaping today1s foreign 
policy."5 
The core problem is not, however, whether these "alleged 
continuties are decisive11 or, as Peuerwerker says, "operative." 
The question is "to what extent" the present foreign policy 
of China is being affected by the traditional factors in 
the form of subtle psychological values, attitudes and per-
ceptions deeply internalized in the consciousness of her 
present day leaders• It is from this perspective that the 
present writer argues in favour of the proposition that 
the foreign policy conduct of China today is influenced to 
some measure by traditional elements inherent in her culture 
and past experience. 
Firstly, although the diinese Bapire "had no foreign 
office and the dynastic record of the * foreign office1 is 
fragmented under the topics like border control, frontier 
trade, punitive expeditions, tribute embassies, imperial 
benevolence to foreign ruler and the like#.#lff it would be 
a mistake to ignore the influence of the tribute system of 
the Empire on the mere ground that China did not have the 
7 
same form of foreign contacts as the ?festem countries had» 
We might dislike the Sinocentric attitude evident in the 
imperial diinese history, but we cannot ignore its influence 
and impact upon the present leadership of China. 
Secondly, as far as leadership of the People's Republic 
is* concerned, the watershed period between the late Ghing 
Hynasty and the Republican period is relevant and meaningful 
5 
to the understanding of the influence of traditional values 
upon its present conduct: 
f,
.## (the Peoplefs Republic of) China's leaders, 
though in ideological disagreement on certain 
issues, including many aspects of foreign policy, 
are all middle-aged or elderly men* All have been 
educated in large if varying degree within 
the intellectual and historical framework of tra-
ditional Chinese society; all are nationalists! 
most appear to have a singularly limited knowledge 
of much of the outer world (Chou En-lai obvious-
ly may be the exception); all appear to be cons-
cious of their historical heritage."8 
And lastly, we must not overlook the great capacity 
of China to absorb, mold and transform, and thus Sinicize, 
nearly every social phenomenon. We have seen that the process 
of Sinici^ation of Marxism-Leninism was completed at the 
9th Party Congress in 1969> when the Thought of Mao Tse-tung 
were declared to represent the new ideological system of China. 
In fact, many scholars consider this system closer to the 
value system and practices of the Confucian tradition than 
Q 
to Marxism-leninism, based upon European categories. We 
have also seen that almost every social institution in con-
temporary China, although it had been originally predicated 
on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, has been by now 
completely Sinicized, and good foundations have already 
been laid in 1971 to Sinicize her relations with Southeast 
Asia, based upon the assertion of her traditional role of 
a benevolent older brother who is entitled to respect and 
deference in exchange for patronage and protection. 
(2) THE TANG CONCEPT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: 
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It would be impractical to trace the historical back-
ground of China's foreign relations to the very early days# 
China was not a true and great aapire until the Tang %mas-
ty when the Empire was consolidated by Tang Kao Tsu (/£ i<?7 ?£) • 
The significance of the Tang is that, politically, it tamed 
the northern normadic peoples of the Jung (A/)# $i (fa)$ 
and later Hu C£)]); the Man (^ f) in the south and then the 
Chiang (Jb) in the west. These "barbarians" no longer presented a 
threat to the "Chung Yuan" O^/jj^ ), or the Central Plain 
area, where the Bnpire was situated. Since this consolidation 
of the Bipire, the concept of unity was a central idea of 
her self-image. As C.P. Fitzgerald puts' it: 
"From the Tang period onward the Chinese state 
remained far more ofter united under one dynasty 
than divided between two or moret the ideals of the 
united empire came to be regarded as normal and 
right, and these ideals were based on the traditional 
Chinese concepts, which made the empire the synonym 
of the civilised world* treating all beyond 
diina as barbarians.M" 
The unity of the diinese Empire was achieved throughout 
her history by two means: the demographic strength of the 
diinese population and the geographical contiguity of the 
two halves of the country. Under these circumstances and with 
the unity of the written language, the Chinese culture 
began to flourish and mature during the Tang ^f nasty. This self-
image of historical greatness and cultural superiority of 
the Itopire was preserved down to the Ching Itynasty* The 
loman Bipire had certainly a similar greatness and expan-
sion, but its creativity was terminated by the Bark Ages* 
Moreover, the bilingual Roman Supire had found its unity 
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shaken, while China, on the other hand, did not have the 
problem of language which was crucial for effective and 
sustained rule. However, the most important factor which 
accounted for the continuity of the diinese Bapire was the 
ability of the Chinese to absorb the conquered people, to 
Sinicize them through the imposition of the unified writing 
system and Confucian ideology and to incorporate their 
elites into the imperial system. The Chinese did not leam 
from the "barbarians", but taught them to read and write. 
It was during the Tang period that the diinese Empire 
initiated contacts with foreign countries. Traders from 
12 
other parts of the world came to China. These residents 
served useful purpose in the Middle Kingdom but they held 
no position of equality. Such an attitude might seem arrogant, 
but it should be noted that the Qhinese Bapire at that time 
was not only self-sufficient in all aspects, but superior. 
Being such a safe and great Sipire, the Tang Biperors had 
no necessity and desire for any imports from outside. The 
self-contained Bapire also had no intention to conquer the 
1^ 
other distant lands which, in its eyes, should be kept afar. -* 
In short, being self-centered and inward oriented, 
the frontier areas were to "keep the barbarians" out of the 
Middle Kingdom and under the control of the court, and 
when necessary, use force to pacify thenu The central idea 
of the Tang in its relations with the border areas, we may 
say a form of foreign policy, is best described by a princi-
ple of "playing-off one barbarian against another" (Ye-Yee-
8 
Tse-Yee) ( ^ A ^ ^ J H K 
(3) THE MING AMD ITS TRIBUTE SYSTEM: 
Since the main concern of this. Thesis is the discussion 
of relations of China towards Southeast Asia, an inquiry 
should be made also into the Ming %nastyf which broadened 
the contact between the Etepire and the Southeast Asian 
countries^ The ling %nasty is important in this discussion 
because it was during this period that the "tribute system" 
was imposed frequently upon the neighbours of China. Inherited 
from the concept of the Tang Bipire, the Biperors of the 
ling followed the "rule of the Tang." 
External effort to conquer this Etopire by force might 
have been successful at times, for examples the Kin (/^N) 
Tartars and the Mongol invasions, but they were unable to 
rule long. 
When Hung-wu (y-TC^/), the founder of the Ming %nastyf 
consolidated his rule after ousting the Mongols, he started 
to gradually seek contact with Southeast Asia. In the year 
of 1371 his edict addressed to the states outside his Empire 
proclaimed the "Idea of Impartiality" (^^fjJ^B^) toward 
kings in the then Southeast Asia: 
"In the past, when the emperors ruled ail-
under-Heaven, all who were lit by the sun and 
moon, whether near or far, were treated with 
impartiality (i-shih t'ung-jen). Thus with China 
stable and peaceful, (the countries in, Ed.) all 
four directions were in their submission 
^o Qaina#ft16 
Such ideal was based on the concept of the tribute system 
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which was !,&n extension to the inter-state relations of the 
principles governing relations between individuals." ' In 
fact, thesetributary relations had existed long before 
the Ming Igrnasty. Putting i* in simple terms, the tribute 
system was different from the concept of the nation-state system 
in the sense that it: 
"••* involved both rights and duties:. China 
had the responsibility of maintaining pro-
per order in this family. She recognized tjje 
junior members (the external vassals) ( H ^ ) 
fwei-fan) by sending special emissaries to offi-
ciate at the investiture of new tributary kings 
and to confer on them the imperial patent of 
appointment. China also wenVto their aid in 
time of trouble;***"18 
Thus, such a system was based not on the recognition 
of equality among sovereign states as in the West, but was 
19 
considered as a father-son or senior-junior relationship." ^  
Based on the concept of Impartiality, the system of 
father-son relationship was continuously and without obs-
truction practised by Biperor Hung-wu toward the periphery 
of China from Korea down to Southeast Asia. However, the 
system, was disturbed in 1377, when Emperor Hung-wufs envoy 
to Srivijaya (Java) was killed; this made the "Son of 
Heaven" ( £ 3- ) angry, making him immediately change his 
attitude toward the Javanese king who had dared to refuse 
to submit. Hung-wu declared: 
"Should the Son of Heaven became violently angry, 
(he can) send an officer with an army of ten 
thousand to execute divine judgement fas easily 
as the turn of his palm*.*1 Only Srivijaya obs-
tructs our influence*** This pitty little coun-
try, by daring to be willful and refusing to 
submit, seeks its own destruction***"20 
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Following this proclamation', Java was invaded and fell 
into the hands of the diinese and remained under them for 
about two hundred years* Later, the diinese who lived there 
followed "piracy as a calling, using the ports as retreats 
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and strong points#" 
Comparing the two proclamations of Hung-wu, it is under-
standable that the Idea of Impartiality was not an empty-
word but a concept of superiority backed with force. 
Following Hung-wufs death, his son Yung-lo (^^>x) 
went one step forward1 to tighten the relations of China 
with Southeast Asia. The powerful naval forces that he 
inherited from his father provided him with an effective 
tool for naval expeditions in Southeast Asia: 
"Yung-lo went further. His envoys were asked 
to persuade all countries to submit to China. 
To Southeast Asia he first sent bureaucrats, 
but he soon turned to his trusted eunuchs to 
bring his largesse to the various rulers. This 
policy was partly to cut down the rigid formu-
lities, administrative restrictions, and 
Confucian scruples and partly to simplify the 
tributary relationship by making it between one 
ruler and and another, not involving the
 2o 
submission of one government to another." 
Started in 1430, Yung-lo sent his first Eunuch Yin 
21 Chfing as envoy to Malacca with presents of silk brocade. ^  
However, more important were the expeditions of 1405, 1407, 
1409, 1414, 1417, 1421 and 1431 when the Emperor sent 
the Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho seven times to make his voyages 
do?/n to Southeast and West Asia. Cheng Ho was thus praised 
as the builder of fame of the Ming court among the kings in 
Java, Calicut, Siam, Malacca, Ceylon and Bast Africa, becoming 
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a legend among the overseas Chinese up to the present days* 
Snperor Yung-lofs justification for promotion of the 
tributary rule was no longer based on his father1s Idea 
of Impartiality* Rather, it was based on a new "Idea 
of Inclusiveness": 
"This was the practice of giving largesse 
and hospitability in order to fshow nothing 
left out1 or fshow no other separation1 
(^JlH) (shih-wu-wai)."25 
A detailed investigation of the reasons for Yung-lofs 
ambition explains that the sending of envoys to Southeast 
Asia was not accidental. It is true that many historians 
do not regard his practice of tributary system as expansioni-
sm, for there was no intention of Yung-lo to bring these 
areas under his rule, and that while the Idea of Inclusive-
ness might sound Sinocentric and arrogant, it was merely an 
intention of the Siperor to know the outside world. In actual 
fact, however, had Yung-lo continued the maritime expansion 
after Cheng Hofs expeditions, it was very possible for the 
Ming court to achieve the status of the most powerful naval 
power, or the first colonial po?/er, in Asia. J.D. Frodsham, 
when examing the foreign relations of the Imperial China, 
identifies this possibility quite clearly: 
"The importance of these expeditions, which were 
probably intended to bring most of the known 
civilized world under the suzerainty of the Chinese 
tributary system can hardly m over-estimated. Had 
they continued, the whole history of Southeast Asia 
might well have been entirely different, since 
it is doubtful whether the European powers, Por-
tugal, Spain and Holland would have succeed in 
establishing themselves in that region in the teeth 
of diinese opposition. Ejy the fifteen centuxy there 
were already considerable colonies of Chinese— 
the nucleus of the present overseas Chinese—scattered 
throughout Southeast Asia. If China had chosen to 
develop her maritime power, to proceed systemati-
cally with the colonization of the rich lands 
to her south and resist all intruders, the result 
on both Chinese, and Euro-oean history would 
have been incalculable*"27 
fhy then the Ming court ceased to continue its maritime 
expansion after 1430? ?lhile it was possible that "China1 s 
long development had already reached its height and matu-
rity on a self-contained and stabilized basis while Europe1a 
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great expansion was just getting started***,H a more con-
vincing explanation is given by Frodsham: 
"The Confucian literati, jealsus of the power 
and presitage of the eunuchs who had been 
primarily responsible for these voyages, 
succeeded in having the expeditions discontin-
ued on the ground that fthe treasure that 
was lavished on these undertakings brought no 
profit in return1, dismantled the fleets, abandoned 
the overseas diinese to the fate that was later to 
overtake them at the hands of the Spanish and 
Axtch* and most important of all, forced China into 
an isolationist policy form which she was not 
to emerge for close to four centuries and 
a half.,,29 
Frodsham1s analysis is convincing because throughout 
the imperial history of China the eunuchs were the only 
people near to the Saperors, continuously under attack 
from the court ministers and the gentry class. 
Thus we conclude that the Ming contacts with South-
east Asia ?/ere really based upon the old concept of "rule 
like the Tang", and that the imperial Mng fs intention was 
really to bring the area to submission to the court through 
the tributary system. An important element of this tributary 
system was the fact that the rule must be based upon an 
old Confucian maxim to the effect that the Biperor must 
13 
rule his vassals and protected states by virtue (te) (4C*)* 
and that he must safegurad the specific status of each 
of them in the hierarchy of the "protected states"* More 
over, should this "pecking order" be disturbed, or should 
the vassals refuse submission, then the Saperor could use 
force to restore harmony and order in the tributary system. 
However, unlike the European powers who practised 
colonial invasions and direct rule over the subgucated people, 
the Ming court did not want to make this area its colonies 
in the Western sense* 
(4) THE CH1NG AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
Imperial China1s tributary system continued during 
the Kanchu period (1644-1919)• Chfien Lung (3fiL?t)$ on^ 
of the greatest rulers of the Ghing %nasty, liked nothing 
better than to be compared with Tang Tfai Tsung (/fc^JrOt 
10 the true founder of the Tang* The Ching %nasty remained 
most of the time self-sufficient and needed nothing from 
the outside in its early reign*, This could be seen from 
Ghfien Lungfs letter sent to the British King George 111 
in 1793$ when the former refused his request for permanent 
11 diplomatic and easier trade relations* 
It was this tradition of the Imperial China, which be-
came soon a burden, which made the Ching Biperors to feel 
superior, to stand "intact, aloof, uninterested in the West, 
unwilling to lear, unable to believe that the barbarians 
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had anything of value to communicate#fM This imperial 
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attitude, hoffever, could not be maintained long. The later 
days of the nineteenth century saw continuously the confron-
tation between the Western concept of the nation-state and 
the tributary system, which placed diina under an increasing 
pressure of the West to give up the old practices* 
However, the Southeast Asian kings continued sending 
the tributary missions to the Ching court even during the 
declining years of the Ching Ikpire^ It was not until the 
onset of Western imperialism, when most of Southeast Asia became 
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occupied by the colonial powers, ^  that local rulers termina-
ted their tributary relation® with the Hanohu Government* 
The regulations of the Ching tribute system were slightly 
different from the Ming's*. Whereas the ling court's real 
intention was to bring to submission the vassals and to 
regard the® as distant, separate and incomparable to the 
Imperial (laina, the Ching tributary regulations were modified* 
Pairbank summarized this remarkable system as follow: 
"(a) non-Chinese ralers were given a patent of 
appointment and an official seal for use 
in"correspondence; 
(b) they ?irere given a noble rank in the Ching 
hierarchy; 
(c) they dated their communications by the 
Ching calendar, that is by the Ta Ching 
(* ^\ ) (Great Ching) reign title; 
(d) they ^ presented tribute memorials of various 
sorts on appropriate statuary occasions; 
(e) they also present a symoblic tribute 
(~%) (kung) of local products; 
(f) they or their envoys were escorted to court 
by imperial poet; 
(g) they performed the appropriate ceremonies of 
the Ching court, notably kotow; 
(h) they received imperial gifts in return; 
and 
(i) they were granted certain privileges at the 
frontier and at the capital."34 
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Understandably, the Ching court in its later years 
treated these tribute missions with greatest importance in 
the hope that its vassals would not fall under the control 
of the colonial powers, and between 1840 and 1908 the tribu-
te missions continued to arrive from Korea, Siam, lima, 
Vietnam and Nepal* 
However, the Ching practice of the tributary system 
since the end of the Opium War of 1840 changed from demands 
for submission to dealing with the vassals in terms of 
strategic considerations. 5r signing the unequal treaty 
of Nanking with Britain in 1841, causing the perpetual 
leasing of the Hong Kong island, the Ching ruler realised 
that the external vassals could play an important role in 
protecting the Sapire from further territorial loss under 
the pressure of the "gun-boat" policy of the Western powers* 
The later Ching Baperors therefore sought practical ways 
to protect diina1s southern border by treating the vassals 
as "buffers**1 
Under the pressure of the Western potters the court 
ministers realised the importance of the defence aspects of 
the tribute system, as aptly stated by one of the Ching 
officials: 
f,The border provinces are diina1 s gates: the 
tributary states are China1 a walls. We build 
the walls to protect the gates to secure the 
house* If the walls fall, the gates are 
endangered; if the gates are endangered, the 
house is shaken. f,35 
In view of the defense function of the tribute system 
it would be wrong to believe that the Ching court was so 
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naive as to use this system only in order to "protect11 
itself from contacts with the f,barbariansft* The best 
illustration of this point is the' fact that the flOffice 
of the Barbarian Affairs11 (*f yfrtij) (Li-Ban-Yuan) was 
abolished in the later days of the Ching %naatyf and 
instead a new Office of Foreign Affairs (i$.1f&]{']) 
(Tsungli Yamen) was established in 1888* However, because 
of the long time isolation of the Imperial diina, the Ching 
court lacked the necessary diplomatic knowledge and experience 
to deal with the "barbarians11, particularly the Western 
powers now entrenched in Southeast Asia and diina herself* 
Created and controlled by Li Hung diang, the Tsungli Yamen 
was not as successful as expected because the f,old 
hands11 of the tributary system were managing the organisa-
tion. Perhaps, the Ching court was really too slo?# to 
xeam* 
% the end of the century not only the tfwallstf .and the 
flgates,f of the Middle Mngdon were unprotected, but even 
the "house11 itself was flown opened and shakened^ Siam 
terminated her tribute mission in 1853$ Buna in 1875, 
Vietnam in 1883 and Nepal in 1908. 
Although the tribute system had many advantages, at 
times it turned into a burden. As early as the Ming %nasty 
it was reported that as one of the reasons that led to the 
downfall of the Ming %nasty was the obligations of the 
tribute system to protect its vassals: 
"One of the causes for the dawnfall of the Ming 
dynasty said to be its extensive military aid 
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to Korea in her defense against the Japanese 
invasion under Hideyoshe at the end of the 
sixteenth century* itelief missions from diina, 
with messages of sympathy and commiseration from 
the emperors, were often sent to the tributary 
states, in the wake of such natural calamities 
as famines, flood, droughts, and typhoons*1137 
As this brief survey indicates, China in the past 
had extensive contacts with Southeast Asia through a system 
of tributary relations, which clearly defined the respon-
sibilities of the protecting power as well as the duties 
of the protected states*- China sa?i? herself at the center 
of this system as the most powerful f,elder brother", who 
was entitled to respect, deference and recognition for her 
special role* 
While this role of China came under criticism from 
her present leaders in the past, after 1971 the theme echoing 
her special relations with Southeast Asia is emerging ever 
stronger in her dealing with various countries of the area* 
The most recent evidence of this trend are the speeches 
exchanged in Peking during the visit of President Marcos 
of the Philippines in 1975, in which both the diinese 
leaders as well as Marcos placed emphasis upon the "special 
historical ties11 between the two countries* It must have 
been music to Peking leaders to hear Marcos saying that 
diina is the "natural leader of the Third \fdrldfft including 
Southeast Asia, implying that she should so be recognized 
and listened to. 
If this trends continues, it can be expected that 
China would re-assert her traditional influence in Southeast 
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Asia not through the force of arms but through casting 
herself into the traditional role of the older brother 
who would demand from her proteges to play supporting 
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roles* * Speaking in a contemporary idiom, China would appear 
building on her periphery a sub-system of friendly states 
?/hich would be based upon an ever increasing assertion 
of her traditional role in Asia* 
Moreover, since the Southeast Asian countries are the 
border areas of China, and since traditionally diina had 
been practising the policy of f,playing-off the barbarians 
against each other11, her present leaders appear to maintain 
this concept as the best means for attaining balance of power 
in the area. It is not, therefore, surprising that Peking 
is using these countries to check the Soviet Union and its 
ambitions in the area at the present time* 
This trend is also clearly evident in her effort to 
check the increasing penetration of Southeast Asia by the 
Soviet Union through insisting that the Americans must 
maintain their military presence in Asia, but small enough 
as not to threaten her and big enough as to nose deterent 
to the Soviets in the area* 
(5) OflRSEAS CHINESE; 
The overseas diinese are one of the great mysteries in 
modem Asia* In political sense, however, they are more 
than that* The departure of discussion in this section 
starts by asking the questions: How did these people happen 
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to settle in the "Ifanyang1^ (^ 7JI )
 f or the Southern Oceans 
of Asia? 
The overseas Chinese have been described in the past 
as the "Fifth Column" of the Oonmunist China; the flThird 
diina11^ and the "Jews of Southeast Asia". All these terms 
are inadequate and biased in describing the role of the over-
seas diinese in present Southeast Asia* 
The f,Piftb Column" term was used during the 1950's to 
describe the overseas Chinese unjustly as! a mere tool of 
Peking in its attempts to overthrow the local governments, 
and today this term has been dropped* The term "Third diina" 
can never describe truely the overseas diinese in this area. 
It is generally agreed that they are a cultural phenomenon, 
not a political one, and while they retain^ this Chineseness 
they are permanently settled in Southeast Asia which is cul-
turally much different. The term "Je?^ s of Southeast Asia" dif-
fers from the real Jews in the sense that the Je?/s are not 
an ethnic- kin to the people of one of the great powers of 
the Middle last; the diinese of Southeast Asia are Chinese, 
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and China is not far away. ^ 
Theoretically, the term overseas Chinese has been used 
by the diinese officials "to embrace ethnic diinese who 
could not claim any other national status in their foreign 
homes and thus, perforce, who were Chinese nationals by 
descent ."^ To a third party, however, the overseas %inese 
is being defined as "a person of some Chinese ancestry 
who views residence abroad as compatible with diinese cultural 
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identity and less certainly with some remote Chinese poli-
45 tical orientation." It is this latter definition that 
describes realistically the situation of the overseas Chinese 
in Southeast Asia* 
Be cause the overseas Chinese are considered by China as an 
extension of her cultural self into Southeast Asia, and 
because the overseas diinese constitute significant minorities 
in all countries of the area, the relationship between Peking 
and the governments of the area depends upon the treatment 
each of them accords to these people* If the treatment is 
mutually agreeable, then the relations are friendly} if the 
treatment is unfriendly, then the relations are tense and 
hostile. Thus diina1s ability to vield influence in Southeast 
Asia depends on how the Chinese minority in the region 
adjusts or is allowed to adjust to the new situation. 
Migration of Chinese to Southeast Asia began early in 
the Ming period, but the main wave was seen only when the 
change of dynasty from the Ming to the Ching occurred. The 
present Chinese in the area are mostly immigrants from the 
southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, x*ukien and Kwangsi, 
the great majority of them hailing from the first two provin-
ces* It was probably due to the growth of population in the late 
Ching period and the contiguity of these two provinces that 
accounted for this migration* 
Moreover, there was a political reason for this migra-
tion. Due to the anti-Manchu atmosphere among the Han (yk ) 
people in Pukien and Kwangtung, the Manchu treatment of 
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of them was harsh* However, it was only after 1786, when 
the British encouraged their settlement in the Malay Benin-
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sula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The 
Manchu Government issued a citizenship law in 1909, defining the 
diinese subject as "every legal or extra-legal child of a 
Chinese father or mother, regardless,of birth place*" ^  
thus setting down the principle of |us sanguinis as a basis 
of diinese nationality* This law was inherited by the Re-
publican, and later the Communist Government, of China** 
From 1860 to 1930 a tide of diinese migration flooded 
Southeast Asia* Disregarding the Manchu Law Code (^JN|H^]) 
(Ta-ching Lu-li) which prohibited migration outside China, 
the Chinese people in southeastern provinces gave up the 
ancestor worship which tied them to the ancestral villages 
and continued to migrate to Southeast Asia as labourers* 
Under the practice of "coolie-trade" most of them were sold 
to the Philippines, Malaya, Java, and other countries. As 
Lea E* William describe the background of this tradet 
"About the middle of the nineteenth century, 
Southeast Asia entered a period of quickened 
transformation* The decline of mercantilism had 
heralded the death of Dutch and British company 
rulej conditions hospitable to free trade 
appeared* Corresponding with the opening of 
greatly expanded opportunities for private 
investment was growing demand for Southeast Asian 
products to feed western industrialisation.** 
Tin, tobacco and later, rubber production doubled 
and redoubled. So rapid was economic expansion that 
chronic labour shortages appeared* Indigenous 
peasants, by and large, were reluctant to leave 
their villages to work under the disciplined and 
often harsh conditions of large-scale mining 
and estate agriculture. Labour had to be recruited 
outside the region. India sent immigrants, but 
China sent vast numbers."50 
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Thus the Chinese labourers worked mostly in the mines 
and plantations, and having succeeded in making a living or in 
accumulating property in one generation, the father would 
usually return to t'ie ancestral village in diina to retire, 
while the second generation took over* Such a pattern of 
migration continued until the forties, when the Chinese 
became "trapped11 and preferred to reside in Southeast Asia* 
Three important reasons made them choose to settle downs 
the business prosperity in the new countries; the continua-
tion of the Civil War in the homeland, and the need for labour 
in the area* 
In the course of a few decades, several important charac-
teristics emerged among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia* 
First, the overseas Chinese depended on the European 
powers for protection of their rights during the colonial 
rule, and when the colonial period was over the Chinese started 
to experience racial discrimination from the indigenous 
peoples* 
Secondly, the majority of the diinese people usually 
chose not to actively participate in local political process 
preferring to concentrate on the activities in the economic 
sphere instead* It was partly because of this that the local 
peoples in Southeast Asia after attaining independence 
controlled the political power, while the economic power to 
a large degree was in the hands of the diinese. And until 
today it is a big question among the overseas diinese whether 
they should participate actively in local politics so as to 
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protect their economic rights or not*, This dilemma is par-
ticularly serious in Malaysia, where the indigenous people 
are aware of the diinese economic power and the Kuala Lumpur 
Government has inssued special laws and regulations to prevent 
limit the diinese from accumulating incresing economic 
wealth. 
Thirdly, through the history of the overseas diinese 
migration there was no protection of their rights provided' 
by the home governments in diina* The Ching Government res-
tricted them to migrate, and during the Republican and Kuomin-
tang rules there rms Civil War which made it impossible to 
pay any attention to them from these diinese governments^ 
fourthly, the overseas Chinese always remained attached 
to their own traditional culture, especially preferring 
their children to receive Chinese education* The Nanyang 
University in Singapore was built in the 1950fs for such a 
purpose, when China terminated in 1349 the opportunities for 
the overseas diinese children to receive education there* 
This aspect, however, is becoming less and less significant 
now because the younger Chinese are under pressures from 
local governments to assimilate into the local cultures. 
All these factors then combined to produce an extreme-
ly complicated situation for both the Chinese minorities 
as well as the governments of the countries in which they 
live t 
"How should the Chinese minority be treated by 
host countries? How should the diinese 
behave as individuals and groups toward the 
national integrity and security concerns of 
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host countries? How and with what criteria should 
minority ethnic rights be protected? Shotild the 
1948 United Nations Human lights Declaration be 
respected in the protection of national sub-
cultures, languages and minority educational 
rights? What should be the long term loyalty 
attitudes on the part of the ethnic Chinese 
toward their land"'of ancestry? What assurances 
should be given and what policies should be pur-
sued by the diinese government to alleviate the 
fear aid concern for national security of many 
Southeast Asian countries? How can the countries 
in Southeast Asia continue to discriminate le-
gally against the Chinese in the field of 
commerce, business ownership, citizenship rights, 
and educational opportunities without aggravating 
inter-racial relations? Ho?/ can the Chinese 
groups in Malaysia and Indonesia, for examples, 
be convinced that they will be given equal*** 
police protection in time of racial conflict or other 
national crisis?"51 
While no attempt shall be make to answer these questions 
one by one, the problems faced by the Chinese can be grouped 
under three headings: economic, integration and political. 
The origin of the prejudices against the overseas 
Chinese in the economic sphere is based upon another myth 
created after the colonial era which alleges that they are 
"controlling" the economies of the countries in which they 
live* It is not my intention to argue the issue of "control" 
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and "ownership" of local economy here. However, the cen-
tral point of the issue is the following one: 
"•*• The Chinese, envied for their wealth and 
dominance in various field of economic life, find 
that preference is given to indigenous enterprises 
and that in certain fields alien (diinese* Id*) 
capital and skills are totally excluded."53 
The problem of integration concerns more the relations 
between the People's Republic of China and the ASEAIT countries 
in the sense that the Chinese minorities, particularly 
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those in Malaysia* the Philippines and Indonesia, are 
considered as "different people11* The problem arises from 
their "Chineseness" and their lack of the "we-group" feeling 
which is perceived by the indigenous peoples: 
"that is perceived as the •alieimess1 of the 
Chinese provides another theme in anti-diinese 
sentiments* In an atmosphere charged with appeal 
to national unity and nation-building, the 
diinese, whether China-born or not, a,re commonly 
felt to be •different1 from the rest of the 
population and this difference is held to be of 
quite a different order from the differences to 
be found among indigenous ethnic groups."54 
The political question of the overseas Chinese cons-
titutes the most serious problem which hinders further 
understanding between diina and the A^ KAlf countries. Their 
involvement in the insurgent activities after 1949 and their 
cultural identification with China allegedly constitute 
a "potential threat" to the governments of the ASEAN countries: 
"One reason for the suspicion directed against 
the Chinese is a widespread doubt as to their 
loyalty. Every state in Southeast Asia demands 
political loyalty of its citizens. The diinese 
are suspect not merely because they seem 
1
 foreign1, but also their country of origin is 
situated nearby and is larger and more power-
ful than the Southeast Asian states. The fear 
of a diinese 'fifth column1 has been lent 
colour by the extent to which the overseas 
Chinese have embraced Chinese nationalism* 
Successive diinese governments have claimed 
overseas Chinese as diinese citizens, even 
though these Chinese might never have 
visited China*"55 
New problems emerged for the Overseas Chinese with 
the establishment of the Peoplefs Republic of diina in 1949 # 
Peking did not abolish the Commission for the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs, a body dealing with the policy toward 
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the Chinese who had returned to diina and those still 
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abroad, and in fact encouraged them to be "patriotic 
toward the fatherland*" The policy also encouraged the 
overseas diinese to "join and unite" with local progressive 
forces to strengthen and consolidate the "international 
peaceful democractic united front,11 which in a very subtle 
way hoped to turn them into a tool promoting revolutions in 
Southeast Asia. 
On June 17, 1951, the People's Republic of China 
announced the following policies at the first Conference 
on the Overseas diinese sponsored by the Commission on Over-
seas diinese Affairs: 
"1* Unite all returned and overseas patriotic 
Chinese to support the Peoplefs Bepnhiio 
of China; 
2. J&cpand and encourage cultural interaction 
between overseas Chinese and local citizens; 
3* Mobilize returned Chinese and their families 
to participate in land reform and production; 
4* Give aid and financial support to returned 
diinese mhen needed* "57 
In 1954, the Peking Government formalized its policy 
toward the overseas diinese by inserting Article 98 in the 
Constitution which stated that China would protect the 
"legitimate rights and interests" of the overseas diinese. 
This policy, however, was amended shortly after the 
Bandung Conference in 1955 which marked a significant change 
from supporting revolutions in Southeast Asia to co-existence 
with the governments in power at that time for the following 
reasons* 
first* Peking became convinced that revolutions could 
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not be exported. Secondly, Peking realised that when the 
overseas diinese were involved in local revolutions, the 
movements could not win support from the local people. 
Thirdly, the fact that the overseas Chinese were only mino-
rity groups convinced the diinese Government that they 
could not effectively mobilise the local people for a 
revolutionary action* Moreover, if the overseas Chinese 
were to be active in local politics, they must not be consi-
dered as puppets of Peking* Most important of all, it was 
important for Peking to prevent the local governments from 
imposing any discriminatory measures against the overseas 
Chinese which would make them to terminate sending financial 
support to their relatives living in China* Peking realised 
that any discriminatory policies of the local governments 
would harm its economy, which depended to some extent on the 
overseas Chinese funds flowing into the fatherland. Accor-
ding to Stephen fitggerald, each year these overseas Chinese 
sent from 110 to 1100 million to their relatives in China, 
which was an important source of foreign exchange* 
It was in view of these factors that Peking changed' 
its policy of urging the overseas Chinese to promote revo-
lutions in Southeast Asia. The new policy was expressed by 
Chou In-lai on December 18, 1956, during his visit in 
Burma* In a speech given at an evening party in his honour 
by the local Chinese, Chou urged them to opt for one nationa-
lity, and then remain loyal to the country of their choice: 
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"In order to fully fulfill the spirit of the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Go-existence and 
to develop our friendly relations with the 
Southeast Asian countries, and to facilitate 
our people to reside and live.permanently in 
their countries, our first task is to fully 
resolve the dual nationality conflict in accor-
dance with voluntary individual preference. 
They must then be loyal to the country of their 
choice."oO 
This announcement did not imply that diina would give 
up protection of the overseas Chinese who had opted for 
maintaining their Chinese nationality when unreasonably 
discriminated against by the local governments. Accordingly, 
Peking was co-operative in the resettlement of the returned 
diinese who had difficulties in the countries of their 
residence, and as a result the Indonesian Chinese were well 
received in I960 by the Reception and Resettlement Commit-
tee, created in Peking with Eiao Cheng-chih as its Chairman 
on February 4 of the same year* 
The nationality problem is one of the most important 
issues that concerns the future relations between diina and 
the ASEAN countries. Except for Singapore,vfoere the Chinese 
are in the majority, the rest of the ASEAN countries are 
incapable of solving their diinese nationality problem* 
Although Peking repeated many times that it would give up 
its claim to the overseas diinese as its nationals, it is 
difficult for China to convince the ASEAN governments about 
her sincerity. 
The plight of the overseas Chinese is further complicated 
by the regulations governing their acquisition of nationality 
of the countries of their residence. If nationality is said 
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to be defined as "the legal and political tie which binds 
individuals to a state and renders them subject to its 
personal jurisdiction," the majority of the overseas 
diinese in the AS.iAN countries are sufficiently qualified 
to receive the local citizenships because they are willing 
to accept the fact that they are no longer Chinese nationals 
loyal to China. They are, however, incapable of convincing 
the local governments of this fact* 
International law gives rights to all governments to 
regulate nationality by municipal or domestic 3a?#* Thus the 
law of a state will determine the nationality of its sub-
jects* To the overseas diinese there are three ways to 
acquire their citizenships through jus soli* birth within 
the territory of the state; jus sanguinis* birth to a parent 
who is a national wherever'the birth occurs; and naturali^a-
tion, a process by which a state confers its nationality 
upon an alien after his birth, usually upon the alien1s 
request* 
China's position on nationality of the overseas diinese 
since 1949 has been vague• Legally, the Peking Government 
has inherited the nationality lairs of the Koumintang regime, 
and it appears that it is following the Republic of diina1s 
Nationality Act of 1929 which states that: 
"Any person whose father was, at the time of 
that person1s birth, a diinese national is 
himself a diinese national*"62 
Based on the principle of Ju£ sanguinis, the act also 
provides for the loss of diinese nationality when a Chinese 
30 
national wishes to acquire the nationality of a foreign 
country* This is, however, subjected to his obtaining a 
permisoion of the Ministry of Interior, which in the past 
was granted rarely. ^ 
The nationality issue is not so serious in Singapore 
and Thailand*, Since her independence in 1965 Singapore 
has, on the basis of jus soli* claimed all those who are 
born in Singapore as her nationals* Because of Thailand1s 
long history of successful assimilation, the overseas Chinese 
in this country are well integrated into the Thai society* 
The issue, however, is still unsolved and forms a barrier 
in the relations between Peking on the one hand and Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines on the other* 
The overseas Chinese in Indonesia remain a suspicious 
group to the indigenous Indonesians mainly because it is 
believed that Peking and the diinese community in Indonesia 
were involved in the "Gestapu" in 1965, when the local 
Communist Party attempted to take over power* The diinese 
in this country are now living as "warga negara asing", or 
non-citizens* They can become "warga negara Indonesia11, 
or citizens only through the process of naturalisation 
which is extremely difficult to attain. This, perhaps, was 
due to the Agreement of Dial Nationality signed with China 
in 1955s 
"In any event the dual citizenship agreement 
with diina has been recently described in the 
more or less official Indonesian Review of 
International Affairs ^ a T o n F T F the greatest 
blunders ever commited in Indonesian recent 
diplomatic relations• • * * * the agreement fim~~ 
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posed on all Indonesian citizens of diinese 
ethnic origin a second, but dominant, nationa-
lity, the nationality of a country for which 
the overwhelming majority of them was absolute-
ly alien, of a country they had never even visited 
but whose nationality they were assumed to possess, 
invalidating even their original Indonesian 
nationality*' There had been no reason*** 
for Indonesia to recognize the * diinese 
imperialist principle of jus sanguinis;f * * * 
it is hoped that by invalidating of the law 
would lead Indonesia to formally repudiate the 
principle of jus sanguinis and adopt the Princi-
p e of 3tis soli in its nationality"" law* "64 
The Philippines is "unique among the three countries 
(Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) in the nationality 
respect in the degree to which access to citizenship for 
the diinese has been restricted by judicial interpretation*fl 
Manila confers citizenship upon Chinese neither through 
jus sanguinis nor jus soli* The only way that these people 
might obtain citizenship is through naturalization* which 
is also extremely difficult to obtain* The 1933 Naturalisa-
tion Act sets out various qualifications which must be met 
by those applying for Philippine citizenship: 
"An applicant fmust be of good moral character1 
and "•must have conducted himself in a proper 
and irreproachable manner during the entire 
period of his residence in the Philippines in 
his relations with the constituted government 
as well as the community in which he is 
living* * * 
• * * Not only must the applicant for naturalisa-
tion qualify as something of a saint, he must 
also be wealthy*"66 
Malaysia has a more liberal approach to citizenship* 
This is perhaps due to the fact that 35 per cent of the 
population, who are diinese, are stronger in the economic 
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sphere * Compared with the Philippines and Indonesia, 
Malaysia has been wise to adopt the principle of jus soli, 
irrespective of Peking1s policy, insisting that all Chinese 
born in Malaysia are naturally Malaysian and not diinese 
nationals* 
The overseas Chinese will remain an unsolved problem 
to most governments in the ASEAN area# Unlike during the 
1950fs when relations with Indonesia were friendly and pro-
gressive, Peking would not enter into any formal treaty 
or agreement with respect to the status of the overseas 
Chinese * Bather, it is believed that China would make use 
of her influence, deriving from her status of a big 
power, to convince the ASIAN" leaders that it is in their 
interest to treat the overseas Chinese reasonably* To attain 
that, Peking would have to prove that it is not and would 
not support any activities of the overseas diinese which 
are detrimental to the interest of the local governments• 
(6) IDEOLOGICAL FACTOR: 
After examining the various aspects of the national 
interest, both strategic as well as traditional, we have 
to look at the nature of the ideological factor which plays 
a role in the foreign policy formulation of China as a 
revolutionary power towards Southeast Asia* 
Here again it is important to emphasise the degree of 
Sinicis&ation which Marxism-Leninism had suffered at the hands 
of the Chinese leaders in the course of decades, and to reali-
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m that Peking1s revolutionary aspirations towards Southeast 
Asia are not based upon the Soviet precepts but upon the 
concepts, ideas and formulaes of Maofs thoughts which are 
much closer to the ^ spirit of Chinese politics*, 
V/hile it is true that the Chinese leaders had accepted 
Marxist-Leninist ideology for mass-mobilisation in their 
revolution during the 1930fs and the 1940*8, it would be 
wrong to say that in the 1970fs Peking would like to see 
the revolutionaries in the world, and especially insurgen-
cies in the ASEAN countries, to borrow this essentially 
European ideology without the modifications wrought upon it 
by the experience of diina* While Mao had once embraced 
Marxism-Leninism as a means to save diina from her fatal 
destiny, it should be noted that in fact he only made use 
of this ideology to suit the Chinese case*, 
Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party, 
Mao was reluctant to submit himself to the Soviet interpre-
tation of Marxism* This was clearly seen from the Tsun-yi 
Conference (i^fi ^ i ^ i*i January 1935, when the Moscow-
trained "28 Bolsheviks" were ousted by Mao* Since this con-
ference he was able to shake off the influence of the Moscow 
faction, headed by Wang Ming, who were sent by Stalin in a 
last bid to mastermind the diinese Revolution and subordinate 
it to the national needs of the Soviet Union* Throughout the 
1930fs and 1940,s~he impressed his own ideas upon the doc-
trine and completely remolded it in the light of the tradi-
tional Chinese tactics of war, because h6 believed that the 
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indigenous experience was more applicable in the diinese 
conditions than the foreign theories and practices# 
Hence it is because of their own experience of revolu-
tion that the diinese leaders believe that its success would 
inspire the insurgent movements in Southeast Asia today, 
and reject the Soviet theories and practices for two reasons: 
first, diina does not proclaim as absolute the theory 
of "Peaceful Transition to Communism," as the Soviet Union 
ha.s done since 1956 because in Peking1 s view it is disarming 
the revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia by forcing 
them to give up militant struggle* diina is keen to distin-
guish the "peaceful co-existence" among states and "peaceful 
transition" to Communism as two diametrically different 
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things. She maintains that the former must be applied only 
at the diplomatic level among different countries, while 
the latter problem is for the local revolutionary movements 
themselves to decide. She simply regards the "peaceful transi-
tion" to Communism as an internal affair that should be 
decided upon locally* This means that Peking would support, 
and in fact does support, those revolutionary movements in 
the area frtiich had decided for militant struggle and tactics. 
Secondly, the Southeast Asian insurgencies and revolu-
tionaries find unwise to follow totally the ideological 
formulations of the Kremlin because they do not want to 
become tools of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chinese are 
wise not to use the term "Mao-chu-i" ( fy^tt) or Maoism, 
while the Soviets use the term "Leninism", the Rnssian in-
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terpretation of Marxism, to describe the "true" revolutiona-
ries* As Ross Terrill puts it: 
"They do not refer to non-Chinese as being 
•Maoists1, the way other communists readily 
refer to followers in various countries as 
Leninists. When referring to their followers 
and admirers in foreign countries the Chinese 
may say Revolutionaries1* .or friends of 
China* , but not fMaoistsf ft*68 
This is one of many ways in which the Chinese leaders 
are showing to the revolutionaries in Southeast Asia that 
they do not wish to impose their own ideology upon them, 
without considering its limiting application in other areas 
of Asia beyond the borders of China* 
The pragmatic uniqueness of China's own ideology is 
best seen when we consider) the main concepts applied by 
Peking in the ASIAN area* There are three outstanding elements 
of diina1 s own Communism in this regard* 
The first element is the notion of "Paper-Tiger11* 
Basing itself on its own experience of national liberation, 
Peking regarded the American military presence in Southeast 
Asia as ire 11 as all colonial rules there as a Paper-Tiger 
which could be defeated. Shortly after her own national 
liberation war in 1949, diina hoped that the Southeast Asian 
insurgencies would employ this notion in fighting for their 
own liberation* According to the diinese Communists, revo-
lutionaries should "despite the enemy strategically but 
69 take full account of him tactically*" 
Since the Bandung Conference of 1955 China developed 
another concept of international relations—the United-front-
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Prom-Above* It is designed "to win over all possible 
adherents; to neutralise those who will not come over and 
who might provide support to the enemy; and in so far as 
70 possible to isolate the enemy." Hence China's policy 
since the Bandung Ira was broadened to build up diplomatic 
ties not only with the Communist states but also the neutral 
countries in Southeast Asia* 
T#ith Lin Piaofs domination of the process of foreign 
policy formulation between 1965 and 1969, a new concept was 
evolved and applied towards the insurgencies in Southeast 
Asia* The concept ?ras called the strategy of "People1 s \farf% 
the essence of which was the call upon the Communist Parties 
in the area to mobilise the local people under the appeals 
of patriotism and social justice in order to overthrow the 
local elites for their co-operation with the American 
political and military authorities in the area* Thus the 
American political, economic and military presence in South-
east Asia was the prime target of this strategy, in order 
to break through the isolation and containment which 
Washington ?#as imposing against China* The revolutionary move-
ments received verbal and other support primarily in those 
countries in the area the governments of which were "collu-
ding with American imperialism11, which was threatening the 
security of China* Thus the central element of the strategy 
of "People fs War11 must be seen as a tool to detach away 
the local governments from the alignment with the United 
States, and to met out punishment to those who were too 
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slow or reluctant to severe the American "connection11* 
The most recent theoretical concept used by China in 
formulating her policies towards Southeast Asia is the 
strategy of the "Third torid". This strategic concept is 
based upon the assumption that while the United States 
ceased to present a threat to China1s security after the 
announcement of Nixon Doctrine and American defeat in 
Vietnam, since 1969 the Soviet Union is emerging as the 
main challenge to China's interests in the area* In vie?/ of 
this, the main objective of the "Third World" strategy in 
Southeast Asia is to organize a new united-front-from-above 
among the states to keep the Soviet influence at bay, to 
agree to a small American presence, and to diminish support 
to the revolutionary movements as a reward to these govern-
ments in the area who join Peking1 s anti-Soviet alignment* 
Thus by 1970 the process of Sinicization of diina1s 
relations with the revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia 
was accomplished, subjugating by and large and for the time 
being the support to them to the promotion of her national 
interest in the area* Thus all the theoretical concepts of 
Mao Tse-tung %ought—Paper-Tiger, United-Front-(Prom-
Above), People's War and the Third World—applied towards 
Southeast Asia must be seen more as tools designed to safe-
guard security of diina and less than ideological precepts 
for revolutions in this part of the world* How long this 
would remain so, and when and if China would re-assert the 
role of the revolutionary power, is another question, to be 
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touched upon in the conclusion of this study. 
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CHAPTER 11 
STAGES Of EVOLUTION OP PBTClWGf3 POLICIES 
TG^llD SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
1949-1969 
The evolution of diina1s policy towards Southeast Asia 
between 1949 and 1969 must be viewed in terms of the dialec-
tical interplay of two major motive factors: (1) Chinese 
Communism, which compels China to act as a revolutionary 
power making her to assist in every way the Communist Par-
ties in Southeast Asia in their efforts to overthrow the 
local governments and establish in their place Communist 
systems; (2) the national interest of China as a major power 
in the area which must protect her territorial integrity and 
cultural heritage and assert her historical role of a "bene-
volent and senior power" in the area# 
V/hile both these variables simultaneously influence the 
process of foreign policy formation of Peking, nevertheless 
one of them emerges as the dominant factor from time to time, 
giving a distinct character to the period in which it is 
paramount. Thus in one period Peking1s postures are full of 
revolutionary rhetorics as well as practical assistance to 
insurgent movements inciting them on the path of revolutionary 
struggle, while in another period Peking emphasises in its 
conduct the state-to-state relations, diplomatic ties, trade 
and cultural ties at the expense of support to the revolu-
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tionary movements whose activities are toned down for a time 
being. Thus there is a kind of pendulum swing in Peking1 s 
postures towards Southeast Asia, in which the periods em-
phasising peaceful co-esistence, co-operation and friendship 
alternate with the periods of abuse of the local governments 
and harsh calls for their overthrow* 
It is frequently impossible to clearly differentiate 
between these two variables which motivate Peking1s conduct 
towards Southeast Asia, because they often merge in what 
the Chinese Communists call the "unity of the opposites" 
and mutually reinforce each other* Ho?/everf for the purposes 
of our analysis it is possible to divide the evolution of 
Peking1s postures toward Southeast Asia between 1949 and 
1969 into periods in which one or the other motive factor 
appeared more pronounced, or periods of confusion in which 
the Peking leaders themselves were not clear in ordering 
their priorities, or the right mix, of the two apparently 
contradictory courses* 
THE DIALECTICS OW IfflBOLOSY AID NATIONAL INTBHBST 
Looking thus from these perspectives upon Peking1s 
postures towards Southeast Asia, the following periods may 
be indentified: (1) between 1949 and 1952 was the period in 
which the revolutionary and ideological motives clearly 
predominated; (2) between 1953 and 1957 was a period of the 
Bandung Spirit, in which emphasis upon peaceful co-existence 
and! co-operation on the state-to-state level predominated; 
(3) between 1958 and 1965 was a period of confusion and 
frustration, because of the unsettled domestic conditions; 
(4) from 1966 to 1969 was a period in which diina returned. 
to revolutionary activitiy both at home and abroad* 
(1) PBBIQB PROM 1949 TO 1952: JBEVOLUTIONAHY FUNDAMENTALISM: 
After the People*s ftepublic of diina had consolidated 
her power by driving out the Koumingtang to the island of 
Taiwan its leaders viewed their success as inaugurating a 
new stage in history in Asia* Daring this period, two 
reasons convinced the diinese leaders to emphasise the ideo^ 
logical and radical postures in their foreign policy toward 
Southeast Asia* 
The Chinese Communists were proud of themselves in 
winning the Civil War against Chiang Kai-shek and of their 
newly inedpendent republic, which emerged as a result of their 
tactics, and understandably wanted- their experience of revo-
lution to be recognized by their neighbours* They hoped that 
their model of revolution would gradually win the admiration 
of other peoples who were carrying on their liberation move-
ments in Southeast Asia, by then still under the colonial 
control or else newly independent* The colonial and "bour-
geois" governments in the area were of course not favoured 
by the newly born Communist giant* As a result, China1 s foreign 
policy during this period was mainly determined by ideologi-
cal considerations aiming at the promotion of revolutionary 
movements* However, her national interest entered soon into 
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the picture to secure herself against external danger. Ear-
ly in 1950 diina concluded a Treaty of Kriendship for thirty 
years with the Soviet Union, then in October 1950 entered 
into the Korean War* Her foreign policy at this time was re-
garded as one of "leaning to one side", i*e., to the Soviet 
Union, based upon the theory that the ?#orld was divided into 
two hostile camps: 
11
 Bjy 1949, the anti-facist alliance of World War 11 
had broken apart, and the Gold War between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was well under way* 
The two superpowers and their allies faced each 
other across Europe; and in Asia, established 
governments, some colonial and others newly indepen-
dent, battled communist party-led wars of national 
liberation* In a matter of months, international 
politics had taken on a bipolar configuration with 
the United States and the Soviet Union at swordd1 
points around the world."! 
Seeing the United States supporting the Taiwan Govern-
ment and perceiving American policies as a threat to her 
periphery, China's principles of foreign policy were three-
fold: (a) unify the country ami defend the diinese border; 
(b) build a Communist society in diina; (c) encourage the 
liberation struggles of the Communist parties in Southeast 
Asia* Thus the dominant character of diina*s relations with 
the ASSAN countries during the period from 1949-1952 was 
seen as aggressive and radical, persistently urging that 
revolutions should be carried out by the local Communist 
Parties. 
Earlier in 1947 it was reported that the Secretary Gene-
ral of the Malayan Communist Party^ Chin Vengf and a group 
of his colleagues, had travelled to Hong Kong and diina to 
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seek advice from the diinese Communist Party**"* As a result 
and two years later in 1949, the Malayan Com moist Party, 
following the call from China, set down the party1 s program 
to struggle for a Malayan Peoplefs Democratic Itepublic which 
was in fact copied from the Chinese model of "New Democracy". 
Baring this time Thailand remained a revolutionary 
backwater because the liberal regime of Pridi Phanamyang 
was overthrown in 1947 and Pridi fled the country, turning 
up in Peking in 1954# Because of this there was not much to 
4 be expected from Thailand* 
In the Philippines, however, China supported the Com-
munist oriented Huk movement* The latter, inspired by the 
success which the Chinese Communists attained in 1949, also 
called for revolution to overthrown the Manila Government* 
Turning to Indonesia, she became one of the most im-
portant allies of Peking during the decade since 1949, because 
of similarities learnt in fighting for independence • through 
armed struggle* Although the Chinese Communist Party had won 
power through civil war while the Indonesian nationalists 
through driving out the Bitch colonialists, both countries 
recognised each other shortly after attaining independence 
in 1949• However, when China sent her first Ambassador to 
Djakarta she clearly demonstrated her aggressive attitude 
by exceeding all bounds of diplomatic propriety by letting 
her Ambassador to make public speeches criticising the poli-
cies of the Indonesian Government then under the control of 
the anti~Communist Sukiman cabinet. 
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i!he post-liberation policy of diina was limited in scope 
primarily to the countries of the Communist World, the coun-
tries on China1s borders, and other colonial and semi-
colonial countries in Southeast Asia* It is, therefore, un-
derstandable that diina was impatient about her southeastern 
neighbours and their slow process of liberating themselves 
from the external colonial control as well as internal 
"bourgeois" rule* airing this time, moreover, diina and the 
Soviet Union ire re honeymooning* Moscow agreed that Peking 
should play a more active and important role in the sphere 
7 
of its own influence in Southeast Asia*' On the whole, the 
Soviet Union was not much interested in Southeast Asia in 
the post-war era because her attention was focused more 
upon Europe* 
(2) PERIOD PROM 1953 TO 1957t BANDUNG SPIRITS 
The second phase in the development of China's foreign 
policy toward the Southeast Asian countries, which began in 
1953t is normally described as the "Bandung Ira"* The most 
significant aspect of her policy during this period was the 
shift from the nromotion of radical ideological goals to the 
promotion of her national interest primarily* This change 
was not obvious until 1955, when Chou En-lai led a diinese 
delegation to Bandung in Indonesia where he assured the 
Southeast Asian leaders that China was willing to accoimiodate 
herself with them according to the five Principles of Peace-
ft ful Co-existence. 
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This shift in her policy reflected the great changes 
which took place in China herself and in Southeast Asia as 
a whole* Airing this period the Chinese Communist Party had 
attained the consolidation of its power, and the foundations 
of a new society were firmly laid# She did not have to 
worry about her northern border because the alliance with 
the Soviet Union ensured her security*. She had thrown back 
the United States forces in Korea and thus had emerged as an 
Asian leader capable of resisting the "United States imperia-
lists*" \7hile the Korean War brought fame to China, her lea-
ders realized that their country had a long way to go to re-
cover economic strength after 30 years of civil war* In order 
to enable her to turn her attention a?/ay from revolutionary 
exploits abroad to domestic reconstruction, it was necessary 
for her leaders to sectxre years of peaceful international 
environment* 
Moreover, when Stalin died in 1953> the ambitious 
new Asian giant was no longer willing to subordinate itself 
to the leadership of the Soviet Union within the Communist 
camp* Although the Soviet Union had supplied weapons to 
support China in the Korean War, this turned out not a bro-
therly assistance because diina had to repay to Moscow every 
cent. Because by this time China had demonstrated that she 
was no inferior to Moscow in competing for influence in 
Asia, her ambition was now to extend her relations not only 
with the Communist countries in Asia but also with the neu-
tral states* Because her national interest called for the 
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promotion of trade abroad, China started to broaden her 
diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian countries to 
import their primary products such as tin, rubber and others 
necessary to her economic development. 
% 1952 China concluded that the armed struggles in 
Southeast Asia, except those in Vietnam, were not successful 
and in view of this limited temporarily her support to the 
revolut i onary movement s: 
mBy 1952, the rebellions of the Huks and the Malayan 
Communist Party as well as those in the rest of 
Southeast Asia outside of Indochina had already been 
beaten* The Communist defeat in Malaya was achieved 
by a critical use of Commonwealth troops and in the 
Philippines by an important but less critical supply 
of military materials and economic assistance from 
the United States. **,f9 
The defeat of the Communists in Southeast Asia was not 
only due to the military involvement of the extra-regional 
powers such as the United States and Britain* There were 
other specific reasons that hindered the revolutionary acti-
vities of the Communists. The Thai, Malay and the Philippine 
elites embraced neither an extreme form of nationalism nor 
extreme anti-Vfesternism. Nor the nationalistic leaders- would be 
inclined to Marxism, making it thus difficult for foreign 
ideologies to take root
 p The Korean War might have appeared 
as a victory for China, but the war had also its unfavourable 
side effect: the leaders of Southeast Asian states started to 
believe that China would be an expansion!stic power- as she 
had demonstrated on the Korean Peninsula* Although later 
studies were to prove that during the early 1950fs diina was 
forced by Moscow to enter the war, it was difficult to con-
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vince the Southeast Asian leaders that Peking was not expan-
sionistic and posed no threat to them. 
Because of this, most of their governments had allied 
themselves with the United States* In 1954, the formation 
of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) indicated 
that given the choice between the Socialist and Western camps, 
they preferred to ally with the latter* This event alerted 
China to the danger to her external security on the southern 
borders, and the emergence of the Bandung line was essen-
tially a response to the United States' initiation of 
the SEATO; 
11
 The shift away from farmed struggle1 had been motivated 
to a high degree by the need for foreign political 
support against possible American military threats 
or pressures* In the spring of 1954, at the tin© of 
Menbienphu crisis, Secretary of State Dalles be-
gan to construct a Southeast Asian Collective Defense 
Organisation (usually called SEATO, by analogy with 
NATO) so as to offer protection to the countries of 
the region, especially Thailand, against possible 
attack or subversion from China or the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam.*!! 
Thus the diinese ftbegan to acquire a somewhat more 
sophisticated view of the world in general, and gradually 
recognised that the leaders of most •neutralist1 nations 
could not be viewed simply as frunning_dogs1 of the United 
States*11 
The Southeast Asian countries during this period were 
confronted with the choice between Dalles* concept of a 
military alliance and Nehru's formula of friendship with 
Ghiro. ^ Thailand and the Philippines preferred the former, 
while countries such as Indonesia, Banna and Ceylon accepted 
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the latter* Malaya chose neither of these because it was 
under the protection of British troops, having a status of 
a colony* 
Among the Southeast Asian countries Indonesia in the 
early 1950fs was least antagonistic toward China, which 
provided a suitable spot for holding the most famous 
Conference of Asian-African nations in Bandung in 1955• She 
was geographically most distant from China, she was sympa-
thetic toward the new Peking regime who was defying the West, 
and within her the pro-Peking Indonesian Communist Party 
enjoyed a strong position, a factor which the cabinet could 
not ignore in making the decision to sponsor the conference. ^ 
The most significant achievement of the Indonesian 
Government during the conference was thr~ signing of a treaty 
relating to the citizenship of the diinese residents in the 
Republic* The overseas Chinese in this country had created 
a problem for the Indonesian Government because of their 
maintaining the Chinese nationality* S¥om then on and until 
Sukarno stepped down from power in 1965, both diina 
and Indonesia agreed that the overseas Chinese in this 
country had to give up the ftdual nationality." In other 
words, they had to chose between accepting the Indonesian 
nationality, or retaining their old Chinese nationality* 
Moreover, China hoped that this agreement would set an 
example to other states in Southeast Asia with substantial 
Chinese minorities showing that Peking was no longer exclusively 
claiming overseas Chinese as its nationals* 
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Based on the five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, 
China*s ties with Indonesia blossomed and grew into an ex-
amplary relationship: 
"After the Bandung Conference Premier Chou Bn-lai 
paid an official visit to Djakarta where on April 
28, 1955 he and Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo issued 
a joint statement on Indonesian-Chinese relations* 
They re-asserted their intention to seek the rea-
lisation of the objectives of the Asian-African 
Conference, expressed the satisfaction over the 
recent treaty on dual citizenship, hoped to deve-
lop extensive economic and cultural relations, 
agreed that their countries should co-operate 
to strengthen their mutual understanding, declared 
it was fthe inalienable right of the people of 
any country to safeguard their own sovereignty 
and territorial integrity1 and expressed 'satisfac-
tion over the fact that Indonesia and China are 
living peacefully together as good neighbours on 
the basis of the principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-
aggression, non-interference in each other*s ,j-
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit.Wp° 
Pollwoing this the Indonesian Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo, 
who visited China in the same year, secured the support of 
Peking for Indonesia's claim to V/est Irian* The most impor-
tant event of the Sino-Indonesian relations in the Bandung 
Ira was, ho?/everf the state visit of President Sukarno to 
diina in October 1956. ftHe was much impressed by what he 
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saw, especially in the domestic fields11 As a result the 
honeymoon bet?/een the two countries was expected to last long* 
Concerning Malaya, China already in 1953-1954 had rea-
lised that the armed struggle in the country was not going 
well, and as a result Peking urged the Malayan Communist 
Party to enter into negotiationswith the Malayan colonial 
government* Peking insisted that unless the Malayan Communist 
Party, which was mostly composed of diinese, broadened its 
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membership by recruiting other races of Malaya, the Communist 
insurgency ought to be delayed for the time being and the 
tactics of legal struggle ought to be applied. As a result 
of Peking1s direction, Secretary General of the Malayan 
Communist Party, Chin Peng, formally offered to negotiate 
with the ftnational bourgeois" political leaders of Kuala 
Lumpur on November 17, 1955* The negotiations were carried 
out in Baling by Tunku Abdul Rahman and David Marshall, 
Chief Minister of Singapore, but they failed because the 
Communist Party refused to surrender as a pre-condition for 
winning recognition from the government as a legal party. 
As a result, Chin Peng had to lead his men back to continue 
the struggle in the Malayan jungle* 
To China the failure of the Malayan Communist Party to 
obtain an agreement from the Malayan Government to legalise 
the party was, however, a small loss compared to her success 
in Bandung. We have seen that the goal of Peking to be attain-
ed through the Bandung diplomacy was to promote its national 
interest of economic development, and that in view of this 
its revolutionary aspirations had to be toned down. Conse-
quently, the Malayan Communists had to accept the new direc-
tions from Peking, and subordinate their own immediate goals 
17 
to the long-term aspirations of diina. 
The operational formula evolved between these two part-
ners is well summarized below: 
l|Ti/henever the armed struggle was going well in 
Malaya, Peking as well as the Malayan Communist 
Party had little interest in conciliation with 
the government; ?rtien things were going badly, 
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however, they were inclined respectively to 
co-existence and constitutional^ struggle* 
If legality was denied the Party, it could 
choose a period of retrenchment and. re-organi-
sation; at the same time, Peking could pursue 
as far as possible government-to-government 
conciliation. f|l8 
Nevertheless, the colonial government in Malaya and 
the revolutionary government in Peking adjusted their 
policies to suit the Bandung Spirit and entered into trade 
relations. In 1956, the embargo on rubber sales to China was 
lifted by both Ilalaya and Singapore, while Peking recipro-
cated by reducing its supnort to the Malayan Communist Party* 
Toward Thailand the peaceful co-existence strategy was 
promoted by diina to convince Bangkok that its alignment 
with the United States was undesirable, airing the Bandung 
Conference, ?/hen foreign Linister of Thailand Prince Tfen 
raised the question of dual nationality in Thailand, Chou 
Eta-lai replied that this problem was "left behind by the 
old diina,f and that the People's Republic was f*ready to solve 
it.1* Later Mao Tse-tung said to a Thai "good-will mission11 
to Peking that "it is not the mistake of you (the Thais, 
Sd.) who make those pacts (SEATO, Ed*) but the mistake of 
iq 
the imperialists." 
Concerning the Philippines, during the Bandung Con-
fere ace Chou made the same offer of a nationality treaty to 
Manila1s chief delegate, General Carlos P* 3omulo, and assured 
his government that diina would not resort to aggression or 
indirect threats against his country. However the Philippines, 
unlike Malaya and Thailand, does not export important pri-
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mary products such as rubber, tin and rice and therefore 
had very little to offer in terms of trade. Moreover, the 
geographical remoteness of the Philippines and the travel 
restrictions to diina and vice-versa during the 1950fs 
limited further communications between the two countries. 
The latter preferred to ally herself with the United States 
with whom it had a longer and closer relationship during 
the colonial days. In short, The attitude of the Philippines 
toward China was the coolest of 9,11 countries of Southeast 
Asia. 
Toward Singapore diina1s attitude was not as enthusias-
tic as towards Indonesia and Thailand, mainly because Peking 
regarded the island as an inseparable part of Malaya. This 
was evident from her piiblic comments on Singapore in the 
mid-19501s, when the trade unions and Chinese school dis-
turbances were reported in Peking ae the anti-British mani-
festations of the Malayan people. Nevertheless, the heavy 
Chinese population in Singapore attracted China's interests 
to trade with it. At the time of the riots in 1955, David 
Marshall, Chief Minister of the Island, was royally received 
in Peking; and when the Colonial Government became hostile 
towards Peking after it had arrested students and union lea-
ders in Singapore in 1956, diina said nothing, perhaps, 
because the ueaceful co-existence was in the offing* 
In sum, soon after the Bandung Conference China drew a 
sharper distinction between enemies and friends, pressing 
friendly governments to take a firm stand against the V/est 
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and putting pressure on those governments that would not 
do so. On the whole, her nolicy was friendly in the state-
to-state relations. Promotion of trade was the major concern 
of her national interest during this period, although she 
was seeking friendly ties with the non-Communist countries 
for a "united-front-from-above11 with them to break through 
the containment imposed upon her freedom of manoeuvre by 
the SEATO* 
(3) PBHOD PROM 1958 TO 1965? INTERNAL TUHBOIL AND CONFUSION; 
China1s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia during 
this period was a combination of frustration and confidence. 
She was frustrated because the short-term Bandung policy 
failed, except in Indonesia, due to the fact that most of 
the Southeast Asian governments preferred to ally with the 
United States to contain her. Mother reason that ms.de the 
Chinese leaders uneasy was the prospect of detente of the 
United States with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's initiation 
of the policy of "peaceful transition to Communism11 during 
the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 was 
strongly opposed by the Chinese leaders, warning the Soviet 
Union that under the leadership of Khrushchev it was gradual-
ly slipping in the direction of "revisionism11. However, her 
antagonistic attitude toward the Soviet Union was not nublie-
ly expressed during the early years of this period, for Mao 
and his colleagues adopted a wait-and-see policy toward 
Moscow, hoping that its leaders would change their attitude 
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to Qhina* 
In spite of the frustrations, there was also an element 
of self-confidence in her conduct during this period* She 
achieved a degree of security and pride from her domestic 
developments, mainly collectivization of agriculture, econo-
mic growth and new industrial build up* Internationally, there 
was a growing optimism among diina*s leaders when the Soviet 
Union orbited the first two earth satellites in 1957# Such 
events were vie?/ed as confirming the emergence of a new 
world balance of power more favourable to the Communist 
World and thus encouraging forward postures in foreign policy. 
Two incidents during this period, moreover, demonstrated 
this forward and aggressive spirit. In 1959 she sent her 
army to suppress the Tibetan revolt; and in 1962 she fought 
a border war with India. Both incidents confirmed that 
Cliina1 s vital interest of national security should not be 
challenged and that she was detexnined to fight back. 
While between 1956-1958 diina was unsure and tender 
about her ties with the Soviet Union, her position hardened 
in I960 when the latter revoked military and economic assis-
tance; as a consequence, her leaders began to doubt the 
nature of Soviet Socialism*, Her new policy crystallised in 
1965 with the publication of Lin Piaofs "Long Live the 
Victory of People fs ,far" which called upon the Third World, 
as the rural areas of the globe, to encircle the urban areas 
of the world headed by the "imperialists and revisionists". 
Such a shift from the moderate policy based on the ten-
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dung Spirit was to show to the developing countries that 
China was prepared to fight the United States and the 
Soviet Union who had "colluded" against her and the deve-
loping countries, ait already in 1964 Peking had recognized 
that in order to form a new united front in the diplomatic 
sphere, China had to change her tactics* As a result, the 
"Two Intermediate Zones" concept was introduced to win also 
the friendship of the countries in Western Europe, Oceania, 
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Canada and the other capitalist countries* 
With respect to the Southeast Asian countries, China1s 
policy mainly concerned itself with demonstrating to the 
Soviet Union that Peking should have an equal voice in the 
leadership of the Interntional Communist Movement based 
upon the following guidelines: (1) that China had an inde-
pendent policy not restricted by the Soviet Union; (2) that 
the countries in Southeast Asia are in the sphere of influen-
ce of diina because the Soviet Union became revisionist; 
and, (3) that insurgencies in the area would be supported 
should the Southeast Asian governments appear antagonistic 
toward China. 
This change of policy was designed as a response of 
Peking to the new environment* Because China made no signi-
ficant advances under the policy of peaceful co-existence 
except in Indonesia, and because of the worsening of her 
relations with Moscow, the foreign policy outlook of China 
started to underplay the "national interest factor" and in-
stead emphasized the "revolutionary" and radical line. 
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The main issues of China1 s policy during this period 
mere the intensification of the Vietnam \/arf the over-
seas diinese, formation of Malaysia, formation of the 
Association of Southeast Asia, and finally, the prospects of 
the Communist Party of Indonesia. 
In the mid-1950fs Sukarnofs admiration for China reached 
its highest point for three reasons: (a) Sukarno respected 
regimes such as of Peking because they were established 
through armed struggle against the "imperialists"; (b) he 
became disgusted with the futility and instability of a 
parliamentary government in his country; (c) he saw Indonesia 
as the leader of the Malay world, hoping that Peking ?^ ould 
21 
render the necessary support. On the other hand and until 
1965 when Sukarno was overthrown, Peking had to co-OBerate 
with him "since it lacked the means to buy him off or put 
effective pressure on him either through the Indonesian 
22 Communist Party or the Indonesian Chinese." Moreover, 
Peking chose^ to co-operate with Sukarno for the reason that 
he was more than friendly with the Indonesian Communist 
Party which was the biggest Communist Party in Southeast 
Asia, consisting of millions of members, a potential force that 
might spread the Chinese style of Communism in Southeast 
Asia. The latter reason became particularly important when 
the Sino-Soviet relations turned hostile in the early 
years of the 1960fs. 
airing the year of 1958 the harmonious relations between 
diina and Indonesia were disturbed due to the seizure of 
57 
the Chinese residents* property, and in August of 1958 the 
Chinese businessmen suffered great financial losses due to 
a drastic currency reform* diina protested in this connec-
tion and urged the Indonesian Government to treat the Chinese 
reasonably. On December 9, 1958 Chen Yi, foreign Minister of 
diina, wrote a letter to the Indonesian foreign Minister 
Subandrio, proposing that "ratification of the dual nationality 
treaty be immediately undertaken so that the treaty could 
go into effect, that the Indonesian Government aggress not 
to discriminate against those overseas Chinese who did not 
acquire Indonesian citizenship in return for a pledge by 
diina to encourage thera to abide by the laws and customs 
of Indonesia.11""^ 
After the ratification Khrushchev visited Indonesia in 
February 1959, and indicated to the Indonesian Government 
that it had the right to treat the overseas Chinese in any 
way it like. The competition between the Soviet Union and 
China in Southeast Asia, and especially to influence Indone-
sian politics, became apparent. It should be noted that 
Sukarno by this time ??as closer to Peking than to Moscow 
because he had personally intervened to liberalize somewhat 
the conditions under which the Chinese could acquire Indone-
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sian citizenship. This pro-Peking attitude of Sukarno was 
further confirmed when dien Yi visited Djakarta in March 
1961, and signed there a Treaty of friendship, a Cultural 
25 Agreement and a Joint Communique* In return for Peking1 s 
continuous support of Djakarta1 s claim to Vfest Irian, Indo-
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nesia barred a Nationalist Chinese team from Taiwan from 
taking part in the Asian Games held in Djakarta in summer 
of 1962* 
In addition to her policy of excellent relations with 
the Sukarno regime at the same time, the Peking Government 
supported Indonesia1s "Confrontation" against Malaysia, 
opposing her formation* diina1s decision to support the 
Confrontation against Malaysia was not only due to her re-
lations with the Malayan Communist Party who was fighting 
for "liberation of Malaya" but also to the fact that 5 
"The diinese government... encouraged Sukarnofs 
1
 crush Kalaysia* policy because it considered it 
a means to the termination of British influence 
it Southeast Asia, so that finally Indonesia 
and China would become the two leading powers 
in that area, dominating the whole Asian 
political scene* This diinese strategy was in 
harmony with President Sukarno's doctrine 
of the struggle between the new emerging forces 
and the old established order, which was focused 
on the elimination of all forms of colonialism, 
or, in other words, the termination of the 
British^and American presence in Southeast 
Asia."20 
At the same time China was successful in wooing the 
Indonesian Communist Party to stand on her side in the 
Sino-Soviet ideological dispute*, In spite of the efforts 
of the Soviet Union to cultivate the Indonesian Communist 
Party, the latter denounced Soviet revisionism on September 
28, 1963 and stated that "the International Communist Move-
ment was undergoing a period of 'selection, crystallization, 
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and consolidation.*" Following this announcement the 
Indonesian Communist Party leader Aidit re-affirmed in the 
spring of 1965 that diina1s line was correct: 
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"The position of the diinese Communist Party 
in the International Communist Movement 
constittited fa red beacon light,1 a signal
 2g 
that will become our line and our guideline." 
The full extent of diina1 s influence on Indonesian 
internal affairs was revealed when Ghou Ba-lai visited the 
country in April 1965 to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of 
the Bandung Conference, during which visit he ur^ ;ed its 
President "to comply with the Indonesian Communist Party's 
proposal to a m the peasants and labourers in order to inten-
sify the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. *' 
Sukarnofs dream to seek hegemony in Southeast Asia 
resulted in his conflict with the Indonesian military who 
strongly opposed the close relationship of the Indonesian 
Communist Party with China. A dramatic reversal of Peking*s 
fortunes took place in September-October 1965, when the 
army suppressed a coup d'etat organised by the Indonesian 
Communist Party and massacred thousands of Chinese in its 
aftermath*, With the downfall of Sukarno on March 12, 1966 
the Sino-Indonesian partnership ended for ten years. 
China's relationship with the federation of Halaya 
was not friendly, although in 1957 she sent a congratulation 
10 to Kuala Lumpur on her Independence Bay. Vftien Kuala Lumpur 
failed to extend diplomatic recognition, Peking returned to 
hostility* 
Although both Malaya and Singapore imposed a ban upon 
import of publications from mainland diina, they permitted 
a limited trade with Peking; however, cement and textile 
imports from diina were restricted late in 1958.^! 
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Following this, the Tunku Abdul Bahman Government closed 
the Bank of diina Branch in Kuala Lumpur. 
Because by the end of 1950fs Peking gave up hope in 
cultivating the government of independent Malaya, it turned 
its alternation to the Communist Party again and extended 
it a significant support* On March 1, 1959, Badio Peking 
began language broadcasts in Malaya as well as Hindi, calling 
upon the non-Chinese races to support the Malayan Communist 
Party* In September of the same year Peking successfully 
won the support of the Malayan Communist Party in its dis-
pute with Moscow, which was expressed in a greeting sent 
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on the occasion of diina1 s National Day on October 1. In 
early 1961 Peking denounced the formation of the Association 
of Southeast Asia, in which Malaya was one of the members, 
by saying that Malaya had "all along been a state subservient 
11 to the United States.f|JJ In December 1961 both the Indonesian 
Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Party came out 
publicly to denounce the concept of "Malaysia," and when 
this was formed in 1963 Peking increased its support to the 
Malayan Communist Party* Peking now emphasized the importance 
of the inter-relationship among Qiina, Malayan Communist 
Party, Indonesian Communist Party, Sukarno, North Vietnam 
and various Communist Parties in Southeast Asia, praising 
the Indonesian party as a model for "certain" other parties, 
clearly indicating that the Malayan Communist Party should 
follow the example of the Indonesian Communists* 
Since the end of "Emergency" in Malaya in I960 
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the Malayan Communist Party intensified its guerrilla acti-
vities, and after being defeated in this effort by govern-
ment forces it had to retreat into the jungle again. China, 
however, continued to give her support to the Malayan Com-
munist Party in order to press the Kuala Lumpur Government 
into changing its hostile attitude towards her* 
Concerning the city of Singapore, Peking opposed the 
separation of the island from Malaya because the separation 
resulted in "national and regional disintegration", contin-
uously attacking the British and the Malayan Governments 
for permitting Singapore to separate itself from the federa-
tion* 
At the beginning of I960 the leaders in Kuala Lumpur 
and Singapore started to call for merger and formation of 
Malaysia, which would include the territories of Sarawak, 
North Borneo, Singapore and Malaya* The Malayan Communist 
Party opposed such a formation and regarded it as a creation 
of British colonialists for three reasons: first, because 
Singapore would increase the percentage of Chinese in the 
new state m?hich in turn would made it more difficult for the 
Malayan Communist Party to gain support from other races; 
secondly, because the Chinese dominated Malayan Communist 
Party would be suppressed by the central government in 
Kuala Lumpur as Singapore would surrender the control of 
its internal security to ICuala Lumpur as a condition for 
the merger; thirdly, Lee Kuan-yew needed the entry into Ma-
laysia in order to maintain himself in power under the pro-
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tection of Kuala Lumpur, for he was facing opposition from 
the radicals in his own party headed by Lim Ghin-siong^ 
Meanwhile, the military significance of Singapore was 
highlighted by the "visit11 of an American marine contingent 
to the city at the time of the Middle last crisis in 1958* 
Peking charged that "Singapore has always been an impor-
tant American and British base for interference against the 
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Southeast Asian countries.11-^ 
In May 1959 the People1 s Action Party won a majority of 
seats in the election organized to make Singapore a self-
governing territory despite the arrest of a prominent pro*-* 
Communist leader of the party, Lim Qhin-siong by the 
British authorities. Immediately after Lira's release demanded 
by Lee as pre-condition for organizing a new government under 
his leadership, Peking greeted the new self-governing state 
of Singapore as a "victory of the protracted struggle", but 
it denounced the British for continuing their opposition 
against merger of Singapore with Malaya. 
Two years after, the Peoplefs Action Party split into 
two different parties as a result of Lim diin-siongfs dis-
agreement with Lee, and a new party, the Barisan Socialis 
or the Socialist front, was formed under the leadership of 
Lim Qhin-siong. Peking gave support to the new party until 
Lim was re-arrested, now by Lee Kuan-yew1 s government* 
During this time, "Malaysia" was denounced by Peking while 
Lee and Tunica Abdul ^hman were labelled as "running dogs 
of imperialists", until 1971• 
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Since the formation of the S1AT0 in 1954, i'hailand 
chose to remain a close ally of the United States in assis-
ting the latter in its military operations in Vietnam and 
Laos, for which role she was severely attacked by Peking, 
particularly during the mid-1960,s. 
It should be noted that before the intensification of 
the American engagement in Indochina, diina had tried her 
best to convince the Thai leaders not to ally themselves 
with the United States, and that it was only because of the 
failure of her good will policy based on the Bandung Spirit 
that diina started to support the Thai Communist Party and 
its insurgency* 
diina was hoping to win from the Thais a friendly 
attitude as early as 1959s 
"China is always falling to develop equal and 
mutually beneficial trade relations with Thai-
land on the basis of peaceful co-existence* 
Sino-Thai trade was suggested by the Thai side 
and it is now being destroyed by the Thai 
gevemment; it therefore has no influence what-
ever on China* On the contrary this action of 
the Thai government of returning evil for 
good will only harm its own interest."36 
% January 1959 Thailand banned the import of all 
products from the mainland as a result of Marshal Sarit's 
successful coup, d'etat which brought dbwn Phibun*s adminis-
tration* Since that year, Sarit decided to abandon the pro-
motion of friendly relations with Peking and instead turned 
to the United States completely* His decision was not only 
due to the internal instability caused by Communist activi-
ties which mere now rapidly spreading, but also due to the 
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external pressure from Cambodia and Laos: 
s,The Thai leadership again became concerned that 
China represented a threat to Thailand1s inte-
grity, this time by subversion through Cambodia as 
well as Laos* To soma , this fear was confirmed 
by the joint communique signed by Chou Eh-lai 
and Sihanouk in July, which was interpreted as 
containing implied threats to Thailand* Also 
by 1958, communist activity in Laos and South 
Vietnam, backed in both cases by Hanoi, raised 
apprehension concerning the designs of the 
North Vietnamese and Laos communists on Northern 
%ailand, where the bulk of the population was 
not only related to the Lao but where 30,000 -*« 
to 40,000 Vietnamese refugees continued to live*.*"** 
From 1959 onward the Thai Government became clearly 
antagonistic against China* It criticized China for suppres-
sion on the Tibetan revolt in May* Peking retaliated by tur-
ning v.*ay from the Bangkok regime by accusing it of inter-
ference in diina*s internal affairs* In lay 1959 Peking 
attacked "the Thai reactionaries" and charged them with 
instigating the "Laos reactionaries11 to launch a civil war, 
warning them that "those who play with fire get themselves 
burnt.I,J 
In early 1960fs, because of the continuing Laotian 
crisis and Bangkok1s increasing involvement with the United 
States* containment policy, China's attention was turned 
increasingly to Thailand*. 
In 1961, Peking received the Thai Communist Party 
representatives, during which visit a decision for armed 
struggle was made* This was the first time that the Chinese 
Government gave her "total support" to the Communist move-
ment in Thailand since 1949* % 1962, after the American 
guarantee made to Thailand that if necessary it would defend 
65 
her unilaterally, Peking charged that Thailand was following 
a dangerous road because of her involvement with "intensi-
fied American military advantures" in Southeast Asia* Mean-
while, the Chinese-based clandestine radio Voice of the 
People of Thailand began broadcasting* 
By 1965 the Thai Government had totally rejected friend-
ship with China, continued its relations with the regime in 
Taipei by allowing the Koumintang elements to run operations 
from Thailand into China,, maintained a Chinese-language 
radio station in Thailand, committed itself to the American 
policies of containment and isolation of diina and opposed 
her vital issue in the international arena* On the other 
hand, diina threw her full support behind the Communist 
Party to assist it in every way to overthrow the government 
in Bangkok* 
By the end of 1950fs and the beginning of the 1960fsf 
diina1 s policy toward the Philipi)ines closely followed the 
line applied to Indonesia* The establishment of close ties 
of Manila with Indonesia, the assertion of Manila1s claim 
to Worth Boreno and its opposition to Malaysia, all these 
coincided with a wave of anti-American sentiments in the Manila 
press during this period* Mainly due to Manila1s remoteness 
from the turbulent Indochina, and because she was less in-
volved in the war, China hoped to cultivate the Philippines, 
although the latter allowed the American bases to supply 
troops and materials to Vietnam* 
Moreover, the split within the revolutionary forces 
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in the Philippines restricted Peking1 s support to these 
insurgent groups* The ideological dispute between Peking 
and the Soviet Union was debated in I960 among various groups 
of Philippine insurgency: 
"In I960 a new young group of Marxist-Leninist 
intellectuals in Manila began to organize and 
challenge the traditional Indonesian Communist 
elements for leadershp of the movement* ^ese 
young Philippine intellectuals organized and 
operated through the development of pro-com-
munist and anti-American popular front groups 
among labour, youth, and the peasantry* The 
leaders of these front groups divided into old 
pro-Moscow moderates, Maoists, and a group of -*q 
leftist nationalists who were not communists.Ifjy 
Peking maintained some distance from the Philippine 
Government until 1964 when the American action in Indochina 
posed a real danger to diina1s security and, as a result, 
she called in the People's Daily upon the United States 
to get out of the Philippines*11 Ihile it praised the anti-
American demonstrations in Itanila and demanded the removal 
of American bases from the Philippines, it carefully avoid-
ed criticism of the Philippine Government mainly because 
the insurgent groups were not ready to re-organize and 
accept China's ideological basis for their armed struggle* 
After the disaster of the Communists in Indonesia at 
the end of 1965> the pro-Communist elements in the Philippines 
lost their connection with the Indonesian Communist Party* 
Although they nominally joined together in 1967 in a united 
front, the question of strategy to be applied again divided 
and polarized them along the Peking-Moscow axis* 
%is period of diina*s policy mainly focused upon the 
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intensification of the Indochinese crisis and the continuous 
cultivation of Indonesia* Her ideological emphasis on the 
insurgencies in Southeast Asia was seen as a response to 
the onset of the Sino-Soviet dispute over the strategy of 
the International Communist Movement* It should be noted 
that her aggressive policy in the later years of this period 
was different from that of 1949-1952, when the Sino-Soviet 
relations had been good* airing the period of 1958-1965, 
Peking ceased mentioning the "Two Camps" concept
 f which 
was the Soviet strategic concept, implying that China did 
not consider herself anymore a member of the Socialist 
camp headed by the Soviet Union. 
As it was stated in the earlier discussion, China's 
foreign policy during this period was a mixture of confiden-
ce and frustration* Concerning Indonesia and until 1965 
diina treated the Sukarno regime as a case of successful 
ftco-existence" policy. Her policy towards Thailand, on the 
other hand, was a failure mainly due to Bangkok's alliance 
with the United States* which made Peking frustrated and 
uneasy* Bit her model relations with Indonesia collapsed 
after the fall of Sukarno, and by 1965 she was completely 
helpless and isolated in the diplomatic activities in 
Southeast Asia* To combat this isolation, she turned to 
the insurgencies* Such a decision was ma.de, therefore, as a 
response to the unfriendly attitudes of the Southeast Asian 
governments rather than predicated on the basis of ideolo-
gical considerations. She preferred radical policy to form 
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a united-front-from-below in Southeast Asia for two more 
reasons: first, it was feasible to make use of the insurgen-
cies, especially that in Thailand, to threaten the pro-
American governments; second, it was desirable to strike a 
radical and revolutionary posture because it v/as necessary 
to show the Soviet Union and the Communist and revolutionary 
parties that the diinese were "the real Marxist-Leninists*" 
(4) PERIOD FROM 1966 TO 1969t AOONT OP CULTURAL REVOLUTION: 
The foreign policy of Qhina during the period of the 
Cultural Evolution is a controversial issue* The main 
reason is that diina was totally absorbed in the internal 
pdwer struggle and therefore very little attention was paid to 
the external and international relations* Also, 
"firing this period, Peking seemed to be 
making foreign policy primarily for the 
purpose of helping to deal with domestic 
problems, rather than in an attempt to seek 
political or economic advantage abroad*"40 
Thus foreign policy operation were a function of domes-
tic politics which were used to justify the consolidation 
of power of one or the other factionsstruggling against 
each other, with Kao and Lin Piao, speaking for the revolu-
tionary line, dominating the scenery* Regarding the debate 
between the two policy lines—revisionism and revolution— 
diina's main concern in the international arena was to endorse 
any revolutionary activities in any part of the world, in 
order to expose the Soviet policy of "liquidation of the 
struggle"*, Peking1 s policy during this period was therefore 
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extremely ideological, aggressive and hostile. 7ttien diplo-
matic representatives were recalled to Peking from almost 
all countries for indoctrination, it was obviotis that 
diina intended to break a?^ ay from the conventional conduct 
of diplomatic relations and customs and that she wanted to 
initiate a new practice to be recognized by other governments 
to the effect that the diinese diplomats would enjoy the 
divine right to propagate the Thought of Mao Tse-tung at 
their posts abroad. 
Vlhile the advocation of revolution instead of normal 
diplomatic relations dominated the scene of Chinese foreign 
activities at this time, this is not to say that Mao himself 
purposefully sought to create diplomatic incidents and make 
enemies of the important governments of the world* The fted 
Guards following blindly the slogan "to revolt is justified", 
disregarded the latter1 s pragmatic wisdom and attacked the 
returned diinese diplomatic representatives in Peking 
without any justifications as to who deserved the punish-
ment for being "reactionary11* Maofs colleagues, especially 
Chen Yi and Chou Eh-lai, peKnitted the rampage* Bjy July 
1967 even the Ministry of foreign Affairs fell under the 
control of the Red Guards* 
The events of the Cultural Revolution clearly demons-
trated the role f^ hich the struggle for power and the con-
flict of the principal factions had upon China's conduct 
of foreign affairs* Beginning with 1965, Lin Piao had establish-
ed himself as an authority on the "People's War" and during 
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the Cultural Revolution he propagated the most radical 
posture in foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia* 
On the other hand, Chou Eti-lai had been closely associated 
with the policy of peaceful co-existence. Because of this, 
the latter definitely was out of control of his own Ministry, 
but it was not the time for him to speak out and oppose 
the Red Guards* He had to follow the radical line of Lin 
Piao to save himself and to wait until the dust of the 
Cultural Revolution settled down, when the new internal 
environment would enable him to return to his policy of 
co-existence which he held was beneficial for China's long 
term national interest. 
At the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and 
after the ouster of Liu %ao*-»chi from power in 1967, Peking 
began to lump the Philippines with Laos, South Vietnam, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia as areas where armed strug-
gles had gained some success. Then in the midst of its 
Cultural Revolution in 1967 and with the radicals in control 
of the foreign E&nistry* Peking proclaimed that the inter-
national situation had never been better for armed stuggle 
and that a high-tide of revolutionary violence was sireeping 
Southeast Asia. During the course of the year the pro-Peking 
Communists in the Philippines, Burma, Sarawak, and Indonesia 
responded to diina1s exhortations with either new acts of 
violence or merely new proclamation of armed struggle, with 
one exception—under the cautious leadership of Chin Peng 
the Malayan Communist Party seemed not fully co-operative* 
71 
Before the September 30, 1965 coup d'etat in Indonesia 
Qhina was confident that her partnership with that country 
would profoundly influence the future of Southeast Asia. 
The diinese officials seeing the Indonesian Communist Party 
and the Sukarno regime hand in hand, praised the latter as a 
"creative revolutionary and an outstanding revolutionary 
personality." Until 1965, there was no evidence of any 
serious disagreement among the Chinese leaders over the gene-
ral policy toward Indonesia. 
it was obvious that Peking had high stakes in that coup 
for three reasons: First, the diinese leaders;and especially 
Mao, sensed that Aidit was in a very dangerous position 
which resembled the one in which Mao's own nartyhad found 
itself in the year of 1972, on the eve of its massacre by 
the Koumintang following a period of co-operation of the 
two parties. Mao and his colleagues hoped that the Indonesian 
Communist Party would be spared a similar ordeal and that 
its opponents could be destroyed in a pre-emptive coup. 
Second, China supported the premature coup also to relieve 
the deterioration of the situation in Vietnam. The control 
of Indonesia by the Indonesian Communist Party would trans-
form the entire strategic balance of power in Southeast Asia* 
Third, although China had consented to Sukarno playing the 
role of a junior partner in Southeast Asia since the Bandung 
Conference, she was reluctant to put him on the throne. What 
Peking expected from Indonesia was the extension of the 
Communist control to the area of Southeast Asia in the long 
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run. Moreover, China understood Sukarno's ambition very well 
to the effect that his ultimate aim was his personal leader-
ship over the entire Malaya world. Having to choose bet?#een 
Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party, Peking preferred 
the latter and, once this was decided, Sukarno had to go to be 
overthrown by Aidit. 
The unsuccessful coug^  turned China from an optimistic 
expectation to frustration. After Sukarno's loss of power, 
the Peking press stopped calling him a "Creative revolutiona-
ry", referring to him as a "bourgeois-nationalist" as before 
1955* %rther, China started' to degrade his teaching, especial-
ly the Wasakom and Guided Democracy concepts in use since 
1957. 
Soon after the failure of the coup Peking avoided to 
maintained the revolutionary comradeship with the Indonesian 
Communists. However, as soon as the Cultural Revolution was 
mounted in 1966 the issue of Peking*s failure in Indonesia 
was debated between the struggling factions in China: 
"The radical coalition with whom Mao was then 
allied tried in 1967-68 to exploit the failure 
of the Indonesian Communist Party in order to 
discriminate alleged revisionists at home and 
abroad*•• the attacks on the earlier policies 
were probably aimed also at Chou Bn-lai and 
Foreign Minister Chen Yi."41 
The impact of the failure of the Peking sponsored coup 
in Djakarta in September 1965 resulted in important changes in 
the domestic as well as foreign policy outlook of diinese 
leadership; 
"The Indonesian event may have appeared to him 
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(Mao, Bd*) as a confirmation of the danger of 
compromising revolutionary principles* Be spite 
the fact that Mao himself had approved the" 
Indonesian Communist Party1s united front with 
Sukarno, the collapse of the strategy may have 
hardened his discrimination to pursue a path 
of revolutionary purity in China and the rest 
of the world."42 
There was one more factor that enhanced the new united-
front- from- be low strategy toward Indonesia since the onset 
of the Cultural Revolution. The killing of thousands 
of overseas Chinese during the rampages of late 1965 further 
stimulated Peking's animosity toward the lew Order of Pre-
sident 4ikarno. Consequently, Peking's attitude toward 
his regime became brutally hostile, knowing that there was 
not much to be expected from his government. 
As the Sukarno regime fell, Peking started to change 
its attitude toward the Indonesia Communist Party and in 
1967 Aidit himself came under fire: 
"••• although the line the Indonesian Communist 
Party was following coincided with the Maoist 
model, in 1967 the Chinese -party and the rump 
Indonesian Communist Party1s Central Comnittee 
in Peking denounced the Aidit leadership for 
having adopted 'the revisionist Soviet line of 
peaceful transition1 and then having compounded 
this sin by involving itself in a fputschist ad-^^ 
venture1 \?hich 'violated organisational rules."' J 
This change was inconsistent with the previous Peking 
line towards the Indonesian Communist Party, probably due 
to the reason that shortly after the failure of the coup 
Moscow had started to blame diina for her involvement and 
Peking had to defend itself* Moscow said that the incident 
"was inspired by Peking and provoked by Western intelligence, 
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while the masses of the people vmre not ready for revolution. 
In response, Peking explained in 1967 the failure of the 
Indonesian Communist Party by alleging that the party could 
have never attained a peaceful transition to power in Indo-
nesia without taking over the army, a mistake experienced 
by the Chinese Communists in 1927. However, Peking did not 
give up and during the Cultural Revolution called for building 
of armed forces in the countryside and initiation of active 
violence in Indonesia, particularly in central and eastern 
Java. Thereupon the Indonesian Communist Party split into 
a pro-Peking and a pro-Moscow faction* The latter sent a 
delegation to Moscow in the middle of 1969 to attend the 
World Communist Conference, while the former mounted 
terriorist campaign against the local leaders in Indonesia 
under the direction of Peking. 
Thailand during the period of Cultural Revolution 
offered an excellent playground for the application of the 
"Peoplefs Vter" strategy because it refused to recognize 
Peking since 1949* Moreover, the failure of Peking in Indo-
nesia and the increased bombing of North Vietnam by the 
Americans provided additional justification for encouraging 
the insurgency in Thailand. The Peking press published con-
tinuously warnings aimed at pursuading the Thai Government 
to give up its alliance with the United States. It is im-
portant to stress, however, that the actual decision to en-
courage the insurgency in Thailand had been made long before 
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the onset of the radical policies of Lin Piao and before 
the seizure of control of diina1s foreign affairs by his 
group. The Cultural Revolution provided only an additional 
factor for further promotion and intensification of revolu-
tionary activities in Thailand. It was clear, however, that: 
"Had the Vietnamese and Laotian rmrs been 
resolved on terms favourable to the Communist 
side in 1965 (before the Cultural Revolution, Bd.)f 
the nature of Peking1s relationship with the 
Communist insurgency in Thailand would have depend-
ed primarily upon the willingness of the Thai-
land Government to establish some minimum accom-
modation with the People's Republic of diina."45 
The origin of the revolutionary organisation in Thai-
land and the scope of its activities suggests that diina1s 
objective in supporting them was in fact her response to 
the Vietnamese War and the -policies of the Thai Government: 
"•*• the revolutionary objective (in Thailand, 
Id*) was an ideal explicit in Qiinese Communist 
ideology, but forceful attempts to achieve it were 
adopted only when the Bandung policy toward 
Thailand had failed, leaving no other channel for 
the assertion of Chinese influence {ui)on this 
country, Ed.)."46 
For example, on April 28, 1965, Peking said that the 
Thai Government was seeking "self-destruction" by allying 
47 itself with the United States, and the Thai revolutionaries 
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called Thailand a "new type of colony*" On October 7, 1965, 
1
 eking hinted that its suw>ort to the "anti-imperialist 
patriotic struggle11 of the people of Thailand was the "in-
evitable outcome" of the Thai Government's policies* ^ 
Throughout 1966, when the radicals within the Chinese 
leadership gradually won the dominant position, subversive 
activity in Thailand grew steadily in intensity. Guerrilla 
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activities, ambushes and propaganda campaigns for armed 
struggle in the villages all increased because Thailand 
was then regarded in Peking as the forward base of American 
"imperialism4* in Southeast Asia which has been encircling 
China. 
The ideological motivations inherent in the "People's 
War" completely dominated the attitude of the diinese leader-
ship during 1967-1969, which became a model of application 
of Mao's revolutionary doctrine. Bit it should be stressed 
that official and party prouncements from Peking scrupulous-
ly avoided any direct commitment of assistance to the Thai 
Communist Party* Were the leaders in Peking preparing the 
way for improvement of their relations with Thailand by this 
"marginal" support of the Thai Communists? 
Turning now to Malaysia, the Malayan Communist Party 
was perhaps the slowest in responding to the events of the 
Cultural Revolution during this period because Chin Peng 
was believed not interested in being involved on either 
side of the Do?#er struggle raging in diina. This assumption 
is based upon the fact that as late as 1967 his party be-
lieved that its policies- were still going through a transi-
tional form of struggle: 
"Our basic policy at the present stage of the 
revolutionary struggle within our country is 
neither to fight decisive battles nor to with-
draw, but to advance forward step by step and 
to accumulate our strength at the same time. 
Tactically we should wage face-to-face struggles 
against the enemy; strategically, we should advan-
ce forward by meandering along. 
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The neople of the various classes being 
engaged in the revolutionary movement with-
in our country are at neither the stage of high 
tide and the low ebb, but are at a stage 
between the high tide and the low ebb, in 
transition towards the high tide. The duration 
of this transitional period will be determined 
by the development of various kinds of contra-
dictions within our country, by the speed at 
which the gap between the strength of the 
enemy and that of ours is narrof^ ed and by the 
degree of repercussion cast by the interna-
tional political situation, particularly the 
political situation in Southeast Asia*"50 
This statement did not pay homage to the Cultural Re-
volution. It even failed to mention the slogans of the 
Cultural Revolution which had called for the stepping up 
of the revolutionary activities in Malaysia. Bfir and large 
the Malayan Communist Party was slow in responding to the 
radical rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, as is best evi-
dent from the fact that during the year of 1967, guerrillas 
on the Thai-Malayan border continued to avoid provoking 
the Thai authorities, and that it did not publicly espoused 
the Cultural revolution until the end of 1967. 
Such response of the Malayan Communist Party indicated 
that since the collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party 
the former might have have been cautious and avoided any 
premature recognition of directives from Peking, or that 
there existed a disagreement between Peking and the Malayan 
leaders during the early period of the Cultural Revolution. 
"Chen Peng was probably skeptical about Peking's new radi-
calism, while others in the party pushed for closer align-
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ment with the diinese line."^ 
It was only in December 1967 that the Malayan Communist 
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Party came openly in support of Peking, with the result 
that in 1968 the Malayan Communist guarrillas began to pro-
voke the Thai and Malaysian Governments by intensifying 
the insurgent activities on the Thai-Malayan borders. 
However, the most significant aspect of this new mili-
tancy was the fact that now the Malayan Communist Party and 
the Thai Communist Party entered into co-operation and 
mounted co-ordinated attacks in the border areas against 
the positions of both governments, hoping thus to form a 
"liberated" area, or a base, for still large operations. 
It was also at this tine that Peking again began to 
emphasise the need for oppressed peoples in Southeast Asia 
"to co-ordinate closely with and support each other, some 
striking at its head (American imperialism, Id.) and others 
at its feet."^ On May 20, 1969 the Hew China Hews Agency 
severely attacked Kuala Lumpur because it "collaborated 
more closely with the United States imperialism and Soviet 
revisionism and intensified its anti-people, anti-Communist 
and anti-China counter-revolutionary policy." However, 
Peking carefully avoided any implication that diina was 
responsible for protecting the diinese community in Malaysia 
when the May 13 rtetcial Incident resulted in a massacre of 
the Chinese residents* This posture was- much different from 
its policy between 1958 and 1965, when diina sent ships to 
Indonesia to take the overseas Chinese back to the "father-
land" as a result of discrimination from the Djakarta Govern-
ment. Hid this new and significant posture reflect any new 
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political winds blowing in Peking as a result of the termi-
nation of the Cultural Revolution at the 9th Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party held in April 1969? 
Diring the Cultural itevolution, Peking did not pay 
much attention to Singapore, probably due to its insistence 
that the island was an inseparable part of the Malayan 
Federation and also because the city did not fit into the 
concept of the "People's War"* Peking simply did not bother 
about Singapore, having its sights fixed upon the rural areas 
such as Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines and not the tiny island of Singapore* 
Nevertheless, ?/hen the city-state was forced to leave 
Malaysia, the announcement of its independence in August 
1965 significantly deepened the contradictions between 
Sukarno and Peking. China merely considered the newly inde-
pendent state as resulting from the "inner contradiction 
of the Malayan bourgeois leadership," while Sukarno viewed 
the emergence of the new republic as a "grand victory of 
his fConfrontation1 policy" by splitting Malaysia* Both 
Indonesia and diina denied recognition to Singapore during 
1965. 
In response to the directives from Peking, all Barisan 
Socialis members in the new parliament in Singapore resigned 
in 1966, and soon its radical policy became reflected in 
the violent activities of this party. The resignation was 
the most important single mistake that the Barisan leaders 
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ever committed, because it deprived them of the support 
from among the masses of Singaporeans committed to the 
democractic process* Had they not blindly followed Peking's 
short-term radical line, soon to be abandoned by diinese 
leaders themselves as incorrect after the termination of 
the Cultural itevolution, the Barisan could have challenged 
the government of the People1s Action Party. 
BSy July 1969 Lim Qhin-siong seemed to realize the reali-
ty and cruelty of power politics in the young republic, '%&& 
collapse of the Djakarta-Peking Axis and the complexity of 
the Cultural Itevolution in China had embarassed and confused 
Lim. He gave up the long struggle and confessed that his 
party had "completely misjudged the mood of the people."1 
In fact, it can be said that the hurried resignation 
of his party from the parliament, and its subsequent armed 
struggle in the streets in emulating the radicalism of the 
Cultural Involution, destroyed his party* 
In sum, since independence of Singapore in 1965 the 
Marxists in this city-state realized that its take-over 
must wait until the fall of its countryside*—Malaya* 
£>ince 1965 Peking made little reference *° the Philip^ 
pines. But by the end of 1966, after the ouster of Liu 
Shao-chi, the diinese press began to lump the Philippines 
with Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia* Ho speci-
fic treatment, however, ?ras given to the struggle of the 
Philippines' People's Liberation Army until the spring of 
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1967, when the radicals in China obtained complete control 
over the internal and external politics of China* 
It was very likely that after the loss of Indonesia, 
Peking intended to cultivate the Philippines* Such inten-
tion, however, was restricted by the fact that the Philippines 
had little in common with Indonesia. Yet, the most disturbing 
phenomenon was the fact that the Philippines continued to 
recognise the Taiwan Government, an issue on which Peking 
could not compromise* Nevertheless, and in spite of its 
remoteness from the Chinese territories, Peking continued 
one aspect of Indonesia's diplomatic line during 1965 by 
placing a heavy stress on "People's Diplomacy11, to win Manila's 
disengagement from the war in Vietnam in exchange for the 
benefits of trade relations with Peking* 
The year 1966 saw the relaxation of the ban on travel 
to the Communist countries by the Philippine Government. 
There was a rash of the Philippine journalists, academicians 
and politicians to visit China, and they all returned highly 
praising the Communist regime. In March, 1966, after the 
debate in the Senate opposing the government sending 2,000 
troops to Vietnam, Peking responded with appreciation given to 
the "enlightened" senators* One of them, Senator Katigbok, 
led an "explanatory mission" to Peking in the same month 
and was warmly received by Chen Yi*> Eatigbok was told that 
"there were no difficulties from the diinese side to exchange 
diplomatic relations with the Philippines* ^ Chen Yi also 
said that the presence of iteierican bases in the Philippines 
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should not prevent the opening of friendly relations be-
54 tween the two countries. Chen Yi reportedly said that the 
major American bases threatening China were not in the Philip-
pines, but in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and Taiwan* 
gy mid-1966, when the Huk activities increased consi-
derably, Marcos charged Peking that these activities were 
supported by China. However, "the substance behind the re-
ports is impossible to fathom", and indeed, Marcos occasional-
ly reversed himself and stated that the Huks received no 
aid from Peking* In May, 1967, when Lin Piao was in control 
of the Cultural Revolution, China began to drop her "diplo-
macy-from-above" and changed to supnort the insurgency in 
the Philippines^ On May 21, 1967, the Philippine Communist 
Party proclaimed her support for the Cultural involution and 
denounced the Soviet revisionism: 
"The Communist Party of the Philippines is com-
mitted to an uncompromising struggle against 
modern revisionist ruling clique at its center* 
There is no middle road between modern revisioni-
sm and the proletarian revolutionary line* 
The outlawed situation of the Party dictates 
clearly that there is no path to a national 
and social liberation except true araed 
struggle."57 
As a result of this proclamation, Peking and Manila 
terminated their attempts of promoting friendly relations 
until August 1970, when Peking toned do?/n its support to 
guerrilla activities* 
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CHAPTER 111 
RELATIONS OP CHINA 
WITH THE COUNTRIES OP THE ASEAN 
SHOE 1969 
The evolution of Peking's foreign policy entered into 
a new stage in 1969 for reasons to be emplained in* this 
diapter. While it is true that the formulation of its foreign 
policy continued to be based upon the dynamic interplay of 
ideological considerations on the one hand and the demands 
of national interest on the other, this interplay developed 
during the early 1970fs into a highly complex system which 
effectively ordered the conflicting priorities into a co-
herent foreign policy outlook known as the "Third World 
Strategy." 
As we have indicated in the introduction which attempted 
to explain the mechanism operative in the formulation of 
foreign policy of China, anytime a, new group of leaders 
is propelled to power as a result of power struggle, this 
new group develops new initiatives in foreign policy. 
We have seen that while Lin Piao dominated the conduct 
of foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution between 
1966-1969, this policy was based upon the strategic concept 
known as the "World Revolution," which consisted of the 
following two main elements; (a) "People's Vfer"; (b) "Class 
Struggles.11 These two elements in turn were actualized 
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through the application of "Dual Adversary" policy, which 
aimed at the hegemonistic tendencies of both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, as well through the support 
of the "Wars of National Liberation" and the ao-olication of 
policy labelled as "Anti-Imperialism." 
With the onset of the new international and domestic 
climate this strategy known as the "florid Involution11 was 
gradually abandoned, and after the fall of Lin Piao in 1971 
diina evolved a new and far more sophisticated system known 
as the "Third Florid Strategy," which features the following 
main elemental (l) peaceful co-existence; (2) assertion of 
her role as a factor in the tri-polar global balance of power; 
(3) anti-superpowers and anti-hegemonism policies; (4) com-
petition with the Soviet Union over the influence in the 
Communist camp; (5) co-operation with the medium and small 
powers, especially of the developing world, in order to 
influence the trends in international politics; (6) co-opera-
tion through trade, cultural mission, sport events and others. 
As far as the area of the ASIAN countries in Southeast 
Asia is concerned, Peking fully registered the profound 
changes which took place there since 1969^ As a result, 
Peking is applying its new strategic concept of the "Third 
World" to that area, toning do?/n gradually the policies 
which had been associated with the strategy of "World 
Revolution" and replacing them with "peaceful Co-existence," 
"Anti-Hegemonism," and other elements of the new strategic 
outlook* 
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©lis diapter analyses the factors which have brought 
about the change in Peking's foreign policy operations, 
explains the main features of the new strategic concept of 
the "Third World," and describes how this is being imple-
mented in Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975* 
(1) THE DOMESTIC VARIABLE: 
In no other period was diina*s foreign policy so signi-
ficantly influenced by the domestic situation than in the 
period since 1969* While two practical domestic problems 
faced the leaders of diina before April 1969* when the 9th 
Congress of the diinese Communist Party was convened to 
make na?# decisions on internal and external policies, it 
should be noted that her leadership before the Congress re-
presented a combination of radicalsf headed by Lin Piao, 
and of moderates headed by Chou Eh-lai. 
The first factor to be tackled was the problem of 
economic re-construction after the Cultural Revolution* 
Although Liu Shao-ohi's "clique" had been destroyed 
politically, allowing the victorious lao-Mn group to resume 
the self-reliant policy in the economy by not following the 
Soviet model of development, the price for such a victory 
was high in economic terms: 
"Economic dislocation and disruption in the 
country's scientific and technical education 
during the Cultural Revolution may have en-
couraged some leaders to seek new economic 
programmes. Although the fundamental national 
priority remains agriculture, a new emphasis on 
the industrial sector, and particularly on 
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its heavy dependence on modem techno-
logy, emerged after 1969#ftl 
In order to regain her strength in internal economy the 
diinese leaders realised that the policy of self-reliance 
was not enough, and that they had to look outward for help. 
"However contradictory it may appear to China's 
most proudly boasted ethic of self-reliance, 
the pattern of diina1s trade since 1969 clearly 
reflects the nation's determination to modernize 
more rapidly*"2 
Indeed, much of the proclamations emanating from Peking 
and directed to other countries since then have emphasised 
the importance of "mutual benefit" through trading* The 
principles of peaceful co-existence, which had originated 
at the Bandung Conference in 1955, have been dug out now to 
replace the call for revolution in the developing countries* 
The second, but equally important domestic factor that 
had influenced China's leaders to adopt a more pra^iatic 
attitude toward the world, was the need to settle the problem 
arising from the confrontation between the charismatic lea-
ders and the bureaucracy* The charismatic leaders are usual-
ly capable of mobilizing the people into a mass movement; 
in China's case it was Mac's role in the Cultural Revolution* 
However, a long-term economic recovery through new policies 
and new management methods is always designed by the bureau-
cracy, the specialists and technocrats, and not by the 
charismatic leaders, and when a mass movement becomes a 
spent force usually confrontation between the two groups 
is on the agenda: 
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"Yet the power of the charismatic leader is 
not absolute; over time the very success of 
his revolution creates within his polity 
the need for development of a breaucracy 
which may or may not fully appreciate the 
presence of the charismatic leader* Hence, 
a clash arises because the bureaucracy 
develops its own administrative routine, thereby 
institutionalising the revolution's policy; 
moreover, it may develop political viewpoints about 
policy alternatives which contradict the 
preferences of the charismatic leader. How-
ever, as long as the latter lives, opportuni-
ties will exist for his view to prevail 
over those of the bureaucracy* But, over 
time, tensions between the leader and the 
bureaucracy may intensify and increase#"3 
While in the case of China Mao represented the charis-
matic leader, the fact that he was able to maintain his 
power ever after the Cultural Revolution was not only due 
to his charisma accumulated through the previous decades, 
but also because he placed the blame for the defects of the 
Cultural Evolution upon the shoulders of a "scapegoat" 
Lin Piao* Praised as a "comrade-in-arm" by the Reds Guards 
during the Cultural Revolution, Lin did not realize at its 
high tide that his close relationship with Mao would bring 
him destruction. Had he understood the unavoidability of a 
conflict between himself and the bureaucratic leaders headed 
by diou Bn-lai, had he confined himself to the position of 
Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and had he 
supported the policies of the bureaucracy, perhaps he might 
have have escaped the tragic destiny after his unsuccessful 
flight into Mongolia^ Mao is known as a skillful engineer 
in the Chinese power game# E^ the end of the Cultural Re-
volution Mao handed over all responsibility for this event 
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to Lin Piao, and latter blamed him for the havoc created, 
criticizing particularly Lin's own build-up through the pu-
blication of Mao's quotation in the form of the "little 
red book*11 The charge against the Vice-diairman, that he 
had exploited Mao's personal cult for his own promotion 
into the top position in the party, destroyed Lin's image 
and reputation after his death* It also rescued Mao from 
involvement in the conflict between himself as a charis-
matic leader and the bureaucracy* Actually, by the time the 
lid on the coffin of Lin Piao was closed, Mao recaptured 
all his former influence and power* 
Howeverf the Chairman was keen to vote for Ghou's demand 
that China return to moderate policies by 1969t and that 
the radical group and its policies* both internal and ex-
ternal, had to go* 
"for revolutionary generations (and even their immedi-
ate successors) do not easily surrender their ideolo-
gical commitment to revolutionary change; but 
as may have happened in China throughout much 
of past decade, even high-level officials who come 
to power as a result of the Chinese revolution 
and"believed in the need for revolution in 
China, have come to realize that it was not in 
diina*s interest to continue to support people's 
war movements in other countries. They may even 
have grown uncertain about the universal validity 
of Mao's Thought* The re-emergence of many, if not 
all, officials who at last partially held 
accommodative position toward the interiational 
system suggest that Chinese foreign policy may 
again be in the process of starting to fturn 
out1 at the beginning of 1970' s. f,4 
(2) THE TITERTAT10IAL VARIABLE: 
4fter evaluating the Theory of the People's *Yar in 
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the context of the new conditions existing in the world, 
the Peking leaders in 1969 agreed that these ideological 
tools had to be stored up for the time being* The situation 
in Southeast Asia, particularly the ASIAN countries, had 
demonstrated that little had been gained as a result of the 
application of this strategy. The People's War, though suc-
cessful in posing a threat to the United States in Thailand, 
was a failure on the whole because its ultimate aim of 
bringing down the existing governments in Southeast Asia 
had not been achieved. 
There were good reasons for the Peking leaders to blame 
the "Lin Piao clique" as far as the Theory of the People's 
War and its application in Southeast Asia was concerned, 
because the harsh application of this theory had seriously 
hampered Peking's control of the Southeast Asian Communist 
Parties, Perhaps during 1967-1968 the Peking leaders had 
not recognized that the People's War would generate serious 
conflicts within these parties* Except for the Thai Communist 
Party frtiich consistently followed Peking's line, the Malayan 
Communist, the Indonesian Communist Party, the Philippine 
Communist Party and most of the Indochinese insurgent 
organisations began to split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking 
groups shortly after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. 
Indeed, most of the insurgent leaders started then to re-
consider the role of Chinese leadership in the International 
Communist Movement. 
Peking's assertion of its ideological correctness is 
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usually followed by enforcement of strict discipline upon 
its allies. When tensions between the Soviet Union and 
China reach the point of crisis, the latter tightens her 
relations with the peripherial parties to seek support 
for her "united-front" policy. However, China did not reali-
se that the call for unconditional acceptance of her ideology 
would also lead to tension within the parties in Southeast 
Asia, frustrated by the threats that refusal to submit would1 
be denounced by Peking, many parties intended to shift their 
support to Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
Perhaps the most serious negative effect upon the 
Southeast Asian Communist Parties was due to the internal 
developments in diina during 1967-1968: 
"The praise of personal cult, the purge and 
the the virtual destruction of the party 
machinary all contributed to the allienation 
of important parties.* *"5 
Such negative effects forced Peking to choose one of 
the following alternatives: either continuation of support 
to the insurgencies, or normalization of relations with 
the existing governments. Peking decided to drop the former 
alternative, for "none of these movements was sufficiently 
large to make any impact on the political struggle within 
international communism, nor were any visible gains made 
6 
agains existing local governments." 
It was at this time that Peking put forward her "Pro-
tracted War" strategy again. According to Mao, struggle with 
the reactionaries is a matter of protracted conflict* Using 
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the "Theory of Contradiction", Peking could explain that 
when conditions are favourable for armed struggle, it is 
necessary to co-operate with the reactionaries for a tran-
sitional and temporary period, as long as these reactionaries 
are not China's principal enemy. Further, according to 
Peking, such short-term coalitions are profitable to the 
insurgencies for the latter might make use of the coalitions 
between Peking and local governments to re-organi^e their 
parties and prepare for a new offensive. 
Peking's decision in favour of co-operation with the 
governments in Southeast Asia was not only necessitated by 
the failure of the insurgent movements, but it was also 
based upon the consideration of the effects which the with-
drawal of the Americans from the area would have upon the 
regional balance of power. Above all Peking must be ready 
to react to Moscow's aspirations in this part of the world 
aiming at the replacement of the American influence there. 
During the 1950's, when the Sino-Soviet relations were 
"not antagonistic" and the Soviet fleet was inferior to that 
of the United States, Moscow had allocated the area of South-
east Asia to diina as her sphere of influence. In the middle 
of the 1960fsf after the Peking-Djakarta Axis had collapsed, 
the Russians gradually shifted their attention to Southeast 
Asia as a result of the fast development of their naval 
forces. Tfy 1967 the Soviet Union was increasing its influence 
also by building-up relations with the Southeast Asian govern-
ments. In November 1967 Malaysia established di-olomatic 
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relations with Moscow, followed by the Republic of Singapore 
in June 1968. % e Philippines were continuously visited by 
Russian cargo ships and by cultural delegations between 
1968-1970. Thailand signed a trade agreement with Moscow 
in 1970, and their relations continuously improved. These 
Russian activities alarmed the Peking leaders who regarded 
them as a thorn in their flesh. To respond to this challen-
ge, diina had to broaden her relations and extend areas of 
mutual co-operation with the conservative governments in 
Southeast Asia, "for only such a policy can provide a suffi-
cient diplomatic leverage to impose effective restraints 
7 
on the Soviet Union." 
The decision to enter into competition with the Soviet 
Union by broadening her diplomatic relations with the 
governments in Southeast Asia was based upon the proposi-
tion that diina would be in a more favourable position in 
her rivalry with the Soviet Union, because of her historical 
and cultural influences in the area. Several other incentives 
prompted the diinese leaders to make such a decision, ilrot, 
diina believed that Southeast Asia is an area of her "right-
ful" influence. Second, China believed that the technical 
and economic assistance that Indonesia, Burma and Singapore 
had received from Moscow was slight and that military 
assistance was next to nothing. Third, diina was a more 
important trading partner for at least Burma, Singapore and 
Malaysia* lastly, there had been Chou Bci-lai's assurances since 
the 1950 fs to several governments in Southeast Asia that 
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China would not interfere in the issue of the overseas 
diinese and would treat them as a "domestic Droblem" of 
the countries concerned^ 
% 1969f Peking leaders perceived that Russia's east-
ward movement would be based upon five elements: (a) the claim 
that Soviet Union is an "Asian" power, justified to seek 
protection of her Asian territory; (b) that the Soviet Union 
would aspire to replace the United States in Asia after the 
end of the Vietnamese War; (c) that the Soviet Union would .seek 
to restrict the Japanese economic influence in Southeast 
Asia| (d) that Southeast Asia was an important area for 
the expansion of Soviet navy; (e) that the Russians were 
interested in economic expansion in the area. 
Confronted with these intentions of the Russians, the 
leaders of China were determined to put forth a new strategy 
which would not emphasise the importance of revolution, but 
a new "united-front-from-above11, a strategy based upon the 
concept of the "Three Worlds". Before going on to the dis-
cussion of this concept, it is necessary to offer some 
observations of the events inside China since 1969# events 
that concerned themselves with the power struggle between 
the radicals and moderates* 
(3) THB POWBR STRUGGLE VARIABLE: 
The decision to end the Cultural Revolution was made 
by Chairman Mao in late in 1968 by eliminating the Red 
Guards as a political force "in order to restore the party 
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and its apparatus as the leading element of the political 
8 
system." Ifcr this time Mao definitely viewed the ited Guards as 
no longer useful to him. In foreign policy he was facing 
two prospects femulated by two competing groups: 
"One side, probably led by Lin Piao, agreed that 
the classic Maoist dual adversary strategy of 
simultaneous political and ideological struggle, 
with military overtones, against both American 
'imperialism' and Soviet 'revisionism1, or 
1
 social imperialism1, must be maintained and would 
suffice on both fronts; there was no need for 
diplomatic gestures, toward the United States 
at any rate *.*"9 
"*.*The other side, probably led by diou Bh-lai, 
apparently argued that ambassadorial contacts 
with the United States, which had been suspended 
since 1968, should be renewed in some of the 
countries with which China had diplomatic relations, 
as a political restrain on Moscow."10 
As we have already seen Mao had opted for the latter 
course and cast his lot with Chou, but refrained from 
speaking publicly about hie choice. 
The clash between the diinese and f&issian soldiers 
on the dienpo (Damansky) Island in March 1969 was a red 
signal to the diinese leaders suggesting that the Russians 
might intend to upset by force their own 9th Party Congress, 
as the Soviets had suppressed the Czechoslovak 14th Party 
Congress by invasion in 1968. It should be noted that it 
was Lin Piao who directed the army in fighting the dienpo 
battle, which so much enhanced his position within the 
Communist Party of diina that he was nominated heir of Mao; 
his report to the Congress rung with affirmation of Maoist 
fundamentalism, including the dual adversary strategy dis-
cussed earlier. 
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While after the Congress Peking was still advocating 
its support for revolutionary movements in theory, in actual 
fact it moved away from the dual adversary strategy and 
began to "tilt" in the direction of the United States as a 
best potential counter-weight to the Soviet Union. Even 
before the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine, already in 
July 1969$ Peking had decided to orient itself on the United 
States, but without making its intention public* This might 
have been due to practical consideration to the effect that 
a public and premature acknowledgement would confer undesi-
rable bargaining leverage upon the United States. Bit the 
most nrobable explanation maintains that an open contact 
with the United States should be postponed for a time, 
fearing that such contact might sufficiently alarm Moscow 
to precipitate its very attack that Peking was seeking so 
urgently to avoid# It was reported that after the Chenpo 
Incident the Soviet Union tested the United States "what 
would be its reaction to a Soviet destruction of diina*s 
11 
nuclear installations, and that it was discouraged*11 
% July 1969 President Nixon proclaimed the Nixon 
Doctrine9 aiming at a reduced American military posture in 
Asia for the 1970fs, to be coupled with an increased regional 
co-operation among Asian countries. At the same time, fearing 
that the proclamation of tfixon Doctrine would upset American 
friends in Southeast Asia, the United States made the last 
but temporary intrusion of her ground forces into Cambodia 
in the spring of 1970. It was generally regarded as a smoke-
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screen for the withdrawal of the American forces to start 
soon. Understanding that it was a temporary intrusion, 
China sent no forces into Cambodia to fight the American 
soldiers but just protested^ Nixon by this time came to 
the conclusion that the tendency of overestimating Chinese 
"expansionism" in Indochina was not correct and should be 
dropped. The ffarsaw talks between the two parties, though 
cancelled by the diinese on lay 20, 1970 as a protest again-
st the American intrusion into Cambodia, were resumed and 
an invitation for a visit was secretly extended by Peking 
12 to the United States President. 
B|y 1971 the conflict between diou Eh-lai and Lin Piao 
inside the Communist Party of China heightened, following 
the secret Sino-American contacts initiated in 1969, by 
which time Lin Piao found himself in a much weaker position 
in combating Chou Ba-lai. The latter obviously realized 
that if his new policy was to be carried out Lin must go* 
In mid-August 1971 Qiou began a series of moves evi-
dently aimed at Lin. A new set of the Communist Party 
Committees was set up on the provincial level under the 
directives of Qhon to replace those destroyed during the 
Cultural Revolution*. The Revolutionary Committees, those 
created by Lin, had to close down# At the same time Chou 
administered another blow to Lin Piao by announcing that 
Nixon was to visit China in 1972, destroying thus completely 
the "dual adversary" strategy of Lin. To prepare the diinese 
people for normalization between the United States and diina, 
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an important article written by Mao during the 1940*s, en-
1H 
titled f0n Policy," ^ was published and distributed in millions 
of copies among the entire population* The publieation was 
arranged by Qhou Sn-lai to reflect his current policy lines 
"*.* that China, when threatened by one imperialist 
adversary, should co-operate temporarily with a 
lesser adversary that was also at odls with the 
main enemy. This could be understood in several ways: 
as advocating co-operation with the United States 
against Japan, or as advocating co-operation with 
the United States against the Soviet Union, which 
since March 1969 has sometime been labelled 'social 
imperialist1 in Chinese propaganda."14 
Although the present day critics of Lin Piao are accusing 
him of being always pro-Soviet and anti-Mao, these charges 
are contrary to the events of 1969-1972. The latter charge 
is probably true that he intended to take away the chairman-
ship of the narty from Mao. The former, however, does not 
appear true. In fact, before he was oustered by diou and 
attempted to flee to Mongolia Lin Piao had been a persona non 
grata in Moscow because he was proclaimed Mao's heir at the 
9th Congress and the main promoter of the "People's War" 
strategy which seriously contradicted Moscow's general 
foreign policy line. Most importantly, he was the one who 
directed the people's Liberation Amy to fight the Russians 
in the Chenpo Incident in 1969• 
In view of this, the possible reasons that led to the 
downfall of Lin Piao might be summarized as follows (a) he 
opposed the opening of relations with the United States; 
(b) he created a "cult" of personality around himself that 
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became a real threat to Mao himself; (c) his military power 
threatened to reverse the Maoist, and Communist, principle 
to the effect that the party must always control the armed 
forces* 
Considering all these factors, it was obvious that Lin's 
position vis a vis Chou was untenable and he had to be 
removed. 
(4) SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE "THIRD WORLD* STRATEGY: 
A clear rejection of Lin Piao's foreign policy toward 
the ASIAN countries was first confirmed by Chou JSn-lai, 
the winner, during a visit of the Philippine President's 
brother-in-law, Governor Romualdez, to Peking in 1972; 
"During the visit* *. in 1972, he was assured by 
Chou In-lai that the previous kinase support 
for Philippine rebels had been a mistaken policy 
which was associated with the disgraced Lin Piao, 
and would not be continued* "15 
Such an open garantee made in 1972 must have impressed 
the ASEAN leaders with the expectation that China would no 
longer support the insurgent movements in their countries, 
and that instead diplomatic relations might replace it. 
When the concept of the "Third World" was publicly 
proclaimed by Teng Hsiao-ping, former Secretary General of 
the diinese Communist Party purged during the Cultural Re vo-
lution, in his speech in the United Nations in the spring of 
1974, many observers believed that it was not much different 
from the Bandung policy, 
Unlike the Bandung policy, which had aimed at the United 
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States as the only enemy, the "Third World" concept is a 
broader idea* It sees both the United States and the Soviet 
Union as adversaries, but of unequal value, and it defines 
the Soviet Union as the principal, and the United States 
as the secondary, adversary of China* The Chinese insist that: 
"As a result of the emergence of social imperia-
lism, the socialist camp which existed for a 
time after World War 11 is no longer in exis-
tence. Owing to the law of the uneven development 
of capitalism the Western imperialist bloc 
is disintegrating*"17 
Moreover, the diinese believe that the present world is 
divided into three parts, or three sectors: 
"Judging from the changes in international re-
lations, the world today actually consists 
of three parts, or three worlds, that are both 
interconnected and in contradiction to one an-
other* The United States and the Soviet Union 
make up the First World* The developing countries 
in Asia, Africa, latin America and other regions 
make up the Third World* The developed countries 
between the two make up the Second World.'*-"* 
Unlike the Bandung policy, the "Third World" concept 
classifies the Soviet Union and the United States as the 
two "superpowers", which are struggling against each other 
for "hegemony" everywhere in the world* Keeping silent 
about her own capability as a great power, China puts 
herself in the category of the "Third World." She claims 
for herself the "international duty" to oppose the domina-
tion by the two superpowers} 
"diina is a socialist country, and a developing 
country as well* China belongs to the Third 
World..* the diinese Government and the people 
firmly support all oppressed peoples and oppressed 
nations in^their struggle to win*or defend national 
independence, develop national economy and 
100 
oppose colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism, 
This is our international duty^ diina is 
not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to 
be one."19 
Seeing that the "Third World" has the majority of the 
population of the entire globe and that it is in this 
area that most of the new independent countries are situated, 
China hopes that through this concept she might win the 
support of the majority of countries in the present nation-
state system A new "united-front-from-above" is aimed at 
by this concept, hoping that by diplomatic relations with 
them diina1s influence would overtake that of the United 
States and of the Soviet Union.* At present, any change in 
"
the
 status quo through violent means is therefore undesira-
ble from Peking's point of view, 
Constituting a part of the Third World, the importance 
of the ASIAN countries was expressed by the People's Daily, 
on January 5, 1975s 
"Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, 
Indonesia etc*, are countries that constitute 
part of the Third World, Situated at the joining 
area of the Pacific and Indian Oceans their 
stragetic position as well as their abundant natural 
resources are important * These countries have 
been enslaved and exploited by colonialism and 
imperialism and, therefore, they bear the same 
destiny of the Third World countries* In the 
recent years, the Southeast Asian countries-
have continuously strengthened their relatioms 
with the other Third World countries to oppose 
big power hegemony*"20 
In texms of Peking's global strategy and diina's 
historical role, the ASIAN countries occupy a very central 
position for initiating the "Third World" concept which 
intends to break down the bi-Dolar world* However, it 
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should not lead us to believe that China's ultimate goal 
in these countries is to create another new multi-polar 
21 balance of power system involving the other big powers* 
"But diina1 s policies toward the region are not 
simply a function of a variety of local factors 
and of Peking's intricate but fluid Third World 
strategy. In any case, it represents an amalgam 
of an aligned and non-aligned nations, of radi-
cal and conservative political systems, of deep-
ly entrenched and highly vulnerable governmentsf 
Even when consistently pursuing the same objec-
tive an effective foreign policy toward these 
countries will require careful attention to 
these national variables#"22 
On the whole, the "Third World" concept is decreasing 
the use of the term "armed struggle", and the word "strug-
gle" is used merely to describe the anti-American and 
21 
anti-Soviet operations in the area* J At present, diina 
encourages armed struggles only in Africa where insurgencies 
. . 24 
are more promising. 
The term "united-frontf" which China had been using 
since 1949• is now associated with the concept of the Third 
World. The content of the "united-front" is different in 
the 1970fs from that of the 1966-1968 period* % e former 
concept signifies a "united-front-from-above," meaning 
co-operation of Chinese Government with different political 
systems through diplomatic relations* The latter concept 
denotes a "united-front-from-below," meaning unification 
under the leadership of the Communist parties of insurgent 
groups at the grass root level for a massive revolution 
against the existing governments. Toward Southeast Asia, 
the former is preferred at the present time* 
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The remaining part of this Chapter will analyze the 
relations between diina and the individual countries of 
ASIAN since 1969* 
(5) CHINA-ASIAN CONTACTS SINCE 1969? 
Ifecause diina had been isolated diplomatically from 
the ASHAN countries for more than ten years, it was difficult 
for her to initiate conventional diplomatic ties with these 
countries immediately^ Hit the most important factor which 
complicated the establishment of diplomatic ties between 
Peking and its neighbours was the past history of their 
relations: 
"At the end of 1950*s the leaders of diina... were 
willing, for a complex of reasons, to establish 
a funited-front-from-above• with the noncommunist 
and 'bourgeois* governments of these states, Bit 
shortly after Peking's diplomatic overtimes had 
been rebuffed in 1959* a ten year period of 
radical internal development in China began, ac-
companied by the intensification of both the 
Sino-Soviet conflict and the wars in Indo-
china* The combination of isolationist policies 
toward China, the leadership's concern with its 
strategic interests in ¥ietnam and Indonesia, and 
its political objective of splitting the Communist 
Camp in Asia—all these led to growing hostili-
ty between Peking and the pro-Western states of 
Southeast Asia* China renewed its interest in the 
Communist parties in these states because they 
were useful tactical weapons to counter allied 
moves in Southeast Asia and also because the 
diinese were then attempting to build their 
own Communist movement in Asia on the claim that 
Peking was more opposed to the United States 
and more diligently served the interests of 
fraternal parties, whether ruling or insurgent, 
than Moscow."25 
In spite of this uneasy history between the two parties 
during the past ten years, many reasons urged the ASBAN 
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leaders to turn to China after 1969# 
Strategically, the development of diinese nuclear 
capability during the Cultural Revolution alarmed the 
ASIAN governments because their countries found themselves 
now within the range of Peking's missiles* They all started 
to question the wisdom of continuing the isolation of the 
People's Republic of China, .and more crucially, questioned 
the credibility of the Western allies to provide an effec-
tive protection and defense* 
The announcement of the pull out of the British forces 
last of Suez in later 1960fs led the ASIAN governments to 
question whether the United States would do the same after 
the end of the war in fietnam* % the time the Nixon Doctrine 
was ^reclaimed in 1969* these governments started to re-
assess the desirability of maintaining their security 
through alignment with any of the major powers* With the 
emergence of the Japanese economic influence in Southeast 
Asia they began to look for stability through a multi-polar 
balance of interests in the area rather than through taking 
sides in a bi-polar world* In view of these developments, 
the ASEAN leaders found a common desire to re-shape the 
security in the area, and thus the diinese "Third World" 
strategy, which emphasises co-operation among all developing 
countries, found a fertile soil for a sympathetic reception. 
The decision of the ASIAN countries to move slowly to-
ward an accommodation with China was also due to the care-
ful calculation of the possibility that Peking might win 
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the control of the Communist Parties. The ASEAN governments 
were carefully watching the deterioration of relations between 
insurgency and China* Assessing the battle for ideological 
supremacy between the Soviet Union and China, they predicted 
that diina would prefer a realistic accommodation with them 
rather than ideological radicalism spoiling the prospects 
of co-operation* Consequently, since 1969, they have been in-
dicating to diina that her denial of support to the insurgen-
cies would in a significant way facilitate the establish-
ment of diplomatic ties* 
The Chinese leadership understood well these signals 
coming out of Southeast Asia and reciprocated soon by the 
announcement of the "Chou fih-lai Doctrine," in content 
similar to the Nixon .Doctrine, to the effect that China was 
mailing to terminate her support to the insurgencies in 
exchange of diplomatic relations and co-operation of the 
local governments with her in her "Third World" concept* 
(i) MALAYSIA 
Malaysia was the first country to recognize China in 
June 1974, followed by the Philippines and Thailand in 
1975* Such move was not without reasons* Ify mid-1969, the 
Kuala Lumpur Government was suffering from the "May 13 
Bacial Incident", which was generally regarded as a massa-
cre of the Chinese people by a government dominated by the 
Malays. It was believed that one of the reasons for Tun 
Bazak's visit to Peking was to placate the diinese community 
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in his country and thus to make it receptive for the elec-
tion to be held in the middle of 1974# Another reason, of 
course, was President Nixon's announcement of the Guam 
Doctrine, as well as the announcement of the British 
withdrawal east of the Suez which made the Kuala Lumpur Govern-
ment quick to sound out Peking about guarantees concerning 
both regional and internal stability*. The recognition of 
Peking, moreover, would promote the prestige of the Alliance 
Party in Malaysia and assist it to win support from the 
diinese citizens who represented close to 50 per cent of 
the electorate in the country* 
y^ early 1974 the difficulties between Peking and Kuala 
Lumpur concerning diplomatic relations seemed solved, since 
the former had indicated that it would not support the Malay** 
an Communist Party. Between 1969 and 1974, when 
governmental ties were under negotiations, the Kuala Lumpur 
Government was careful in dealing with China, first through 
unofficial contacts and later by sending its own officials 
to Peking*. It is important to note, however-* that after the 
communique was signed between Peking and Kuala Lumpur, and 
contrary to the promise not to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of the latter, diina continued practising her two-
side policy by recognizing the Kuala Lumpur Government while 
supporting the "just struggle" of the Malayan Communist Par-
ty at the same time* Such a support appeared verbal only 
because the Malayan Communist Party, in the transitional 
period, was isolated deep in the jungle* 
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Malaysia had shown interest in recognizing China as 
early as 1968 when the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku 
Abdul Bahman, stated that if China would not encourage in-
surgent movement in his country his government would consi-
der having diplomatic relations with Peking. Bahman1s state-
ment elicited no positive response from diina, probably due 
to the fact that the Cultural Hevolution was still raging 
and because Lin Piao's "People's War" strategy dominated 
Peking's foreign policy* In March 1969 the Deputy rime /imster 
Tun Abdul Bazak* set down his conditions for recognizing 
diina: 
"If Malaysia's independence and integrity could 
be guaranteed by the big powers—America, Soviet 
Union and China—then we can look forward to a 
stable and peaceful future."27 
Stepping into the year of 1970 Malaysia decided to play 
a more active role in her foreign policy through a non-
aligned posture, by repeatedly expressing her desire to en-
ter into friendly relations with diina* The first friendly 
attitude of Kuala Lumpur was her abstaining in the United 
Nations in 1970 when the Albanian resolution proposing 
admission of Peking into that international body was voted 
upon, which was quite contrary to her former vote favouring 
the maintainence of Taiwan's seat in the organisation* During 
the Commonwealth meeting held in January 1971 in Singapore, 
Bazak commented on the question of diina as follow; 
"It is a fact that China for the most part has 
been excluded from the mainstream of interna-
tional affairs for more than two decades. 1 do 
not think it is profitable, at this point of 
time, to go into the whys and wherefores of this, 
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what is of more immediate relevances is that 
as a result, a natural result some might say, 
diina does not accept the international order 
as it exists today and seeks to upset it 
because, in her view, she has been deliberately 
excluded* The countries of Southeast Asia are 
her immediate neighbours and are the first to live 
with the consequences of her policies*"28 
In the same month a clearer indication of trends to-
wards the recognition of diina emerged from Kuala Lumpur: 
"Malaysia accepts the fact that diina has a right 
to play her part in the international forums 
and to have an interest in the affairs of Asia* 
Our support of diina *s membership in the neu-
tralization of Southeast Asia is a clear mani-
festation of this belief.** We want to see diina's 
response, whether she for her part recognizes 
and respects our independence and integrity and 
our legitimate interest in Southeast Agia*.**,f29 
Peking was now in a position to respond more favourably 
to the initiations emanating from Kuala Lumpur because Lin 
Piao had no more decisive influence upon diina's foreign 
policy, as is evident from the stream of sport teams, cul-
tural delegations, technical experts and trade missions 
dispatched to Malaysia* Moreover, in ftebruary 1971 the 
diinese Bed Cross sent US$208,000 worth of relief aid for 
the Malaysian flood victims; in larch the Hong Kong pro-
Peking Silver Star Group (M^^^iM)^) visited Kuala Lumpur 
and drove the local diinese community into frenzy with joyj 
when the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement ended in April 
and was replaced by a looser pact consisting of Australia, 
New gealand, Malaysia, Singapore and United Kingdom, Peking 
attacked only the British without commenting on the other 
members of the new pact* The same month also saw the es-
108 
tablishment of a Malaysian Consulate in Hong Kong to make 
easier her trade with diinaj and in lay Malaysia sent her 
first unofficial Trade Mission to China since 1958. 
On the other hand, Peking carefully called the Mission 
as a "Malaysian Group11, indicating that it terminated its 
support to Indonesia's "Confrontation" against Malaysia 
and that it for the first time recognized the sovereignty 
and independence of the federation of Malaysia* airing the 
visit Chou Ba-lai met with its members and said that the 
overseas diinese in Malaysia should live as Malaysians. The 
result of the visit was rewarding: direct trade with diina 
instead of through middlemen in Singapore and Hong Kong; 
diina promised to buy annually 200,000 tons of rubber while 
Malaysia would import Chinese consumer goods, machinery 
and agricultural equipments; and all trade between the par-
ties would be handled by national shipping lines of the two 
countries* After the announcement that Nixon would visit 
Peking in 1972, diina sent her own trade delegation to Malay-
sia, which called upon Bazak to extend Chou Eh-lai's "best 
wishes to the Malaysian Premier. ** In October 1971, while a 
trade mission from Kuala Lumpur attended the Kwangtung fair, 
the Malaysian delegation in the United Nations voted against 
the "important question" resolution which required a two-thirds 
majority to oust the Taipei Government from the Security 
Council* 
Qr the end of 1971 diina purchased 40,000 tons of rub-
ber from Malaysia and during 1972 the Malaysian National 
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Co-operation approved 4,000 applications of Malaysian traders 
to import Chinese goods worth about M|110 million* 
These cordial relations between the two countries were 
improved by another step in 1973• During that year most 
Southeast Asian countries were seriously hit by a rice shor-
tage, and to express its concern Peking sold 100,000 tons 
of rice at a low price.to Kuala Lumpur. 
Be spite this sympathetic attitude of China, the Malaysian 
Government was weighing the advantages and' disadvantages of 
recognizing Peking* The Malaysians, and especially the 
diinese Malaysians, remembered well the "May 13 Incident" 
of 1969* and in view of this more effort had to be made to 
improve the understanding between the Malay and diinese 
races* Secondly, the problem of Communist insurgency was not 
completely solved, that there was no clear and definite an-
swer from Peking that it would cease supporting the Malayan 
Communist Party* 
Nevertheless, an unspoken accommodation between the two 
countries seemed to have been reached early in 1974, when 
Bazak was ready to deal with China to undercut the revo-
lutionary movement in his country by making it diplomatical-
ly unrewarding for China to maintain the existing level of 
her support* On the other hand, diina was ready to apply the 
"Chou Ba-lai Doctrine" in the ASIAN countries, to convince 
them that no one would return from Peking empty handed if 
willing to accept the fact that diina was now their "protec-
tor" and, most important of all, if they were willing to 
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support diina*s Third World strategy aiming at eliminating 
the influence of the Soviet Union from Southeast Asia* 
diina was ready to promote Malaysia into an example 
for other ASIAN nations to follow for several reasons* Since 
1971 Malaysia, as the most active member of the ASBAN, was 
proposing that Southeast Asia ought to be neutralized and 
that the military presence of the big powers in the area 
should be eliminated* Malaysia was also enthusiastic in 
opposing the proposal of the Soviet Union and Japan to in-
ternationalize the Malacca Strait* 
The final obstacles to Bazak1s visit to China were 
removed in early 1974 when Peking started to tone down its 
contacts with the Malayan exile organisations in the capital* 
The time was ripe, and all the Malaysian Premier had to do 
now was to jet to the Forbidden City. 
Hof^ever, the Malayan National Liberation Army was upset 
by these events, and annoyed and uneasy to see itself betray-
ed by its supporters in Peking, and^to demonstrate its dis-
pleasure it destroyed 6-million dollars worth of construc-
tion equipment on the east-west highway between Kelantan 
and Perak States on May 30, 1974, shooting a Police Inspec-
tor-General a few days later* 
These acts of violece were clearly directed at Peking, 
pointing out that the revolutionary struggle in Malaysia 
should not be sold down the river and warning the Chinese 
leaders against abandoning their ally* It seems that this 
warning was heeded in Peking because immediately after 3azak*s 
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departure for China Badio Peking broadcast support for the 
Malayan Communists* 
However, it was too late for ffezak's jet plane to make 
a U-turn and return to Kuala Lumpur* 
Now in Peking, lazak signed a joint Sino-Malaysian 
Communique with Chou En-lai on May 31* 1974 of which the 
central point dealt with Peking's stand on the overseas Chinese* 
"The Chinese Government considers anyone of diinese 
origin who has taken up of his own will, or 
acquired Malaysian nationality, as automatically 
forfeiting Chinese nationality* As for residents 
who retain Chinese nationality of their own will, 
the diinese Government, acting in accordance with its 
consistent policy, will enjoin them to abide by 
the laws of the Government of Malaysia, respect the 
customs and habits of the people there, and live 
in unity with them, and their proper rights and 
interests will be protected by'the Government ^ 
of China and respected by the Government of Malaysia*"-1 
While the Communique clarified the legal status of the 
majority of the diinese residents in Malaysia, it failed to 
resolve the position of those stateless diinese variously 
estimated at between 150,000 and 250,000* The document was 
further criticized for not even hinting at the solution of 
the problems arising from the economic strength but politi-
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cal weakness of the diinese population in Malaysia. The 
political disability of the Chinese is the real problem 
because while they comprise almost 40 per cent of the popu-
lation they are represented by less than 15 per cent of mem-
bers of the parliament* 
However, upon his return from Peking Bazak said that 
the Chinese had assured him that "the Communist activities 
are an internal affair of Malaysia and that the Government 
in Kuala Lumpur can deal with it as it pleases*"^ 
While even after the arrival of the Malaysian Ambassador 
at Peking on January 13* 1975, China maintained her ties 
with Malayan Communists, there is no public evidence that 
she called upon them to revolt* It seemed that soon the 
Malayan Communist Party reconciled itself to the diplomatic 
relations of diina with Kuala Lumpur, as is evident from 
its letter of April 11 expressing sympathy on the occasion 
of death of Tun Pi-wuf a close comrade of Kao since the 
1930*s. ^ In return and shortly after the fall of Cambodia 
the diinese Communist Party sent on April 29 a greeting to 
the Malayan Communist Party on it 45th Axmi\rersary* The 
headlines in the People's Daily explained to the Malayan 
Communists two important points: (a) that the "brotherly" 
relations between the Malayan Communist Party and the Chinese 
Communist Party would remain, although diina had recognized 
the Bazak regime through the state-to-state relations; and 
(b) that the Malayan Communist must understand the situation 
in Southeast Asia where both American and Hussian hegemony 
was the crucial issue, hinting at the same time that the aim 
of Peking's co-existence policy is to combat the main enemy—*ke 
Soviet Union through the united-front-from-above. However, 
*kc Steeple's Daily on the same day published a greeting from 
the Malayan Communists celebrating the victory in Cambodia, 
which said that Cambodia's example would inspire the Malayan 
Liberation Movement in the future* On May 2 the diinese Com-
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munist Party published another latter of the Malayan Communist 
Party celebrating its own 45th Anniversary., The letter re-
affirmed the position that the Malayan revolution would be 
carried out by means of armed struggle? 
"According to our country's (Malaya, Ed*) concrete 
situation*.* if our revolution is to be successful, 
we cannot follow the 'parliamentary democratic line,1 
nor the way of armed uprising in cities; we can 
only be successful to attain political poorer by 
encircling the cities from villages, i.e** through 
araed struggle* Therefore we must uphold this 
correct line under any circumstance*"37 
Yet, the position of the diinese Communist Party was 
clear: it believed at this point that Malaysia was not ready 
for revolution, and that unless the Malayan Communist Party 
broadened it united-front-from-below to include different 
races of the country, the party was doomed to be confined 
in its struggle to the jungle# Although basically the diinese 
Communist Party does not disagree with the strategy of the 
Malayan Communists, which is an exact copy of the diinese 
experience of the 1930's .Peking advised the Malayan Communists 
on April 29, 1975 that: 
"••• the Malayan Communist Party must and shall 
strengthen its consolidation based on Marxist-
Leninist principles, sufficiently mobilize 
all races, all strata of masses of the people, 
unite all possible forces to fight the enemy 
together, and overcome various difficulties in 
order to achieve a new and greater victory*"38 
It should be noted that in 1975 the diinese Communist 
Party was not satisfied with the activities of the Malayan 
Communists because these restricted themselves to mobili-
zing only the diinese population of the country* Avoiding 
the use of the term "class-struggle," the diinese Communists 
urged the Malayan Communists to unite with other "strata 
of the masses of people," meaning with the Malays, Indians 
and other races* The leaders in Peking understand well that 
the fire of class-struggle in Malaya cannot be intensified 
for the moment, and that for a period of time this style 
of struggle must be postponed into the future* At the moment, 
diina prefers to woo ffetzak's regime through the state-to-
state relations, trade and other contacts. 
Bj$r the end of 1975 China quoted with great relish from 
the Malaysian press any anti-Soviet postures, while trade 
and other contacts grew in extent* In August even the broad-
cast of the Malayan ¥oice of Involution accepted the guide-
line of Peking to shift its attention from Bazak1s regime to 
attacks'upon the Soviet Union and its diplomatic, economic 
and political activities in Southeast Asia* 
(ii) THB PHILIPPINES 
While preliminary contacts between China and the Philip-
pines were initiated in 1969* it was not until 1974 that 
Marcos explicitly showed his willingness to enter into diplo-
matic relations with Peking* This willingness was expressed 
through the visit of Ifedame Marcos to Peking in September 
1974* Seeing the accommodation and then full diplomatic 
ties between Kuala Lumpur and Peking attained in 1974 on 
the basis of reasonable terms of the Sino-Malaysian Communique, 
and then watching the fall of Cambodia and South fietnam 
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into the hands of the Indochinese Communists in April 1975* 
Marcos was alarmed and ready to move* In view of this he 
decided in June 1975 to seek guarantees from Peking that 
it would not support the insurgency in the Philippines in 
exchange for diplomatic ties with his country* Peking, on 
the other hand, appeared satisfied from the fact that the 
Philippines, this important member of the SBATO, decided 
to bow« 
Looking at the background of these events, Marcos had 
said already in 1968 that by the time of the American with-
drawal from Asia some arrangement with diina would be neces-
sary* However, when this time approached Marcos could not 
make up his mind, showing good-will at one time while critic-
izing China at other for supporting rebels' in his country* 
diina, on the other hand, carefully avoided any criticism 
of Marcos* During the riots of the pro-Peking students in 
Manila in 1970, Marcos* interest in a new diina policy tempo-
rarily cooled off* To warn up Marcos' spirit, Peking sent 
US$83*000 as a contribution to flood victims in the Philip-
pines in November, avoiding carefully to mention the insurgen-
cy in its press. In larch 1971 Peking further showed its 
good-will by returning a hijacked Philippine plane to Manila 
within 24 hours* In return, Marcos permitted a ping-pong 
team to visit Peking in May, which was received by Chou En-
lai who hinted that diina was ready to enter into diplomatic 
ties with Manila* The prospect of new relations marked a 
high point in fey 1971 * when Marcos said for the first time 
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that he did not believe that diina was trying to export 
revolution and intended to dominate Asia* 
The end of 1971 saw a sudden change in Marcos* He sus-
pended the habeas corpus and repeatedly stated that the 
armed insurgent movement in his country was supported by a 
"foreign power", meaning clearly Ghina^ In the United Nations 
Manila was the only country in Asia to vote against Taipei's 
expulsion from that organisation in November 1971* Following 
the position taken by the United States, Manila voted for 
admission of China into the United Nations but opposed ex-
pulsion of Taiwan* 
When after diina1s admission into the United Nations 
there was a rush for recognizing her, Marcos changed his 
attitude once again and mounted fresh initiatives* 
Throughout 1972 a stream of visitors from the Philippines 
went to diina, while Peking sent its first ship to the Philip-
pines with 2104 tons of relief goods for flood victims*, 
Moreover, Marcos1 brother-in-law, Benjamin Hernandez, paid a 
9-day visit to Peking, talked for two hours with Chou Efct-
lai* and asked him three questions in Marcos1 name: 
"Would the People's Hepublic of diina agree to 
cultural) trade and other links, short of diplomatic 
relations? If not, would it agree to establish 
diplomatic relations without disturbing the exis-
ting relations between Manila and Taipei? And 
would the People's ftepublic of diina refrain from 
stirring up overseas diinese or other groups in 
the Philippines?"40 
Ghou's reply was clear: China would have no diplomatic 
relations with the Philippines if the latter continued her 
ties with Taipei; China would maintain her five principles 
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of peaceful co-existence; diina does not believe that re-
volution can be exported/ and that she would not interfere in 
the Philippine domestic affairs, including matters concer-
ning the overseas diinese* 
By this time both parties realized that the main obstacle 
in the way of diplomatic ties stemmed from the internal 
unrest in the Philippines* However, when the martial law 
was introduced by Marcos in September 1972, the Philippine 
press did not blame Peking for the internal disturbances. 
from this significant event it would then appear that Marcos 
was now ready to ?#alk toward China with slow but steady steps * 
In 1973 the Philippines sent several delegations to 
Peking and the Kwangtung B&ir* and in exchange Peking dis-
patched a trade mission to the Philippines. In the same year 
Chou En-lai said to a group of Philippine visitors that 
the "trade relations between the two countries can be imme-
diately expanded and further developed into diplomatic re-
lations in the near future."4 Bjy July 1973 export to China 
from the Philippines jumped to US$25 million, and when China 
started to explore her newly developed oil indurstry a consi-
derable amount of petroleum was exported to the Philippines, 
while her sugar, coconut oil and wood were imported by China* 
Both were happy with such a development* 
fihen it appeared to the leaders of both countries that 
relations between them could be raised to a semi-diplomatic 
level, Mrs. Imelda Marcos visited Ohina in September 1974 
with the result that Peking, seeing the Philippines suffering 
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from the oil crisis, promised to sell her "no less than 
42 
one billion barrels of crude oil yearly." 
Early 1975 saw the highest point of contacts between 
the two countries, especially in Januainr and February, during 
which time the insurgent movement that once had hindered 
their relations was not mentioned in the Chinese press, ex-
cept on Stebruary 22 when the Philippine Communist Party 
sent a greeting to Chou Eta-lai wishing success for the 4th 
National People's Congress* •* %is f of course, the larcos 
regime had to tolerate* In the meantime many Chinese delega-
tions visited Manila* On January 5* & Chinese Trade Exhi-
45 
bition was held in Manila ^ and on February 16, Marcos 
received a diinese physician for personal consultations• ' 
On March 2, 1975, seeing the deteriorating situation 
in Indochina and after consulting his cabinet and other high 
military officials* Marcos announced that the "Philippines 
is to normalise her relations with the People's Republic of 
China within 1975,f* adding that: 
"When the weather is warmer, 1 might visit 
Peking myself in order to actualize this *«. 
normalisation between the two countries*" 
The puzzling expression "when the weather is warmer" 
might have meant two things: either the last stage of the 
war in Indochina through increased armed confrontation, or 
a warmer response from Peking, It was the latter assumption 
which proved correct because by that time Peking nearly 
caught the fish and would not let it go* On January 5, 1975 
diina reported and appreciated the Philippines1 national!-
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za t ion of the imerican ifeso Oil Cormany and nra ised t h i s as 
48 
sfan act of justice of the Philippine peopled struggle* 
On the same day the People *s Jaily reported that the Philippine 
National Ochestra in Manila had played in its loro^ rarame a 
Chinese hit piano piece called Huang Ho tyl^4)9 the Yellow 
^.verf praising this ae wa sign of a further understanding of 
4Q 
the Chinece neople."^ jfollowins; the reception of the Philip-
pine delegation of petroleum industry by hifrh Chinese officials 
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on Karch 21, Marcos looked UP to the sky and said to himself 
that lthe weather is vara enough for a vi^it of Peking." 
Is the developments were surging ahead, Peking announced 
on Hay 30 that Marcos wrs to visit China, in early June. 3ro 
drjs later, ii order XQ emphasize this imp »rtant shift in 
Manila's policy towards Peking its press mounted criticism 
of the "Soviet Union and its intention of expanding naval 
52 forces into Southeast \sir,# 
1'Pvrcos arrived in Pekinr on June 6 and on the same day the 
People ys Oaily published four articles introducing the ."tepublic 
of the Philippines to the people of diina• One of them discussed 
the "lonr; historical ties11 b tween the two countries, particular-
51 ly emphasising the contact during she '"in" ^rm sty* ^ Faroes met 
Itao Jse-tung and talked with feng Ilsiao-pin^, but could not met 
Chou ,-&i-lai becuse the Prenier was sick in honpital* At the 
banquet we leonine :he "'resident and Kadame riarcos both 2onr 
Hsiao-ping and T'arcos recalled attain the "length historical 
relations17 between the two countries* T'eng said that China 
would base her diplomatic re la ; ions with the Philippines 
on b e following principlest 
"•*• it is possible for countries with different 
social systems to develop state relations on the 
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basis of the five principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l integrity," 
mutual non-aggression* non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit and peaceful co-existence* Our policy 
and stand are consistent and firm* "54 
Commenting on the situation in Southeast Asia, Teng 
said that diina "noted" the proposal of the ASBAN on neu-
tralisation of this important area of the world: 
"We are glad to note the significant progress 
of the struggle of the people of Southeast Asian 
countries to safeguard independence and sovereign-
ty
 # fhe Southeast Asian countries have won ex-
tensive international support for their positive 
position for establishing a zone of peace and 
neutrality in Southeast Asia and barring super-
power interference and contention. We sincerely 
hope that these countries will unite more close-
ly with other third world countries and play a 
greater role in international affairs."55 
feng Hsiao^ping particularly stressed the "wicked" 
intentions of the Soviet Union toward the area which followed 
on the heels of American defeat in Indochina and warned 
that: 
"What should especially put people on the alert 
is the fact that while one superpower has to 
withdraw after suffering a defeat, the other 
superpower, with unbridled ambition, is trying 
to sei^e the chance to carry out expansion by 
overt or covert means of contest into the area*## 
The people of Asian countries, who have rich 
experience in combating imperialism, will see 
through superpower wiles and schemes, guard 
against fletting the tiger in through the back 
door w h i l e ^ r e ^ l l ^ 
^ _ ^ ^ — _ 
Marcos also spent a lot of time during his address on 
the "historical relations" of China with the Philippines, 
dating back to the Sung (960-1279) and the Ming (1369-
1644) dynasties when a tributary system had been practised 
57 between these two countries, and explained why the diplo-
matic relations had to be delayed until 1975: 
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t#Some years back it was said of the Philippines 
that we were apprehensive of Japan, fearful of 
China, watchful of Indonesia, and aggravated 
by India—so that Philippine policies were ori-
ented toward lesser Asian countries and stronger 
non-Asian nations, Perhaps these were the genuine 
perceptions at the time* fhey were, in any case, 
a realistic basis for the premises of diplomatic 
dependence• 
It may be pointed out that as a people we are 
good and dependable friends and fearlessly loyal 
allies* Our national character is reflected in 
the policies of our Government, sometimes as we 
have learnt, to our great disadvantage. It is 
only when our friendship is repeatedly depre-
ciated or taken for granted that we make an 
effort to do what is distaseful to us, to act 
as if selfishly, with a singular devotion to our 
strict national interests#f|58 
And Marcos continued to hint that as his governments 
old policy of a close alliance with a superpower, the United 
States, would gradually decrease, he would re-examine the 
role of the Philippines as an Asian country: 
"So historical experience and realism both bid 
us to be more objective and less emotional, or 
if we are to engage our emotions* it should be 
based on our authentic identity as Asians• It 
is on this basis that we re-examine the world, 
our region and ourselves* fhe old modes of 
thought can no longer sustain us or any other 
nation in Asia* We must review our alliance, re-
appraise our destiny| and, in a word, go out 
into the world*"59 
Marcos further indicated that he would support Ghinafs 
flfhird florid11 policy, praising China as its leader: 
"1 believe that China, with the depth of the moral 
outrage she has shown for the inequities of the 
past and the present, is the natural leader of 
the third world*"60 
On June 9, 1975 a Joint Communique was published which, 
after restating the principles of peaceful co-existence, 
declared in Article 2 that both countries would not inter-
fere in each other1s internal affairs: 
"The two Governments hold that the economic, poli-
tical and social, sustain of a country should be 
chosen ony by the people of that country, with-
out outside interference*
 # * 
fhe two Governments agree that all foreign 
aggression and subversion and all attempts by 
any country to control any other country or to in-
terfere in its internal affairs are to be con-
demned* They are opposed to any attempt by any 
country or group of countries to establish hege-
mony or create spheres of influence in any part of 
the world,"61 
On the issue of the overseas Chinese, the Communique said 
that: 
"fhe Government of the People fs Republic of diina 
and the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines consider any citizen of either 
country as automatically forfeiting his original 
citisenship*"62 
fhe Philippine President's visit to Peking thus ended 
almost 25 years of confrontation between Peking mnd Manila* 
After Marcos1 visit and through the entire year of 1975, 
China did not even utter one word about the insurgency in 
the Philippines* Instead, she was interested in promoting 
the prospering trade exchange between the two countries, 
and in reprinting in her own press the criticism appearing 
in the Philippine press of the Soviet Union1s political, mi-
litary and economic activities in Southeast Asia. It was ob-
vious that the Philippines began to lean on China, once an 
"itchy pillow", but now a "soft and romantic" cushion* 
(iii) THAILANP 
China1s a t t i tude toward fhailand in early 1969 consisted1 
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of an expectation from her not to intervene and involve 
herself in the Indochinese War, and a pressure to give up» 
her ties with the United States* However, as soon as moderate 
policies were introduced in China after the downgrading of 
Lin Piao, Thailand responded with her traditional flexibili-
ty and gradually started to bend her posture to the east* 
throughout 1970 and 1973# and until Thanom Kittikachorn was 
forced to leave his country in October 1973» there was an 
intensive debate within the Thai cabinet over the China 
question* One side, headed by fhanom himself, maintained 
that the alliance with the United States was necessary and 
that Thailand should not recognise China at the moment* An-
other side, headed by foreign Minister Thanat Ihoman, argued 
that sooner or later Thailand would have to accept the reali-
ty that China could not be ignored and that in view of this 
she should recognise Peking as soon as possible for the sake 
of the long term national interest, Thanat Ihoman1s enthusia-
sm for travelling abroad to propagate the necessity of re-
cognising China led to his ouster from the cabinet by Kitti-
kachorn in 1973• ^he latter was to hand over his premier-
ship to Sanya lhammasakti after the student unrest in October 
1973* However, Sanya also found himself unable to handle the 
internal and external situations and had to resign, and it 
was only in January 1975 that the diina issue was assigned 
the highest priority after Kukri t promoj became the new 
premier. Understanding well that Thailand1s security in the 
future would be affected by the attitude of Cambodia and 
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Vietnam, the new premier persistently urged the Americans 
to leave his country immediately* He realised that it was 
necessary to seek accommodation with the Communist big-bro-
ther, China, in order to use her influence to restrain the 
Communist neighbours hoping that the diplomatic ties with 
her would oblige her not to encourage the Cambodian .and 
Vietnamese Communists to support the revolutionary activities 
in Thailand* 
Until the Communist takeovers in Cambodia, South Viet-
nam and Laos, diina consistently held that the withdrawal 
of American troops from Thailand was the pre-condition for 
her denial, or elimination, of support to the insurgent 
movement in that country* Shortly after the Communist vic-
tories, however, diina started to reconsider her position 
concerning the withdrawal of American troops, because by 
mid-1975 she faced the dilemma of either the American or the 
Soviet Union1s presence in Southeast Asia# 
The result of this new assessment was the conclusion 
not to regard the United States as diina1s "main enemy" and 
the limited presence of its forces in Southeast Asia as a 
threat to Peking1s security, but rather to consider Moscow's 
influence in the area as the main danger for the future,, 
This was the new perspective that Peking was anxious to im-
press upon the governments of Southeast Asia in the new 
situation* 
In February 1969# the national election saw the govern-
mental party, the United Thai Peoplefs Party, to win a ma-
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jority of 75 seats in parliament. Shortly after the election 
Thanat Ihoman indicated that Thailand was ready to sit down 
for discussion with China, and that a stable settlement in 
Southeast Asia would require her participation, ^ which was 
responded to by the demand of the Thai Qhamber of Commerce 
that the government should ease restriction on trading with 
China* Peking, however, was not ready to change its policy 
toward Thailand at this juncture, partly due to the fact 
the Lin Piao was still dominating the foreign policy process, 
and partly due to the fact that the Thais still maintained 
their relationship with the United States and assisted them 
in the Indochinese far* 
% 1970 the creative and forward looking Thai Foreign 
Minister called for another Bandung Conference, and although 
the idea was oremature China responded by toning down her 
support to guerrilla war in that country. In return, the 
Thai Government decided to withdraw itw troops from Vietnam as 
veil as not to send troops to help Lon Nol against the 
Sihanoukists and the Khmer Rouge* Both Hanoi and Peking 
were quite impressed by the new Thai policy* Moreover, when 
the former Thai Premier Pridi Phanomyong, who had been living 
for some 20 years in Peking, decided to leave diina for an 
exile in Paris, the Thai Government awarded him a passport 
and a pension as well, which obviously signified that Pridi 
had given up, with the consent of Peking, the armed strug-
gle in his country# Further, he was permitted to leave Peking 
with a mission to act as a go-between the two governments* 
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When Nixon called for "Asianisation11 of regional secu-
rity in 1971, the Thai Foreign Minister criticized the de-
cline of American economic aid to his country and the in-
trusion of tie United States into the world rice market* 
Daring the "ping-pong diplomacy11 in May Thanat referred to 
Peking as the Peoplefs Hepublic of China, first time a Thai 
official used such a term, meaning that Bangkok1s relations 
with Taiwan would undergo a drastic change. 
However, the Thai generals were not very pleased with 
the announcement of the planned Nixon1s trip to diina. Thanat 
seamed to have been holding back his advocation of normali-
sing with China when he said that he hoped that the Southeast 
Asian countries would not "jump on the band?/agonft, and he 
was obviously under pressure from ELttikachorn to express 
the government's view that Thailand could not follow Washing-
ton^ new policy towards Peking because Thailand was a small 
country close to China# having a Peking supported insurgency 
and a large Chinese community in it# 
13jy the end of 1971, following the failure of the Ameri-
can resolution in the United Nations, the Thai delegation 
abstained rather than voting agaisnt the Albanian resolution 
which supported the admission of the People's Stepublic of 
^hina into this world organisation. Personal contact began 
in the United Nations immediately after the arrival of the 
Chinese delegation in lfew York# Domestically, the Kittikachorn 
regime was under a continuous pressure from the press and 
opposition, urging it to soften its attitude toward China* 
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Pridi* then in Paris, urged too Thailand to recognise diina 
immediately. As a result, Thanom Kittikachorn removed the 
ban on diinese trade in November 1971, relaxed the anti-
Communist laws and allowed the sport and cultural exchanges 
with China* 3ut the Thai Government insisted that formal 
diplomatic relations with China ffere not yet desirable. 
Despite the indications from China that she was willing to 
tone down her support to the Thai Communist Party, Kittika-
chorn insisted that his country would continue close ties 
with SRaiwan and opposed publicly Thanat Khoman's demand 
for an immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with 
China* To foster his tight rule, the Premier and his generals 
dissolved the cabinet on November 17, dissolved the parlia-
ment, suspended the constitution, and declared martial law. 
Most noteworthy, Ihoman1s responsibility for foreign affairs 
was handed over to Kittikachorn* 
Unlike the coup dfetat of 1958, the coug_ of 1971 had 
no external support from the United States. While the United 
States had supported Saritfs coup in 1958 because she was 
interested in winning Thailand over to combat Communism, 
14 years later feshington was courting diina and cutting 
back its military presence everywhere in Asia* 
Seeing that the change of attitude of Kittikachorn1s 
government would be a slow process, Peking applied again a 
pressure upon it through supporting the Communist insurgency 
in the country by revolutionary rhetoric. Such a pressure 
however, was more a ploy for bargaining with the Thai Govern-
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ment to make it disengage itself from the Indochina conflict, 
In fact, Peking was very eager to see Thailand going 
its way, and many informal contacts between the tm?o countries 
developed despite Thanomfs involvement in Indochina* In Sep-
tember 1972 Thanosi permitted the Thai ping-pong teas to 
visit Peking and Prasit Kancharawit, powerful director of 
Finance, Economy and Industry of the National Executive 
Council, was attached to it as an "advisor11* He was received 
by Qhou Ea-lai ?#ho told him that China, while not in-
terfering in the internal affairs of other countries, never-
theless supported the struggle for freedom of various peo-
ples against foreign imperialism. This was a clear hint that 
the Thai Government should force the United States to leave 
their country if they expect from Peking to tone down its 
support for the Communist insurgency in Thailand. Chou fur-
ther said that the overseas Chinese in Thailand should be 
loyal to the country of their residence and obey its laws. 
Finally, China promised to buy 60,000 tons of maize from 
Bangkok* 
By the end of 1973 Thanom accepted the inevitable fact 
and decided to accommodate Peking with full diplomatic re-
lations* Bit it was too late new, because he fell after the 
October uprising of the students in Bangkok* Acting as a 
care-taker government, the new premier, Sanya Ihammasakti, 
former Chancellor of the Thamasat University, immediately 
repealed the 1959 "Revolutionary Party Decree No* 53fft which 
had prohibited any contacts with Ooiiimunist states and dispat-
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ched his Deputy Foreign Minister Ghatichai dioonhavan to 
64 Peking in December 1973* 
China was unable to follow the confusing internal poli-
tics in Biailand in 1974, and had to wait until the political 
dust settled and a stable leader emerged. 
In January 1975 the People*s Daily spent much space 
reporting upon the domestic and international position of 
Thailand. In that month Thailand experienced unrest again, 
and diina made use of the situation for continuously attac-
king the United States* On January 5, 1975 the People*s Daily 
reported that the Thai student and worker's movement was in 
fact an ftanti-American struggle,11 but there was no mention 
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of the "armed struggle,11 ' and on the same day the Deputy-
55 
Foreign Minister was received by Chou iSn-lai. 
On January 14 and 16, 1975, when reporting upon the 
worker's and peasantfs unrest in Thailand, Peking critici-
zed the United States again, but denounced the Soviet Union 
more seriously in the same reports for her attempt to domi-
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mte the Thai economy* there was no comment on the Thai 
Government* This possibly meant that by January 1975 China 
was eager for an accommodation with the Thais almost at any 
price, as was further evident from the fact that although 
the Indochinese War was at its highest tide, there was no 
attack upon the Thai Government in Chinese press. The only 
report was a message sent by the Thai Communist Party to 
Peking congratulating upon the success of the 4th National 
Peoplefs Congress, a message which any "bourgeois11 govern-
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ment would not object to* 
Following the publication of a report on the reception 
of the Chinese Medical Society by the Speaker of the new Thai 
National Congress during its visit to Bangkok on March 11, 
go 
1975, the People1 s Daily commented upon the results of the 
Thai elections held in January 1975, after a delay of about 
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two months* The publication of the results of the elections 
with such a delay implied that the Peking leaders were con-
fident by that time that the new cabinet headed by llrukit 
71 Promo3 would show friendly attitude to China* This delay 
in reporting was probably due to the fact that during the 
intervening two months, Peking was reviewing the possible 
course which the new government might take. 
From April to July, until Kukrit pramojfs visit to 
Peking in July, the People1g Daily published almost 
10 articles on Thailand, mostly emphasising the necessity 
for the United States to pull out, attacking the Soviet 
Union's Collective Security Proposal, and only one protested 
against the Thai Government's action on the "rfayagues11 
Incident in which the United States made use of Thailand1 s 
territory for a military operation against Cambodia* 
On April 14, 1975 Qhlna published a letter of the Thai 
Communist Party on the occasion of death of an old member of 
the Chinese Communist Party, Tun Pi-wu. On Hay 9> after the 
fall of Cambodia, the Peopleys Daily: praised her concept of 
the People's War and its successful application in Cambodia. 
Bit there was no indication that this strategy would be 
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utilised to overthrow the Bangkok regime* It only stated 
that it ras a '^strongest weapon11 for national liberation 
movement, Teporting on student protest in Bangkok against 
the continuous use of Thailand by the Americans against 
Cambodia, Peking was signalling to Kukrit that his regime 
should get rid of them as soon as possible * Iloreover, be-
cause by this time Bangkok and Peking were ready to enter 
into diplomatic relations, it might have been a smokescreen 
and a mere lip service to please the Thai Communist Party* 
Bangkok, however, understood well that not the United States 
but the ftissians ?/ere the main concern of the diinese then. 
In view of this, the Thai Foreign Minister played up the 
Ohinese by stating on May 15 that "Thailand refuses to par-
ticipate in any Collective Security organisation in Southeast 
72 Asia sponsored by the Russians.11 
Obviously expressing dissatisfaction over the delay 
in the establishment of diplomatic relations since Kttkrit 
ce.me to power, the People1 s Daily published a statement of 
the Thai Peoplefs Voice on May 21, to the effect that the 
"Peoplefs War was a magic weapon to beat imperialists and 
reactionaries,11 of which the latter part clearly referred 
to the Thai Government* Understanding well this hint, Thai-
land moved a step forward by entering into diplomatic re-
lations with North Korea, a, close ally of China on May 25, 
1975, while the Thai press supported the Philippines in en-
tering into diplomatic relations with China in early June. 
Finally, Bangkok announced on June 29, 1975 that the 
132 
Thai Prime Minister was to visit diina, !^ and following 
Marcos* return to Manila Kukrit Praaoj stepped into his 
shoes and went to the Forbidden City on July 1* He was too 
eager to shake diou En-lai's hand in order to promote his 
own prestige at home* 
China was to profit from Kukrit's visit too, of course, 
because the former used the occasion to attack the Soviet 
Union as vehemently as during Marcos1 appointment# At the 
state banquet Teng Hsiao-ping, substituting for Chou En-lai, 
emphasised the importance of ant i-hegemoni em * He told the 
Thai leader to be watchful of the Soviet Union after the 
withdrawal of the Americans from Vietnam: 
"Now, this superpower (the United States, Id.) has 
finally suffered irrevocable defeat*## It is, how-
ever, noteworthy that the other superpower (the 
Soviet Union, Id*) with wild ambition has extend-
ed its tentacles far and wide* It insatiably seeks 
new military bases in Southeast Asia and sends 
its naval vessels to ply the Indian and West Paci-
fic Oceans, posing a menacing threat to the peace 
and security of the Southeast Asian countries. 
The spectre of its expansionism now haunts South-
east Asia, as it hankers for converting this «,-
region into its sphere of influence some day*11 
airing the banquet both Teng Hsiao-ping and Itikrit re-
viewed, as Marcos did, the long historical relations which 
existed between the two countries, emphasizing that "our 
two countries are close neighbours, and that there existed a 
kinship-like traditional ties between our two peoples*11 
Vftiile Teng said that the ^friendly contacts between our 
peoples can be traced back to more than two thousand years,if 
Eiikrit emphasized that, "In actual fact mutual understanding 
and sympathy between China and the countries of Southeast 
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Asia have existed since ancient times; in the case of Thai-
land and diina, contacts between the Thais and Chinese go 
7? back thousands of years*11 
On July 2, 1975 a Joint Communique was signed* Mke the 
Communique signed with the Philippines, besides mentioning 
the five principles of peaceful co-existence as a basis of 
diplomatic ties, Article 4 states that both parties would 
not interfere in each other*s internal affairs: 
s,The two governments agree that all foreign 
aggression and subversion and all attempts by 
any country to control any other country or 
to interfere in its internal affairs are im-
permissible and are to be condemned*ft78 
On the issue of the overseas Chinese, which is so cen-
tral to the Thais, Article 8 states: 
11
 The Government of the Peoplefs Hepublic of Qiina 
take note of the fact that for centuries diinese 
residents in Thailand have lived in harmony and 
amity with the Thai people in conformity with 
the laws of the land and with the customs and 
habits of the Thai people* The Government of 
the People's Republic of China declares that 
it does not recognise dual nationality* Both 
Governments consider anyone of Chinese nationa-
lity or origin who acquires Thai nationality as 
automatically forfeiting diinese nationality* 
As for those Chinese residents in Thailand who 
elect to retain Chinese nationality of their 
own will, the Chinese Government, acting in ac-
cording with its consistent policy, will en-
join them to abide by the laws of the Kingdom 
of Thailand, respect the customs and habits of 
the Thai people and live in amity* Their proper 
rights and interests will be protected by the 
Government of diina and respected by the Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of Thailand. tf79 
Peking got what it wanted by entering into diplomatic 
relations with the Kingdom of Thailand because the following 
months saw vehement and emotional attacks on the Soviet 
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Union mounted by the Thai press. Mice the Philippines, the 
Thais bent with the prevailing eastern wind. 
(iv) S1NGAPOH1 
Compared with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, 
Singapore is less enthusiastic about recognizing the People*s 
lepublic of China. Probably due to absence of a revolutionary 
"liberation movement ,fl it has not to worry about the threat 
from China* Further, Singapore has no diplomatic ties with 
Taipei, which makes Peking less antagonistic toward the 
lee Kuan-yew Government* % 1970, the idea of re-unification 
with Malaysia became a non-issue, forcing the Malayan 
Communist Party to put Singapore aside for the moment in 
its plans* Bit a more important reason responsible for the 
lee Government's delaying the recognition of China is the 
problem of national identity of Singapore* Having some 75 
per cent of ethnic Chinese in its population, Singapore in 
the past was called the !tThird diina11 by its neighbours* 
lee and his cabinet fear that premature diplomatic ties 
with Peking would possibly generate a wave of Chinese 
chauvinism and thus make the countries such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia uneasy because of their ethnic composition* It is 
true that Malaysia had her diplomatic relations with Peking 
in 1974; but it is also true that this did not mean that the 
Kuala Lumpur leaders wanted the Singapore Government to 
follow in their steps too early. It is therefore understan-
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dable to hear from lee, even after the end of the Indochinese 
7/ar, that Singapore would be the last of the ASEAN countries 
to recognise China* 
However, it appears that Singapore had a tacit consent 
from China to delay recognition and diplomatic ties in 
favour of trade and cultural exchanges at this stage* % 1971 
Singapore1s trade with China beat the record of U83160 
million, and since 1971 Singapore has been continuously 
sending her trade missions and technical delegations to 
Peking* On the other hand, diina stopped describing the Ma-
laysian and Singapore Governments as the flBahman-»1jee Kuan-
yew-3azak clique11 since 1971 • 
In May 1971 China did not respond when lee charged three 
Chinese newspapermen involved in the 8fSlack Operation11 which 
glamorised Communism and stirred up communal and chauvinistic 
sentiments over the status of the diinese language and cul-
ture in Singapore* Bven after closing down the Eastern Sun, 
an English newspaper, alleging that it was financed by Peking, 
China's leaders remained silent, which made the people of 
Singapore hard to believe that Peking was not pulling the 
strings* 
To extend a friendly gesture to the People's Action 
Party government after the incident, Peking received in 
October 1971 the first diinese Chamber of Commerce mission, 
the first mission sent by Singapore since 1956* In Peking 
the Chinese officials agreed to send 10 vessels to Singapore 
every month to pick up cargoes destined for European ports 
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in order to break the monopoly of cargo shipping by the 
far Eastern Freight, a loropean shipping fleet which was 
charging too much for cargoes from Southeast Asia* In res-
ponse to this help the Singapore Government voted for diina*s 
admission into the United Nations, sending in November a 
ping-pong team to Peking* Besides these trade and cultural 
activities, Singapore was not interested in diplomatic and 
political relations with China. The officials in the republic 
insisted that the Communist threat in Malaysia definitely 
had a direct bearing on Singapore* lee was extremely care-
ful in dealing with the diina issue, fearing that any poli-
tical move would harm his effort of building the Singaporean 
national identity and that it might stimulate the opposition 
to exploit it* 
In July 1972, when the Chinese ping-pong team toured 
Singapore, China acknowledged the legitimacy of the island 
republic in her press by reporting that lee Kuan-yew, wthe 
Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore11 had received 
the team* ?ftien the People fs Action Party won all 65 parlia-
mentary seats in the elections of September 1972, the Peking 
leaders were ready to deal with the government in a, more 
formal way* However, Singapore was not ready and preferred 
non-official ties* Lee^ attitude toward China after his 
successful elections was clear: he neither wanted to make the 
Communist giant angry by criticising its support of revo-
lutionary movements in Southeast Asia, nor was he willing 
to get closer to it other than with trading* 
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111 do not see a diinese iavyf a diinese Seventh 
Fleet complete with missile cruiser in the 
South Pacific or the Indian Oceans in the 1970s* 
Ilore trade, particularly in the simplier i^ nt>* 
facturcs—cheap garments, footwears, processed 
food, lathes and simple machinery, yes.tf80 
In 1973, Singapore's trade with China reached another 
ne?? record of US 1300 million, not including trade through 
the colony of Hong Kong* Singapore's official position 
maintained that the diplomatic ties v/ith Peking were only 
a matter of time, but that Singapore would prefer her ISBAW 
partners to take the initiative and make the first move. 
% mid-1974, after 3azakfs return from the successful 
China trip, lee expressed his view on the China issue to the 
effect that he did not share Jfalaysia's confidence that 
diina would always respect the sovereignty and independence 
of the Southeast Asian countries: 
"Once the influence of the other great power 
in the region had been effectively checked, 
China would probably seek to expand its own 
pressure and activities* lf32 
Relating this fear to Singapore herself, Lee was still 
concerned with two old problems: 
w(l) The need to assure her neighbours that 
diplomatic recognition will not make her an 
1
 out-post of Chinese influence1; and (2) the 
danger of arrival of diinese chauvinism accom-
panied by communal tensions. ,f83 
J?hus the relations between the two were restricted to 
trade and cultural exchanges for the time being. On March 14, 
1975 the Peoplef s "Daily published an article saying that 
friendly relations between Singapore and China were developing 
A A 
in trade and cultural events, and concluded that lfthe 
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recent contacts have been developing fast.11 This article 
further summarised the attitude of China toward Singapore 
during Bajaratnamfs visit to Peking. Baring the dinner to 
welcome the Singapore guest, the Chinese Foreign Minister 
diiao Xuan-hua said on March 13 that both parties should 
further develop their lfdeep traditional, economic and cnl~ 
tral relations,u while Bajaratnam replied that "historical 
and cultural traditions brought by the overseas diinese 
have been acting as a bridge for understanding between China 
and Singapore^11 Both parties seemed to realize that the 
time was not yet ready to exchange ambassadors, and each 
side was contented with the existing relations** The Singapore 
visitors were later received by Chou Bn-lai. 
Following this, Singapore continued sending cultural 
87 
delegations, including soccer and swimming teams, to diina. 
When the swimming team celebrated Singapore*s Independence 
Day on August 9 in Peking, the party was attended by Chinese 
officials, indicating that China completely recognized the 
republic as a sovereign state and that if the latter was 
88 
ready for diplomatic ties these could be established* 
Later in the same month China showed another sign of her eager-
ness toward Singapore. On August 27 diiao Kuan-hua invited 
the Singapore foreign Minister and Tommy Koh, Singaporefs 
Ambassador to United Nations, for dinner at the united 
Nations* However, the Singapore side showed no interest in ex-
changing ^i^s in the diplomatic level during the dinner discussion. 
Da spite the continuous approaches of Peking, Singapore 
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maintains a standstill on the matter of recognition* Her 
immediate reason is simple: that until Indonesia—the last 
Malay neighbour decides to follow the example of Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand—her relations with Peking 
would remain restricted. 
(v) INDONESIA 
Among the ASEAN members, Indonesia seems to be the most 
troublesome partner for China. 
The involvement of the Chinese Communist Party in the 
W65 coup d9etat is a painful reminder to Indonesian generals. 
Being the biggest country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has 
not been satisfied with the diplomatic moves of the other 
ASIAN members, who are not comparable to her siae and popula-
tion. By 1974, and especially 1975, the other ASEAN countries 
were no more willing to respect Indonesian attitude toward 
China* 
Actually, Indonesia was not unmoved by the changed in-
ternational climate since 1969 when the Nixon Doctrine
 t the 
entrance of China into the United Nations and the fall of 
of Cambodia and Vietnam, changed the main aspects of security 
in Southeast Asia^ However, the changes in the leadership 
in diina in 1969, and then after the fall of lin Piao, were 
not sufficient to move the Indonesian generals to seek a 
closer understanding with Peking* 
The Indonesian attitude toward Peking in 1970fe was 
most unstable, swinging between unnecessary hostility and 
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extraordinary friendly postures.. This vacillation had its 
impact upon her small neighbour, Singapore, which believed 
that it mas better not to get too close to Peking in order 
not to upset Djakarta* It would be safe to say, therefore, 
that unless Indonesia makes a faster move towards Peking, 
Singapore might possibly be the last country to send her 
ambassador to China# The difficulties of China to convince 
General Suharto to visit Peking are not only due to the in-
terference of the Chinese Communist Party in the coup of 1965 
attempted by the Indonesian Communist Party. It is in connec-
tion with the overseas Chinese that the Peking leaders are 
unable to give a satisfactory answer to Djakarta- Perhaps 
the Indonesian generals are asking too much, in view of the 
fact that since 1965 there have been no signs showing that 
the overseas Chinese are threatening Indonesia's sceurity* 
It appears that the military regime in Indonesia is exploi-
ting the overseas diinese as a scapegoat to justify the de-
lay in recognition of China* 
Since 1970 Peking has separated its national from its 
ideological goals in regard to Indonesia, being more interes-
ted in convincing the Djakarta regime that it should not 
align itself with the United States nor establish close 
ties with the Soviet Union* Peking is thus less concerned 
with the domestic and internal problems of Indonesia than 
with her foreign policy* This assumption seems to be con-
firmed by her message to the Indonesian Communist party in 
May 1970, hinting that the party should turn underground 
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for a time being* In the message the Central Committee of 
the di inese Communist Party described the m i l i t a r y coup of 
1965 as a temporary setback and encouraged the par ty to ad-
Of) 
here to the principle of protracted armed struggle.^ This 
alarmed Adam Malik very much. 
In April 1971 • following the first sign of the Sino-
American rapproachement, Malik said that Indonesia was taking 
certain unspecified steps to normalise her relations with 
China. However, there was a complete absence of news on 
Indonesian affairs from the diinese side until January 1971; 
and in fey Peking for the first time feiled to mention the 
Indonesian Communist Party Anniversary in its media. Sven 
when the Indonesian elections led the Golkar to victory in 
July 1971, diina did not attack this party although it was 
sponsored by the military. In return, when Adam Malik 
served as President of the United Nations General Assembly 
in October 1971, he ruled against an effort by the United 
States delegation to vote separately on the two sections of 
the Albanian Besolution to seat China# Indonesia's action 
in the United Nations had not been favourable to diina in 
previous years. Although in 1967 she had favoured admission 
of diina into the organisation, yet in 1968 and 1969 she 
suddenly absented herself from the crucial vote. Bven in 
1970, when most of the Southeast Asian countries started to 
smile at the Goiraiunist regime in diina, Indonesia1 s dele-
gation to the United Nations was tfpresent but did not par-
ticipate in vote^11 This action, however, impressed Peking 
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and when the Vice-Foreign Minister Ghiao Kuan-hua arrived 
at New York, he first called at the United Nations on Adam 
Malik. However, the Indonesian Foreign Minister could not 
do much regarding the recognition, for the decision on this 
matter rested in the hands of the generals in Djakarta. 
The policy aiming at the isolation of Peking was once 
again seen in November 1971, when Djakarta refused to par-
ticipate in the harmless Afro-Asian Table Tennis Tournament, 
indicating that Indonesia again became one of the conserva-
tive forces in Asia. Moreover, until 1973$ when the other 
members of the ASEAN were trading happily with diina, Dja-
karta refused to join. 
The reluctance of Djakarta to deal with Peking was 
expressed by Adam Malik at the Paris Conference on Vietnam 
in April 1973$ who told the Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-
fei that: 
"Indonesia would need time to educate its 
Chinese population to be loyal to Indonesia Q. 
and not to have their orientation toward Peking*,,y 
Such an openly antagonistic attitude toward the over-
seas Chinese in Indonesia put diina in a difficult position 
despite the fact that the latter was willing to guarantee 
to Indonesia that she would not interfere in this issue., The 
way in which Malik expressed his concern suggests that 
Djakarta has its own difficulties with the overseas Chinese, 
and that this has nothing to do with the question of China1s 
support to them* 
The essence of the story is not the question of loyalty 
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of the overseas diinese to Indonesia*. It is true that the 
majority of the overseas diinese have not clarified their 
own citizenship status; yet it is equally true that the 
government's policy in this matter has been marked by 
procrastination, indecision and a tendency to reinforce a 
popular suspicion of diinese loyalties and of their life 
style. There is, moreover, little evidence that the Suharto 
regime has fashioned, or would fashion in the near future, 
a coherent programme for the political and economic inte-
gration of the diinese community* On the contrary, the se-
parate existence of this ethnic community is likely to be 
maintained as long as it provides a convenient scapegoat for 
local discontent. The January 1974 riots in Surabaya provided 
a typical example of this* *7hile originally the student pro-
test aimed at the Japanese domination of Indonesian economy, 
ultimately it was transformed into an anti-Chinese rally, al-
legedly manipulated by some anti-Chinese generals* Following 
several other similar incidents, Suharto even announced that 
the rioters would be treated as if they were "Communist 
terrorists*ft It is thus clear that lfit is this kind of 
contrived ideological response, rather than the machination 
of the diinese government, which is likely to retard the 
movements toward closer diplomatic relations (with Peking, 
Ed.), for it makes it exceedingly difficult for Peking 
not come to the defense, at least in verbal terms>of the 
beleaguered Chinese minority,11 
To justify its policy of bucking the contemporary 
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international trends and to isolate diina, Djakarta should 
produce better explanations than blaming the diinese communi-
ty. Suharto maintains that it is not necessary even to 
develop trade with China "since Indonesian and diinese econo-
mies are essentially comparative, both of them relying on 
the sale of raw materials and the import of machinery and 
the technological know-how*11 J^ However, this is inconsistent 
with the decision of the Indonesian Government of ifovember 
1971 to lift the ban restricting private merchants from 
trading with the People1s Republic, obviously designed to 
redress Indonesia's unfavourable balance with China through 
private trade
 #
y
^* 
The possibility is slim that the Indonesian generals 
would change their policies towards diina, even though they 
had supported her claim on the Paracel Islands where her 
navy clashed with the South Vietnamese in 1974* 
Assessing the slow progress between Djakarta and Peking 
it appears that the vested interests of the generals are the 
main hinderance in the process: 
ffThereare reasons to believe, however, that this 
reluctance stems largely from the policies of 
the ruling generals rather than the orientation 
of career diplomats in the foreign ministry^ 
Since the demise of the Sukarno government, the 
military elite has tended to rely for the success 
of its domestic politics on the good-will of 
Western powers principally Japan and United 
States, who have ensured the regular flow of 
foreign investment and foreign aid»ft95 
As Justus M. Van der Kroef concluded in the Asian Quar-
terly, the American assistance or aid to Indonesia is more 
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than US$300 million annually;^ the military assistance 
amounts to additional US$18 million;^ and then there is 
the 60-men American Defense liasion Group stationed to advice 
on counter-insurgency planning in Indonesia., In vie?/ of these 
benefits it is understandable that it would be difficult 
for Djakarta to give them up and to turn to China #* 
Seeing no signs of change in Indonesia's attitude, China 
maintains active ties with the Indonesian Communist Party. 
However, unlike during the years of 1967 and 1968, Peking 
treats these ties gingerly in order not to agrravate its 
already uneasy relations with Djakarta. Although many com-
munications between the Indonesian Communist Party and the 
Chinese Communist Party have been exchanged, these ire re mere-
ly congratulatory messages of small significance*, Moreover, 
not a single reference to revolution in Indonesia appeared 
in the Chinese media in 1975• The three articles published 
in the People's Daily mentioned only the formal greetings 
sent by the Indonesian Communist Party to China1s 4th National 
People's Congress, and a message congratulating on the 
victory of the Vietnamese Communists* xhere was, however, 
a greet±ng from the diinese Communist Party sent to the In-
donesian Communist Party on the occasion of the latter1s 
55th Anniversary in 1975• The message stressed the importance 
of co-operation between the two parties in the future, which 
might possibly be interpreted as a hint that Peking would 
not tone down its support for the Indonesian Communists if 
Djakarta continues its present trend* 
In early December of 1975, when Indonesia invaded 
Timor, the New diina News' Agency, "advised11 Indonesia to 
withdraw her army, claiming that both Indonesia and Timor 
are the flThird World11 countries and should seek to solve 
their dispute peacefully. ^ This showed that the diinese 
willingness to restore the Sino-Indonesian relations is 
still existing, despite the negative posture of Djakarta. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BIG PQ/flHS FT SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
1969-1975 
•Vhile it has been stated in the main hypothesis of 
this study that the international behaviour of the Peoplefs 
lepublic of diina is basically determined by her assessment 
of the intentions and capabilities of the other big powers 
as well as by domestic contingencies, this is especially 
true when dealing with the ASIAN countries, particularly 
in the 1970fs* This Chapter intends to bring forth the dis-
cussion of some issues that involve this assessment of the 
external factors by Peking* 
(1) BRMKING DOffN THE BI-POLAR STHTTCTUHB: 
fe have seen that one of the main goals of Peking1 s 
strategy in Southeast Asia from 1949 up to 1965 had been the 
elimination of American pom*er and influence from the region^ 
4ie next stage in the development of Peking1 s policies 
towards this region was initiated in 1965 as a result of 
the unfolding and deepening conflict between the Soviet 
Union and China* As an upshot of this schism and antagonism 
between these two Communist giants Peking started to see 
Moscow as a dangerous rival, particularly in Southeast Asia, and 
responded to this new thread by lin Piaofs strategy of the 
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flPeoplefs War,11 based upon the concept of "double adversary,fl 
which placed the United States and the Soviet Union on the 
same footing as far as China1s security was concerned* 
% 1972 the evolution of Peking's policies towards 
Southeast Asia entered into its third stage, its policies 
being based upon the "Third World Concept *tf ihile this concept 
implied some kind of lfmultiple balance1* to provide the 
security of Southeast Asia, there are clear indications that 
Peking did not wish to create in the area any new system 
of balance of power. This ambiguity in Peking1 s posture 
leads us to the question of what type of security system, 
a balance, or a situation, did the Peking leaders then have in 
mind during this period? 
%e term balance of power has been abused and mis-
understood to the extent that "we cannot ass*ume that all 
those who talk about a new power balance in Asia are re-
1 
ferring to or anticipating the same things11 The meaning of 
the term is vague in its multiplicity of usages* Regardless 
of its different usages of descriptive, conceptual and nor-
2 
mative meanings, the weakness of the concept as applied to 
Southeast Asia rests on diina1 s perception of such a system 
as a "situation." Corall Bell argued as early as 1968 that 
the difficulty with such a system was its incompatibility with 
the presently dominant diinese concepts of international 
politics. 
The type of balance that the present Chinese leaders 
hope to benefit from is therefore neither a system, nor a 
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situation, but an active policy which would balance one or 
more big powers through the application of the checks and 
balances derived from its own concept of the Third World* 
The belief that the Peoplefs Hepublic of diina is not in 
favour of balance of power is therefore not at all true, 
because her leaders are seeking out a pragmatic meeting 
point between her Third World strategy and the balance of 
power concept* In other words, China is favouring such a 
meeting point in the sense and to the extent that as long 
as this is not contradictory to her own grand strategy of 
the united-front-from-above policy, she would not hesitate to 
combine with one or more big powers and adversaries, to 
achieve her anti-Soviet aims in Southeast Asia, 
Adding diina to the group of big powers, the future 
Southeast Asia would be under the influence of what Corall 
Bell calls sldouble balance,"^" i.e., the balance among the 
regional states on the one hand, and the balance among the 
interested external powers, on the other. 
It is easy to explain the reasons which 1B d to the 
normalization between Peking and Washington, yet this rapport 
has old historical roots, because it is basically founded 
upon the revival of diina1s traditional behaviour under the 
maxim f,to use the barbarians to check barbarians,11 a prime 
strategic guideline of the Imperial diina* In this sense, 
it is not dissimilar in essence to the balance of power 
concept* 
Because China is profiting from American presence as 
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a counter-weight against the gradual intensification of 
Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia, there is no 
reason to believe that Peking would insist upon the 
complete withdrawal of the entire American military forces 
from the area, 
This explains the reason why the diinese leaders are 
really interested in the continued American presence in 
Southeast Asia even though Peking had an uneasy relationship 
with them since 1940fsf when the latter combated d>mmunism 
through Chiang Kai-shek. % the end of this decade we shall 
either see a gradual return to the promotion of the national 
interest theme in diina*s foreign policy toward Southeast 
Asia, or there might be a return to the ideological emphasis, 
the promotion of revolutionary upheavals, should the internal 
environment of diina change* However, two points are clear: 
(a) there is a very slight possibility for Chinese leaders 
to return and embrace the &emlin leaders as during the 
early 1950fs, though on a new basis; (b) the Sino-American 
relations shall continue developing as long as the basic 
contradictions in their ideology and social systems would 
not reach the "antagonistic11 proportions and as long as 
the "Chou En-lai Spirit11 continues* 
With respect to the AS3AH countries, Peking is now 
interested in seeking co-operation even with the United 
States, assuming that the United States would continue a 
strong and viable presence in the Pacific area* In fact, as 
flbbert A* Scalapino states, 
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lfPeking would have found little benefit in 
dealing with a weak, isolationist America* 
In its essence, the new diinese policy relies 
upon a balance of power in which" 
American strength is a central assumption.fl5 
Although the examination of the Chinese media as recent-
ly as 1975 shows that Peking continues to attack the rivalry 
of both superpowers in Southeast Asia, the real meaning of 
such attacks should not be misreads 
"*•• the attacks * * is good politics, and will 
always have a considerable" appeal to the 
small and weak states, especially when it is 
couched in stridently nationalist tones*, 
Moreover, within the Communist world, a strong 
attack is the best defense against charges that 
Peking itself is 'selling out to American im-
perialism1 —as of course the Soviets delight 
in claiming* f|6 
(2) ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FOE BIG POWERS IN ASEAN: 
The most immediate factor that attracts the rivalry 
in Southeast Asia is basically economic. 
According to Arthur D. little's Survey of the Potentials 
of the Southeast Asian B8gion9 the area «will be producing 
between 765 million to 1,305 million barrels of crude oil 
7 
by 1980, and between 1,020 to 1,835 million by 1990.f Such 
an opportunity will undoubtedly inspire the United States1 
future investment*. At an Asian Financial Forum held under 
the auspicies of the American Chase Manhattan Bank, its 
Chairman David Bockerfeller, who is also one of the biggest 
oil tycoons, predicted an investment of 35 billion dollars 
by the oil companies in Asia and Western Pacific in the* 
seventies, most of it in Southeast Asia* 
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Besides this estimate of increasing petroleum production, 
Southeast Asia and especially the ASEAN" countries, are high-
ly productive in metallic minerals which they export* In 1970 
the region produced 1578 million worth of such products, in-
cluding 60 per cent of world tin output* It is estimated 
that the production' of metallic minerals shall reach more 
than $3,000 in 1990. There is also the rubber production from this 
region that accounts for almost 80 per cent of world market* 
One of the reasons that fostered the Sino-Malaysian diploma-
tic relations in 1974 was Malaysia's intention to make China 
into an important buyer, in order to shatter the Anglo-
American control of the market price* 
Southeast Asia meanwhile is becoming the world1s fas-
test growing developing region., The United States, Japan, 
the World S&nk and the Asian Development Bank are pouring 
more funds into the area than anywhere else in the ?#orld. 
Foreign aid from these countries and financial organisations 
reached- $25,000 million in 1970, and by 1980 the figure will 
in 
reach 150
 f000 million. 
% the end of this decade it would not be surprising to 
see the four major powers to continue seeking opportunities 
from the Southeast Asian economic boom. Both the United States 
and Japan would try to absorb the region1 s oil, while diina 
to corner the Malaysian rubber markets Only one power, the 
Soviet Union, would regard the importance of Southeast Asia 
mostly in military terms, because in economic sense 
she is a late comer into the region*, Although recent 
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evidence shows that the Soviet Union is trying to compensate 
for this by extending her shipping trade with the ASIAN 
countries since the early 1970's, she has not decreased her 
military activities since the end of the Indo-Pakistan V/ar, 
rtben a twenty-year Soviet-Indian Treaty of "Friendship,f v?as 
signed in 1971 to allow the Bussian navies to enter the Indian 
Ocean, an area right next to the ASEAN"1 s Malacca Straits, 
One of the Indonesian experienced diplomats who served as 
ambassador to many countries, including Washington and London, 
confirmed in 1973 that there will be no decrease in Soviet 
military activities in Southeast Asia, because the Soviet 
intentions there are a part of her global designs 
"..* the USSR will continue to strengthen her 
naval pressure in the Indian Ocean* This is 
being done for many reasons: to serve as a link-
up between her western {Black Sea and Middle 
last) fleet and her eastern (Pacific) fleet; to 
counter the United States submarine-based po-
laris units in the area; to encircle and keep 
an eye on China's ally in the area (Pakistan); 
to control oil routes from the Kiddle last to 
Japan, Australia, Europe, and America; to .*, 
control the trade routes from Asia to Europe." 
By expanding her naval forces in Asia, the Soviet Union 
believed that she would bring its major waters under control 
in the late seventies*. In actual fact, Axssian naval presence 
in Southeast Asia has escalated to the leading position 
recently, her warships, submarines, aircraft carriers, 
crusiers and destroyers which passed these waters came al-
19 
most to 400 in 1974* 
All this existing and future competition of the big 
powers l^adsus to the conclusion that China1 s future policy 
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toward the ASEAN countries would depend to a large degree 
upon the attitudes of the big powers, as well as of the 
ASIAN countries themselves, but comparatively more upon 
the attitudes, intentions, and capabilities of the big 
powers, to the main regional issues: (1) Hissian Proposal 
on Collective Security in Asia; (2) Hussian Proposal on the 
internationalization of the Malacca Straits; (3) Malaysian 
Proposal on the Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, 
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(3) Till HUSSIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROPOSAL AND THE MALACCA 
STRAITS: 
Fro® 1969 to 1975 China was persistently criticising 
the Asian Collective Security Proposal made by the Soviet 
Union, aiming at replacing the American influence in South-
east Asia after its withdrawal from Vietnam^ Such a proposal 
is important because of its potential as a new imlitary 
design to replace the American military presence in Asia 
and to encircle China on her southern and eastern borders* 
Although the Soviet proposal is not receiving much response 
from the ASIAN1 leaders, diina definitely expects the ASEAN 
countries to reject it in exchange for further friendly 
relations with the governments in the area, especially of 
Singapore and Indonesia* 
The proposal was originally initiated by ¥*¥# Matveyev 
in an article in Investia in lay 1969, and them elaborated 
upon the following month by Leonid Brezhnev, first Secretary 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the occasion 
of the meeting of the Communist and ?torkersf Parties in 
Moscow. J Mring the meeting the first Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union referred to the Warsaw 
Pact and said that: 
"Despite the pressing problems of the present 
international situation we do not push a system 
of collective security in those parte of the 
world where the threat of the unleashing of armed 
conflicts is concerned* Such a system is the 
best substitute for the existing military-political 
groupings. 
The Communist and the Workers1 Parties of 
Europe, both the parties in power and those in 
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the continent's capitalist countries, at their 
Karlovy Vary conference drew up a joint program 
of struggle for ensuring security in Europe. 
The Warsaw Pact member states have come out with a 
concrete security system for the peoples of 
Europe, the stability of border and peaceful 
co-operation among the European states* The 
CPSU and the Soviet Union will do everything 
they can to implement that program. 
We think that the course"" of events also places 
on the agenda the task*l)T^^ 
of collective security in Asia."14 
The proposal was widely interpreted at that time as 
15 primarily aiming at China, ^ attempting to "deny the People's 
lepublic of China's diplomatic influence in her natural 
1 fi 
periphery," although the Bussians denied this and pointed 
17 
out that China had been invited to participate.11 It might 
be useful to trace the background of the proposal* 
First, the proposal came into the being after the Sino-
Soviet conflict on the Ussuri 3iver in March 1969• At that 
time the Chinese moderate leaders decided to change the 
foreign policy of their country by cultivating friends in 
Asia* The Soviet proposal can thus possibly be regarded as 
a response to counter this new challenge of Chinese policy. 
Secondly, the Russians have their economic interests in 
Southeast Asia and these interests can only be safeguraded 
when there is political stability* When the Mericans complete-
ly remove their troops, a new security arrangement to 
maintain political stability would be required in the region, 
and the Hussians see themselves as a replacement for the 
Americans* 
A third reason for the proposal is due to the wish of 
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the Soviet leaders to expand their control and influence in 
Southeast Asia* Since the decline of Sukarno in Indonesia 
in 1965, the Russians lost one of the most important bases 
of the International Communist Movement. In spite of the 
dominant influence of China over the domestic and foregn 
politics of Indonesia immediately after the Bandung Conferen-
ce, the Russian influence in Indonesia in the late 1950's 
and early 1960fs was considerable. However, after the 
coup d'etat, both the Chinese and Soviet reputation drasti-
cally declined* In order to regain her influence, Moscow 
has been eager to cultivate relations with the non-Communist 
countries of Southeast Asia through military assistance. 
fiie fourth reason, and observed from a longer perspec-
tive, the Soviet proposal of Asian Collective Security arran-
gement was intended to promote the concept of non-alignment. 
The notion of non-alignment was defined by the Hussians in 
terms of "possitive neutrality,fl which implies that the 
Third World countries in Asia should keep away from the 
Western*-backed alliances, and instead display an inclination 
towards the Socialist Community, Vfflien positive neutrality 
is attained, it would facilitate absorption of its Asian 
friends into the Socialist Community as a sub-system. 
Ever since the project was proclaimed in 1969 the Soviet 
Union avoided giving any concrete elaboration of its real 
meaning, leaving the Asian leaders to guess what kind of 
"collective security1* it was talking about; in view of this, 
it could be considered merely as a weather ballon to test 
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the flatmosphereft prevailing in Asia. 
It was not until 1972 that Moscow started to articulate 
more substantially its intention* In the spring of that year the 
Soviet Ambassador to 'Thailand, A*A^ Bozanov, urged this !lsystem 
of collective security" on the Asian nations assembled for the 
annual meeting of the BCAPE, giving the proposal an economic 
18 
and commercial dimension as well as a political one* firing 
the SCAPE meeting in Toyko in 1973 the Russian delegates in-
tended to undo some of the damage caused by the vagueness of 
the proposal, when A.E. Nesterento announced that it was not 
a project aiming at China: 
ntn our vie?/, the People's Republic of China would be 
a full fledged member of such a system of collective 
sects*ity# "19 
But this statement was not repeated sufficiently, fre-
quently or strongly enough by Soviet leaders to erase the 
impression that their real intention was to isolate China 
20 
from her Asian neighbours* However, the transparent anti-
Chinese aim of the Soviet proposal was explicitly underlined 
when Brezhnev accused the diinese in Alma-Ata in nugust 1973 
of irhegemonistie aspirations*•* evidenced above all by their 
activities in Southeast and South Asia, including the old 
idea to create, under Peking's patronage, a kind of military 
21 
and political group of states in Southeast Asia*,f 
(l) THE ASEAN VISff ON THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL: 
Generally speaking, any regional arrangement must meet 
the pre-requisite of a "collective consensus,fl or of a 
"collective will," of the countries in the region themselves. 
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That is to say, the perception of security by the countries 
themselves will determine the workability of such a proposal* 
Limiting ourselves first to the region of Southeast Asia, 
we find that the Russian proposal has not, as yet, received 
favourable responses from the leaders of its countries* 
Shortly after the Asian Collective Security proposal 
was made by Brezhnev, Tun Basak of Malaysia expressed his 
neutral position by rejecting the speculation that Russian 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean would pose a threat to 
the countries in the region. This calculated attitude was 
mainly aimed at Peking to test its response, to warn Peking 
not to support the Malayan Communist Party, as well as to 
indicate that should China continue supporting the Communists 
in Malaysia, the Kuala Lumpur government would turn for 
assistance to the Russians. Yet, when Itetsakfs effort to win 
22 Moscow leaders for his neutralisation project failed after 
a discussion in the Kremlin in 1972, he shifted his position 
and indicated that Malaysia would not welcome the Sussian 
presence in Southeast Asia* f*To bring the big countries in 
Asia into such a scheme," said Ifezak to Malaysian correspon-
dents after discussing the matter in the Kremlin, "will be 
to bring in problems which we small nations may find dif-
21 ficult to solve." 
The next year, when the Soviet Union proposed that the 
Malacca Straits should be internationalized, Itetsak further 
refused to promote the Russian project, saying that "Malay-
sia has its own neutralization proposal for peace and secu-
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rity in the region, which we regard as more practicable 
and feasible and which we think the Soviet Union should have 
24 
no difficulty in accepting.11 ^ In addition to the above 
reason given by the Prime Minister, the Malaysians do not 
mash to involve themselves in a project which is a 
function of the 3ino-3ussian dispute * diazali bin Shafin, 
another high Malaysian official, said in Singapore in 
October 1973 that: 
11
 The Soviet Union.*, appears to be moving in 
the Pacific region with a design and a purpose. 
This may be because she has never really played 
a role in the Pacific or because there is a 
clear and undivided focus of attention and in-
terest brought about by the Sino-3oviet dispute. 
Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, 
Soviet interest and activities are invariably 
analyzed within, that perspective. It would seem 
that any Soviet initiative that is designed 
or even only as to appear to further the Soviet 
cause in the dispute"" is not likely to gain the 
support of countries in the region. This factor 
is unfortunate because the Soviet Union has M U C I W 
to contribute to the development of the region.1* 
As for Indonesia, the Malacca Straits are as vitally 
important to her as for Malaysia, and therefore the proposal 
on internationalization was not favourably received by 
Djakarta. The armed forces1 daily published in Djakarta, 
Angkatan Bersendjataf summed up the perception of security 
in the region on October 14, 1969 in tkese terms: 
"We in Indonesia believe that no Southeast 
Asian is eager to join the Soviet defense 
system. The initiation is unwelcome." 
Two years later, ?/hen President Suharto was interviewed 
by C.L*. Sulzbuifer of the New York Times in March 1973. the 
President expressed himself critically by calling the propo-
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sal a part of the "Brezhnev Doctrine,fl a term which the 
Soviet leaders do not like to hear: 
"We want ASIAN to strengthen regional independence 
and avoid having this area become a regional 
cockpits Therefore we automatically reject the 
Brezhnev Doctrine . f|27 
This arguement was further evolved by Adam Malik in 
September 1973? 
flThe Soviet Collective Security was fbiased to 
one side,' and any genuine collective scheme 
should include China, United States and the 
Western European powers, not merely the Asian 
states and the USSS."28 
When Soviet Deputy Minister Mryubin paid a visit to 
Indonesia early 1974 President Suharto refused to support 
the idea which the Kremlin had been pressing upon him as 
oq , 
a solution to the region1s defense problem. me Straits 
Times in Singapore reported the attitude of the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister on March 8 and 11, 1974 to the effect that 
"we do not want to reject the idea, but it is still not 
clear to us#tf 
Singapore fs attitude to the big powers in the area has 
been flexible because it is dictated by her determination to 
11 
survive. Her foreign policy has been described as the 
most pragmatic among all the Southeast Asian countries * In 
response to the lussian proposal Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew 
said in 1973 that Singapore would stake use of the other 
big powers to check Moscow1 s future movements in Southeast 
Asia. He once suggested in Toyko that joint naval forces 
comprising the American, Japanese, Australian and 7/estern 
European fleets be formed to counter the growing Soviet 
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naval presence in the area.. Although Leefs proposal of 
joint naval forces of different powers sounded too ambitious, 
it nevertheless clearly indicated that he would not appre-
ciate the Bussian to play a dominating role in Southeast 
Asia through their Collective Security system. When the 
Foreign Minister of Singapore was visiting Australia in 
1974, he made a comment upon the vagueness of the Soviet 
scheme: 
"We say in principle, like all these things, 
like the Ten Commandments, that the Collective 
Security Proposal is a good idea."33 
Thailand has been described as the slowest of all the 
regional countries to adjust to the changing power configura-
tion in the area. Yet, when the Rissian Collective Security 
proposal was broached, the former Foreign Minister of Thai-
land was quick to respond to expose the intention of the 
Soviets. Thanat Khoman stated in 1969 that despite the 
changes in the American, Soviet and diinese foreign policies, 
Thailand does not want to "live with a crocodile," meaning 
14 
the Soviet Union, just to "avoid a tiger," meaning China. 
And during a trip to the United States early in 1970 he said 
that Brezhnev1s proposal for Asian Collective Security advanced 
in June 1969 "seems to envisage the eventual occurance of a 
power vaccum which would be filled by a large nation present-
ly inimical to Bussian interest, clearly implying China. " ^ 
Being a member of the ASEAN the Philippines also see 
local co-operation more important than any endorsement of 
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Soviet Union1s proposal on Collective Security. In con-
clusion, there is a great deal of negative consensus towards 
the proposal of the Kremlin on the new security arrangement 
in Southeast Asia. 
(ii) CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET PROPOSAL: 
Since the lussian Collective Security proposal is aimed 
at China, and since the United States would be less active 
than in the previous decades in Southeast Asia, diina natu-
rally is the only country who is moat concerned about the 
proposal. The Peking leaders are extremely antagonistic 
towards the Soviet proposal not only because the Aissians 
failed to invite China to join their scheme in 1969, but 
also because Peking views the proposal as a new kind of 
containment, far more dangerous than that of the Americans 
during the 1950*3, when the SEATO was formed to limit the 
Chinese influence in the Pacific area. 
Peking denounced the proposal in 1969, immediately after 
its appearance, as an "anti-Qaina military alliance### picked 
17 
up from the garbage heap of the warmonger Dulles.SI,J The 
Chinese view on the subject was never better expressed than 
during Sir Alec Douglas^ Home1 s visit to Peking in November 
1972. During the meeting the Chinese leaders said that diina 
was eminently interested in the improvement of the relations 
with India through the help of the British Government. They 
further said that Peking was attempting to convince the In~ 
dian Government not to allow a Bussian naval presence in 
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the Indian Ocean, but that these attempts to cultivate 
India failed. Instead, the Soviet-Indian relations became 
ever closer. 
Prom 1972 to 1975 Peking changed its tactics and would 
not attack the Soviet Collective Security proposal directly. 
Realizing that the Russian proposal concerned all Asian 
countries, China decided not to oppose it unilaterally, 
because such an opposition would be less effective than 
letting the other Asian countries denounce it in their media. 
Hence, since 1972, "Peking has skillfully reproduced state-
ments published in the media in other Asian countries and 
used private contacts with foreign dignitaries and journalists 
19 
in an effort to counter the Russians.ff She has been moat 
successful in employing the smaller Asian countries, par-
ticularly the ASIAN members, to criticise the Hissians 
between 1973 and 1975. 
(iii) THE MALACCA STRAITS: 
Strategically, China does not treat the Soviet proposal 
on Collective Security as.an isolated.isaie# Although the 
People's Republic of diina has been criticizing the proposal 
indirectly, she is treating another issue, the problem of 
internationalization of the Malacca Straits, in a different 
way. She is attacking openly and directly the internationali-
zation as a "plot." To understand the connection between the 
Soviet proposal on Collective Security and Moscow1s position 
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on the Straits, we must explore the central point of the 
debate over internationalization and de-internationalization 
of this waterway, which is raging among the countries of 
ASKAN, Soviet Union and Japan. 
Beside the fact that the Malacca Straits are important 
for the west-east shipping fleets that prompted the Japanese 
40 
once to called them lfthe life-line of Japan," the Straits 
are also important as a military strategic as well as natural 
resource: 
"••• if we bear in mind that the naval rivalry 
of the two superpowers, America and Russia, 
America has the advantage of two Alantic coastal 
frontages, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and 
thus need not go through the Malacca Straits to get 
to the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the 
shortest route between the Indian Ocean and 
xiussian naval elements based in Vladivostok 
on the f/estern Pacific is the Malacca* 
*•* There is currently underway an active 
search for offshore oil throughout the entire 
Malaysian coastline. This is also true of the 
Indonesian coastal area.*"41 
Realising the importance of the Malacca Straits to their 
own national interests, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
signed an accord, claiming that the Straits are not an in-
ternational waterway in November 1971: 
"(1) The three Governments agreed that the safety 
of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore is the responsibility of the coastal 
states concerned; 
(2) The three Governments agreed on the need that 
a body for co-operation to co-ordinate efforts for 
the safety of navigation in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore be established as soon as 
possible and that such a body should be composed 
of only the three states concerned; 
(3) The Governments of the Republic of Indonesia 
and Malaysia agreed that the Straits of Malacca 
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and Singapore are not international straits, 
while recognizing their use for international 
shipping in accordance with the principle of 
innocent passage. The Government of Singapore 
faS¥!^o%e^"^iThe position of Governments of the 
Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia on the point."42 
Citing the principle of Internationa la?/ and the case 
of the Corfu Channel, the Accord states that international 
shipping through the Straits should be subjected to the 
principle of innocent passage * which implies the right of 
the adjacent states to stop vessels which they consider 
might pose a threat to their own security or vital interest* 
This principle was later rebuffed by the Soviet Union who 
maintained that the Straits of Malacca should be subjected 
to the principle of free passage, implying that all ships, 
whether armed or not, are entitled to pass unmolested. 
Singapore1s position on the Accord was different from Malay-
sia's and Indonesia's because Singapore just "took note'1 
of its provisions, due to its location as an international 
port, i.e., were the Straits to lose their international 
character Singapore1s economy would be badly harmed because of 
its dependence on international trade. As L.C* Green states: 
"Since shipping coming from the north to Singapore 
by the shortest route must pass through the 
Straits of Malacca, the assertion that it is no 
longer international opens the door to the possi-
bility of the two coastal states issuing strin-
gent restrictive regulations, the effect of which 
might well be to cripple Singapore completely 
as an international port of any significance* 
r/ftiile not suggesting that this is in fact the in-
tention of either Indonesia and Malaysia, it is 
possible to see that this might well be to the 
advantage of such a port as Penang—and with the 
development of oil exploitation at Dumai and 
Sungaipakning, especially if refineries are deve-
loped there too, this may constitute a further 
167 
threat to Singapore economy•" J 
Despite the fact that it did not completely agree with 
the positions of Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore shares 
a strong "community of interests11 with both) concerning 
navigational safety and control of oil pollution caused by 
the tankers that pass through the Straits. 
Die joint statement of the three states predictably 
rem into opposition from the Soviet Union and Japan a few 
months after. Oleg Troyanovsky, Russian Ambassador to Japan, 
met the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister in larch 1972 and 
was quoted as stating that the Kalacca Straits were "an in-
ternational waterway which must be kept open for free passage 
44 by foreign ships." Subsequently, a Soviet diplomat visited 
Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur early in 1973 and repeated the 
Soviet position that Moscow could not accept the "de-inter-
45 
nationalisation11 of the Straits* 
Alongside with her proposal of Collective Security, the 
Soviet Union was eager to claim the Malacca Straits as an 
international waterway because "these Straits represent the 
only maritime link in winter between its European and Siberian 
ports, since passage through the Arctic Ocean is blocked 
by ice,,"4 Her claim that the Straits are an international 
waterway is based upon the fact that she recognizes only a 
3-mile territorial limit for both Malaysia and Indonesia, 
and that she disregards their claim to the territorial sea of 
a 12-mile limit. However, 
"The Russian position seems odd,*** in view of 
the fact that the USSR has officially declared 
168 
for itself a 12-mile territorial limit in 1921 
and this claim has also not been ratified by a 
recognized international authority. The Soviet 
view seems rather belated considering the fact 
that Indonesia extended its territorial sea limit 
to 12-miles in 1957 and Malaysia did likewise 
in 1968."47 
The Russian view on the matter is closely co-related 
to Kremlin's conflict with China since 1969* The support 
?/hich Moscow had extended to the Japanese to claim the 
Straits as international waters in 1972 also coincided with 
Nixon1s visit to Peking in the sprint of that year. It is 
clear that the Russians were worried over the Sino-American 
detente and impatient to extend their naval presence in the 
east through the Malacca Straits and under the cover of thei 
Proposal on Asian Collective Security* 
Of course, Peking would not delay its criticism of the 
Russians for claiming the Straits as an international water-
f/ay. Shortly after Nixon1s vi«it the New China News Agency 
critically pointed out that it was "absurd" that the Straits 
should be internationalized^ It said: 
"This attempt aimed at interfering in the affairs of 
the Straits is encroaching upon the sovereignty of 
the states on both sides of the Straits and the 
Governments of Malaysia and Indonesia* *• It is by 
no means accidental that Soviet revisionist social-
imperialism cherishes ambitions for the Straits 
of Malacca—the main passage between the Indian 
Ocean and the South China Sea. In recent years, the 
Soviets carried out frantic expansionist activities 
on the sea trying its utmost to build up naval hege-
mony in the vast area from the Black Sea, the 
Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the 
Yfest Pacific to the Sea of Japan; of late quite a 
number of Soviet warships entered into the Indian 
Ocean through the -Straits of Malacca and carried 
out furtive activities there, thus severely threa-
tening the security of various countries in the area." 
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The Agency continued: 
"At present, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism 
is colluding with the Japanese reactionaries who 
claims that 'the Straits of Malacca is the life-
line of Japan* to peddle the internationaliza-
tion1 of the Straits. This has further laid bare 
its ambitions for expansion and aggression*"49 
(iv) PEKING IS USING THB ASEAN COUNT RIBS: 
Putting the Soviet Collective Security proposal and 
the issue of Malacca Straits together and viewing them from 
the perspectives of the big powers-— America, Soviet Union, 
diina, and Japan—it seems that the Soviet Union placed itself 
into an untenable and embarrasing position. Among the four 
major powers only the United States failed to express its 
position on the Malacca Straits. 
The accommodation achieved by President Nixon with 
China released the United States from the troublesome tur-
moils in Asia and guaranteed to the Cliinese that the Americans 
are no longer interested in rivaling Peking in Southeast 
50 
*isia. It is for this reason that the United States has not 
said much about the Soviet proposal on Collective Security 
since its birth in 1969• Nor would she join the Soviet Union 
and Japan in insisting that the Malacca Straits must be in-
ternationalized. Although Admiral Thomas Koorer, Chairman 
of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, did say that 
the "United ^ates feels we should have and must have freedoir 
51 to go through, under and over the Malacca Straits," yet 
he did not, like the Soviet Union and Japan, rebuff the 
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Malaysian-Indonesian claim to a 12-mile territorial sea. 
It could be further inferred that this official state-
ment made by the Admiral took into consideration the re-
maining naval forces of the United States in the Pacific 
Ocean., The suggestion of the 12-mile claim of the coastal 
states, therefore, would be acceptable to the United States 
on the condition that her naval and air fleets would not be 
blocked or stopped by either Malaysia or Indonesia. It is 
important to note that the American position on the Straits 
of Malacca, though understandably based on the "view of its 
52 
worldwide interests," has not been attacked by Peking, in 
a sharp contrast to Peking1s castigation of Moscow. 
Following Nixon's visit to Peking Japanese Premier 
Tanaka said to Qiou En-lai during his visit that Japan was 
not regarding the Malacca Straits as her "lifeline" in a 
military sense. Bver since Tanaka's visit to Peking the 
Chinese press stopped accusing Japan of "militarism,11 and 
the denouncement of Japan1s "ambitions" in the Malacca Straits 
was dropped*, China by this time entered into diplomatic 
relations with Japan and normalized her relations with the 
United States, winning thus two potential allies to lessen 
the threat from the Soviet Union. 
The establishment of ties with both the United States 
and Japan enabled Peking to accentuate its attack upon the 
Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, on the question of the 
Soviet proposal on Collective Security diina thinks unwise 
to attack the Soviet Union unilaterally, preferring to re^ 
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print from the media of other Asian countries1 criticism 
of the proposal, while on the other hand she supports open-
ly the Indonesian, Malaysian and the Singaporean positions 
on the issue of Malacca through critical denouncements of 
Moscow. The latter behaviour of China is possibly due to 
the fact that she wanted to show a friendly attitude and thus 
to make sure that no A SB AN member would lean to the Soviet 
side after the Vietnamese tfar. China, therefore, plays her 
cards well in the diplomatic game. She understands well that 
when their interests are concerned none of them would per-
mit any one big power to dominate the regional affairs. 
Moreover, these countries have also realized that for 
stability*s sake they must oppose the entry of the Soviet 
Xtoion into the area; China is simply much nearer. This 
then provides the common denominator for the de-internationa-
lization of the Malacca Straits between Peking and its 
neighbours in Southeast Asia. In this regard Peking has 
been very successful, which in turn strengthens its image 
that it would support the smaller nations in resisting the 
bullying by the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union. 
Some months before Malaysia, as the first country in 
the AS3AN organisation, entered into relations with Peking 
in 1974, the Chinese media began to woo all ASEAN members 
by attacking the Soviet Union's "furtive" activities in their 
countries. An article written by Hsiang Tung in the People ys 
.Daily under the title "The Soviet Revisionist Social Im-
perialists1 Expansion in Southeast Asia," presented a long 
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list of grievances on this score. The writer cited a dozen 
or so ports in the Indian Ocean in which the Soviets had ac-
quired facilities, and criticized the recent upsurge in 
exchanges between the Soviet Union and the countries of 
Southeast Asia: 
"In the name of ftrade* they dispatched •mer-
chant ships,1 ftrawlers,1 and warships to show 
their flag in various Southeast Asian ports. 
Under the pretext of * overhaulsff and •replenishment1 
of fuel and provisions, they tried to grab the 
right to use various Southeast Asian ports and 
turn them later into military bases as a foot-
hold for further expansion in Southeast Asia. 
To acquire the right to use the port of Singapore, 
the Soviet revisionists have sent a 'shipping 
experts delegation1 and a fshipping delegation1 
to conduct subversion and disruption there. All 
this had aroused the vigilance of the Singapore 
authorities. In Malaysia, the Soviet revisionist 
ambassador took advantage of his diplomatic 
privileges to make frequent tours of Malaysia*s 
remote area in his scheme to acquire the rights 
to use Malaysian ports. In Thailand Soviet 
revisionist diplomats conducted activities along 
the coastal lines of the Isthmus of Era in South-
western Thailand, thus arousing discontent fro® 
the Thai government* The Soviet revisionists 
have also stretched their claws to Indonesia and 
the Portuguese-occupied part of Timor Island. 
Disregarding Indonesia's sovereignty over her 
territorial waters, the Soviet revisionists sent 
their 'trawlers' to run amuck in Indonesian 
territorial waters. Furthermore, it was disclosed 
that they are making painstaking efforts to build 
a naval base in the Portuguese-occupied part of 
Timor Island and for this purpose have held 
frequent consultations with the Portuguese au-
thorities^ What warrants particular attention is 
that in recent years, the*" Soviet revisionists have 
loudly trumpeted finternationalization* of the 
Malacca Straits."53 
As Wilson concluded, these moves were to secure for 
the Soviet fleets "based in Vladivostok free passage through 
the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean to join forces 
with the Mediterranean and Black Sea fleets in an attempt 
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to establish hegemony in the vast waters."^ 
It is clear that all ASEAN countries preferred to 
extend friendly attitudes to China rather than to the Soviet 
Union by 1975, because China was in a much better position 
to challenge the Soviet Union in Asia at that time. She 
could rally the ASEAN members to join in her anti-Soviet 
compaign because since Jfozak's visit to Peking in 1974 most 
of them were eager to seek the same contacts with Peking 
as Malaysia had done* In vie?^  of this, the pro-Peking ori-
entation of their press attained in the meantime launch 
into severe criticism of the Soviet Collective Security propo-
sal, which criticism was adroitly picked up by Peking and promi-
nently displayed and reprined in its own press in bold letters. 
On January 5, 1975 the Peopleys Daily published an 
article entitled "The Southeast Asian Countries Open an 
\nti-Hegemonic Struggles Together with the Third World 
Countries," citing the unfavourable official vie?/s of some 
countries of Southeast Asia toward the proposal on Collective 
Security System of the Kremlin and its activities in the regions 
f,#»# Itoder the cloak to develop trade and cultural 
exchanges, the Soviet Union sends large groups of 
officials to Southeast Asian countries to say good 
word for, even by publishing advertisements in news-
papers to sell, the Asian Collective Security Sy-
stem* However, the social-imperialism's effort of 
such peddling has received cold responses and ob-
jections from the Southeast Asian governments and 
public opinion* The Thai Foreign Minister, Chati-
chai Ohoonhavan, had said in April 1974 that Thai-
land did not agree with the Soviet proposal on the 
Asian Collective Security System. The Philippine 
President Marcos in January 1972 told the Senate 
that: 1the security of Asia must basically rely 
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upon the Asians,1 The foreign Minister of Indonesia 
Adam Malik said in 1974 that the purpose of the 
Soviet Union to build the 'Asian Collective Security 
System1 is to secure the position of a super-
power in Asia, the Soviet concept of Asian security 
is built upon the foundation of fpolitical 
hegemony.* Trying in vain to peddle the Asian 
Security System directly, the"* Soviet social-im-
perialism has changed its techniques by suggesting 
to sign •Treaties of Friendship* with Southeast 
Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia; its 
purpose of attempting to trap these countries into 
the Asian Collective Security has also been refused. 
Referring to the Soviet suggestion concerning 
these kind of treaties, Tun Ismail, former ¥ice«-
Prime Minister of Malaysia, pointed out that 
•a lot of dirty business1 is fbeing done under 
the name of friendliness, ' "55 
On Jtebruary 29$ 1975, when Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore held the Ministerial Conference to discuss the 
Malacca Straits, China again supported these three countries 
on protecting their rights, and agreed with their proposal 
that a control of pollution in the Straits should be 
56 instituted. 
from May 1975 onward China1s press intensified its 
policy of quoting from the media of Southeast Asia to criti-
cize the Soviet Union. Quoting from an article in Modern 
Asia, the People's Daily said on May 13 that: 
"The Soviet Union's initiation of the Collective 
Security Proposal is aimed at putting Asia under 
Aissian hegemonism*•* If the Asian Collective 
Security Proposal really aims at building peace-
ful relations under the principle of equal mutual 
benefit, then it must be based on the foundation 
that no country should seek hegemony in Asia. 
Than why the Soviet Union is so antagonistic 
against the efforts of China and Japan to put an 
article on anti-hegemonism into the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Friendship and Peace, which is under 
negotiations?fl57 
One of the Cliinese Cfeiimunist newspapers in Hong Kong 
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Wen Hui Pao, joined Peking in denouncing the Soviet Union 
in June 1975* In an article written by Hsiao Yuen, entitled 
"The Proposed Soviet Asian Collective Security," the author 
quoted a diinese ne?#spaper The Orient News published in Mani-
la to the effect that: 
^ln recent years, Moscow persistently has been 
saying good words to the Asian countries regar-
ding its Asian Collective Security Proposal, 
urging them to join the system. Yet until now, 
among the Asian countries only Mongolia public-
ly agreed to join the system. Even country such 
an India, who ha,d signed a 'Treaty of Friendship' 
with the Soviet Union, has only verbally said 
that she would support the plan of isian Col-
lective Security System. In actuality India,
 R 
too, maintains a cold attitude toward the system*"^ 
It should be noted that at the time at which the Philip-
pines had exchanged diplomatic ties with China, even Manila 
was ready to sing the song of denounciation, when Teng Hsiao 
ping told Marcos in June 1975 to be watchful of "letting 
the tiger in through the back door while repelling the 
wolf through the front gate#" 
In Peking1s eyes the Asians should be watchful of the 
Soviet Collective Security proposal for it is not different 
from the purposes of the SEATO, in which some Asian countries 
had colluded with the "western imperialists" to contain 
China, and because the Soviet leaders are trying to change 
the 3SAT0 from a "star-s^langled banner" into a "polar-bear 
banner*"^ On June 26 Peking made use of another media from 
Southeast Asia to charge the Sussians. 3feporting from a 
Chinese paper Kuang Hua Yit Pao of Malaysia, the People's 
Daily commented that "the intention of the Soviet Oollec-
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tive Security Proposal is to 'attain the same hegemonic 
go 
ambition as another superpower.f" On July 4, another 
Malaysian Chinese newspaper, Sin Pin Jit Pao, was quoted by 
Peking to the effect that when "the Pacific fleet of the 
Soviet Union departs from fladivostok through the Sea of 
Japan and the Malacca Straits to the Atlantic Ocean,*** it 
is a threat to peace...; the Soviets intend to substitute 
for the Mericans and play their role in the oceans." 
Starting in August 1975 Peking extended the practice 
of quoting from Malaysian and Philippine presses to the 
Thai and Singaporean newspapers on the Soviet proposal, gy 
this time, Thailand became another country of the A.S3AN 
nations who had just entered into diplomatic relations with 
China while the foreign Minister of Singapore had visited 
Peking in March 1975. 
The editorial of August 27, 1975 of a Thai Cliinese 
paper, Th£ China Press, was reported by the People's Daily 
on August 30, saying that after the JBuropean Security Coun-
cil meeting in Helsinski held in July the Russians were in-
fusing their "wicked" Collective Security proposal into Asia: 
"The so-called Asian Collective Security is an-
other trick of the Soviet social-imperialists. 
It is more vicious^than the fCo-prosperity in 
Greater Asia1 (*9-i-^^® ) proposed by the 
Japanese during their imperial days. No wonder that 
the Asian countries are not interested in it.** they 
fear that they would fall into the trap of the 
Soviets... The Asians are not so stupid as not 
to recognize what is good or bad for them and let 
the Russians to Jiave a chance to put their 
hands in Asia."62 
iemembering the SEATO, which had been dissolved after 
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the end of Vietnamese War, another Thai paper, now an 
English one, The Nation, said that "the ASSAN countries 
would nox accept the Soviet proposal on the Collective 
Security to militarize Southeast Asia again.11 Also this 
was reported by China in her press on August 30, 1975. 
(v) SUMMARY; 
Viewed from the quotations published in the People's 
Daily it is interesting to note the tactics used by Peking 
in its verbal war with the Soviet Union, fery seldom Peking 
published its own criticism of the Russian proposal on 
Collective Security System for Asia. It is important to 
emphasise that the Peoplefs Daily quoted mainly from the 
Chinese papers published in Southeast Asia. Further to note 
is the fact that while the ASIAN governments had been once 
hostile to China, in 1975 they allowed the local Chinese 
papers to publish many pro-Peking articles and editorials. 
Some years ago two Chinese newspapermen in Manila, Quintin 
and Azal Yuyitung (Yu Ghang-chen and Yu Chang-keug), had 
oeen deported by Marcos to Taiwan for publishing materials 
favouring China* Singapore had detained Lee Yao-cheng of 
Nanyang Siang Pao, a popular Chinese ne?/spaper in Singapore^ 
for similar reasons in 1971. Even in Malaysia the situation 
has changed, where due to her racial plurality and domination 
of politics by the Malays the Chinese newspapers had a 
hard time to survive. 
Frnxs while most of the ASIAN nations had established 
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diplomatic ties with Peking, the basic Question is whether 
their leaders would really change their attitudes towards 
the diinese minorities in their countries. To this writer, 
the answer at the moment is in the negative. 
The real winner, however, is Peking* It has secured 
recognition from the governments ?rhich had been known for 
their hostility toward the new China in the past" on the 
one hand, while on the other it has made an adroit use of 
their Chinese press for mounting a severe attack upon Moscow 
and its Collective Security proposal to keep it out of the 
region. Contrary to a popular belief, the Chinese in South-
east Asia were, are and shall remain a tremendous asset 
to the Peoplefs Republic of China# First, in the past two 
decades many of them had joined the local Communist Parties, 
and are still in their ranks, in order to promote Peking1s 
objectives through revolutionary war, while others were an 
important source of foreign exchange by sending remittances 
to their relatives in China. Second, in the 1970*s a new 
dimension was added to the usefulness of the overseas Chinese 
to Peking through the use of their press for waging its war 
on the Soviet Union in order to keep it out of the area 
which is of such a strategic importance to its security. 
This conclusion is contrary to the view of Stephen Pitzgerald, 
a distinguished student of China, who maintains that the 
6 
overseas Chinese are a burden rather than an asset to Peking* 
VShether the ASEAN peoples and their governments would 
remain leaning upon China and against the Soviet Union in 
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the long term is too early to say. However, at least with 
respect to the Collective Security, all ASIAN countries are 
deaf toward Moscow1 s proposals 
%is was well expressed by Dick Wilson, a long time 
observer of Southeast Asian affairs: 
"Since the Soviet presence and influence in the 
region is waxing rather than wanning, any Soviet 
backed proposal tends to be seen as a means 
of maximising that greater presence. The fact 
that any such development would be regarded 
by China as provocative adds another damper to 
its attractiveness. And the fact that the 
Brezhnev proposal would include Japan, India, Pa-
kistan, Bangladesh, and even China in one single 
Collective Security network would mean that 
the big Asian powers would be given an authority 
in Southeast Asia that Southeast Asians are 
anxious to deny them."^5 
lie can perhaps conclude this section of our study with 
an observation tnat as far as the security in Southeast 
Asia is concerned, the conduct of Peking has all the attri-
butes of a great power. It is building a string of friendly 
ties with the countries on her southern border, it is wel-
coming a credible but not predominant military presence of 
the United States in the area, and it is T/aging an uncom-
promising struggle against the Soviet Union if not completely 
to exclude it then at least to reduce to a minimum its in-
fluence in the area* 
Here the interplay between the national interest and 
ideology is heavily loaded in favour of the former, with 
a few traces of the latter* It is all power politics and 
national interest and no ideological and revolutionary 
rhetoric. 
180 
(4) MALAYSIAN NEUTRAM1AT10N PROPOSAL: 
The states in Southeast Asia have been slow in under-
taking any major regional initiativies for security arrange-
ment because of the long history of involvement of external 
powers in the area. The failure of such alignments in the 
past, and the rejection of the recent Soviet Collective 
Security Proposal, prompted the leaders in the ASS4N coun-
tries to start initiatives for a new security configuration 
in the area. The declaration calling for neutralization of 
Southeast Asia is one of such examples. Nuetralization was 
proclaimed and in principle accepted by the five members of 
of the ASJSAN on December 4, 1971 * The declaration states? 
"1* that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore and Thailand are determined to exert 
initially the necessary efforts to secure the 
recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia 
as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, 
free from any form or manner of interference 
by outside Power; 
2. that Southeast Asian countries should make 
concerted efforts to broaden the areas of co-
operation which contribute to their strength, 
solidarity and closer relationship."^ 
The Declaration of Neutralisation in fact had been pro-
posed by Malaysia earlier in January 1971, at a Commonwealth 
Conference held in Singapore. During the conference the 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul iteisak, urged that 
"neutralization of Southeast Asia will be the region1s only 
salvation." 
Before going into the discussion of the viability of 
the neutralisation project viewed from the perspectives of 
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the regional countries and the big powers as well, it is 
necessary to briefly discuss the background and significance 
of the Malaysian scheme* Neutralization is not a new concept 
in international politics* There were many countries in the 
68 
world that once were declared neutralized; and in Asia, 
too, neutralisation was not new to U Nufs and Ne Win's Burma 
and to Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Cambodia, two of the most 
convincing and authentic examples of neutralism and neu-
tralizatiy in an Asian context. 
7!hat makes the Malaysian proposal important for the 
future international politics in Southeast Asia is not only 
the fact that it was the first time that a group of nations, 
not just one nation, proposed the neutralisation of the 
whole region. However, it is important also in the sense 
that the proposal has come at a time when in Southeast Asia 
a rapid change in the security configuration of the major 
powers is under way: 
"It cones at a time of rapid and profound change 
in the Asian balance of power, when the Indochina 
War may be nearing a comprehensive settlement 
and relationships between external powers and 
the region are in flux. It is a period during 
which the United States is clearly searching 
for some new Asian configuration and the Soviet 
Union has advanced its own grand blueprint for 
the area* Neutralisation has recently been the 
focus of renewed interest in Europe in the con-
text of an effort to build a stable continental 
security arrangement there. Finally, the Malaysian-
ASEAN plan constitutes the first neutralisation 
proposal concerning Southeast Asia to originate 
from within rather than outside, the region. "70 
The Malaysian declaration proposing neutralization of 
the region is different from the previous security arrange-
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ment in Southeast Asia in two ?fays# Internally, the project 
intends to bring all Southeast Asian countries, i*e*, the 
4SKAN, and the four nations in Indochina and Burma, under the 
collective arrangement under which each state within the 
region would respect others1 sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity, not participate in activities likely to directly 
or indirectly threaten the security of others, promote 
regional co-operation, devise methods of ensuring peace 
among themselves and accept full responsibility for peace, 
present a collective view to the outside powers, agree that 
the United States, Soviet Union and China should be excluded 
from the region, that they recognise Southeast Asia as an 
area of neutrality, exclude it from their own power struggles, 
guarantee that neutrality and work out ways of making that 
72 guarantee effective# 
(i) THB A3BA1C ¥TB?IS ON THE MALAYSIAN PaDPOSAL: 
The Malaysian authorship of the neutralization proposal 
?/as mainly due to the intention of Tun ffe^ ak to erase the 
images of many Asian leaders that Malaysia's foreign policy 
71 * bas been consistently pro-«Vest* -> Succeeding Tunku Abdul 
Hahman as Premier in 1971, Tun j&zak thought that it would 
be unwise to continue the British line in foreign affairs, 
and in view of this picked up the neutralisation idea which 
had been once rejected by Tunku in the Malaysian Parliament 
in 1968, following this, he visited many neutral countries, 
such as Belgium and Austria, and consulted their leaders on 
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the possibility of Southeast Asiafs neutralization* Also 
a book written by Cyril Black (et al.), published by 
Princeton University and entitled Neutralization and World, 
Polities, had significantly influenced Iteakfs planning for 
neutralization in the early months of 1971; the book was 
'•known to Malaysian policy-makers and had played a role in 
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the formation of their proposal*" f^ 
When Malaysia proposed this concept she ?#as more con-
cerned with her own interests, although the far-sighted Malay-
sian Premier did intend to promote regional co-operation in 
Southeast Asia. Michael leifer views its background: 
"•••, it can be argued that the neutralization 
proposal was a product in large of special Malay-
sian interest rather than of general requirements* 
It emerges as the personal response of the late 
Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ismail, to the pros-
pect of British military withdrawal and to the 
implication of the Nixon Doctrine« It was made 
possible, above all, by Malaysia1s new relation-
ship with Indonesia—which, following the end of 
Confrontation, had been transformed from one of 
bitter antagonism to one of de facto alliance* 
The assurance of the political benevolence of 
neighbouring Indonesia, together with the inter-
posing shelter from the perils of Indonesia 
provided by an amicable Thailand, contrasted 
with Malaysia*s sense of apprehension about 
the prospect of internal disorder realised in 
the light of the dedicate inter-communal balance 
of Malaysian society, the neutralization was 
geared in large part to the exclusion of extra-
regional forces which might exploit communal 
feelings, and in particular local Chinese aliena-
tion, to challenge the legitimacy of a system 
of government which reflects a constitutionally 
entrenched Malay political dominance#fl^5 
Although Leifer has offered this insight into and ex-
planation of the background of the Malaysian proposal, he 
missed one important point* The point in question is the 
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fact that it was also the improvement of the Sino-Malaysian 
relations since 1971 that had allowed 3azak to advance 
his idea of neutralization to the other ASIAN members* 
Her insistence that neutralization of Southeast Asia must 
have the guarantee from the People fs iSepublic of China made 
many people to guess that Malaysia was making use of the 
plan to show her good will to Peking, hoping that the latter 
would withdraw its support from the local Communists 
operating in Malaysia. In spite of Indonesia*s advice to 
Kuala LtJitipur that Malaysia should learn from the 1965 
Indonesian Communist Party coup and be cautious in making 
friends with the Communist China, ifesak did not give 
other ASEAN members an advanced notice which he had promised 
when he travelled to Peking in 1974• His impatience to 
establish diplomatic ties with China to win her support 
for the Malaysian proposal of neutralization was strategi-
cally planned, disregarding the views of the other ASIAN 
members; 
"The twin elements in the attraction of neutrali-
zation for Malaysia were as a carrot-and-stick 
for China and as a beacon by which Malaysia 
could claim regional leadership and international 
respects"77 
The proposal indeed was a tactical initiative to re-
lease the present Kuala Lumpur Government from the embar-
rassment of being called pro-West. It can be taken as a de-
vise addressed to Bazak*s fellow citizens of different races 
to promote unity which was deeply affected since the lay 13 
Incident in 1969* As Dick Wilson explains; 
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"The Malaysian position on neutralization is one, 
clearly, of unremitting approval; indeed, as 
the author of a glamorously attractive regional 
plan that has brought her name to world atten-
tion in a serious and flattering light, Malay-
sia is newer likely to jettison her ideas on 
this subject* When things go badly for neutra-
lization, it can be explained that it was only 
intended as a long-termed goal and as providing 
a context or a framework within which regional tactics 
and strategy in the new era could be plotted* 
When things go well for neutralization, it can 
be taken as a vindication of the Malpysian plan* 
Sither way Malaysian public opinion is satis-
fied and the momentum of regional leadership 
in foreign policy can be maintained*"78 
Indonesia is the one who was most dissatisfied with 
the Malaysian proposal, not because she disagrees with the 
principle of neutralization but because of the psychologi-
cal feeling of being thumbed down by a neighbouring coun-
try who is not as big and as populous as her*. The Indo-
nesian generals were unhappy to see a second-rate country 
like Malaysia to initiate such a regional arrangement 
without consulting them in advance, because Indonesia expec-
ted to play the leading role in the regional affairs* 
If we try to look at the Indonesian contemporary 
history, we might find that the Indonesians have not only 
been proud of their bigness, but also of their ambitions* 
Not so many years ago they were able to persuade the big 
powers to force Holland to surrender the soverignty of 
West Irian; they dared to challenge the British armed 
might by openning Confrontation against Malaysia in 1963; 
and finally Indonesia was the only Southeast Asian country 
who openly forged an alliance with China to antagonize the 
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United States and the Soviet Union during the later days 
of Sukarno« In terms of national power, ¥ietna® and Indone-
sia seems to be the only two countries who posses the capa-
bilities to challenge the future regional stability in 
Southeast Asia, should they decide to do so* The former 
possessing the abundant weaponry supplied mainly by the 
Soviet Union during the Vietnamese Tar, would find only 
Indonesia a comparable opponent for competition for a 
sphere of influence * vlfhile as of now Indonesia is friendly 
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with other ASIAN members she might, however, find herself 
acting as a major regional power to claim leadership in 
the ASEAN area# 
mother reason that makes Indonesia uncertain about 
the Malaysian approach to neutralization is the latter1s 
suggestion of having China as a guarantor of security in 
Southeast Asia. She could not forget diina1s involvement 
in her internal politics during the Sukarno era when the 
country was almost driven into the Coimunist camp* Indonesia 
also does not feel that in the long term perspective the 
other big powers, such as the United States and the Soviet 
Union, would be able to provide guarantees of neutrality 
of the region* 
Differing from Malaysia, Indonesia1 s view on the future 
security configuration in Southeast Asia can be seen from 
Idam Malik*s speech at a meeting of the Press Foundation 
of Asia held in Bali in September 1971, three months before 
the Kuala lumpur Declaration: 
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11
 In my wiewf three alternatives are open to 
us. first,w we could align ourselves with 
any one or a combination of powers whom 
we would trust to help secure our safety 
and well being; second, we could obtain 
the concurrence of the major powers to de-
clare Southeast Asia a neutralized ^one, free 
from big power interference; third, we could 
develop among ourselves an area of indigenous 
sociopolitical and economic strength* tf80 
The first alternative was rejected by Adam Malik on 
the ground that it was not feasible and not different from 
the situation during the colonial days* The second option, 
much favoured by the Malaysians, was not acceptable either. 
%us Malik sees only the third option desirable: 
fll strongly believe that it is only through deve-
loping among ourselves an area of internal 
cohesion and stability, based on indigenous 
sociopolitical and economic strength, that 
we can ever hope to assist in the early stabi-
lisation of a new equilibrium in the region 
that would not be the exclusive *dictat* of 
the major powers* However dominant the in-
fluence of" these big powers may be, 1 think 
there is and there should be scope for an 
indigenous Southeast Asian component in the 
new, emerging power balance of~the region* 
In fact, 1 am convinced that unless the big 
powers acknowledge and the Southeast Asian 
nations themselves assume a greater and more 
direct responsibility in the maintainence of 
security in the area, no lasting stability can 
ever be achieved. if8l 
The Indonesian Foreign Minister's insistance that the 
regional security should not rest upon the assurances given 
by external powers but attained through developing an in-
ternal cohesion and stability, based on indigenous socio-
political and economic strength, implied two things* Firstly, 
Indonesia does not want to depend on the external powers* 
guarantees; she dislikes military pacts of any kind* Secondly, 
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Djakarta thinks that having excluded the big powers1 in-
fluence from the area, Indonesia would automatically became 
the "number one1* to talk about the regional security aff&irs 
since she is the biggest among the ASIAN members * When lee 
Kuan-yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, suggested in Bangkok 
at the beginning in 1973 that the United States should 
maintain military presence in Thailand, Adam Malik snapped 
back: 
tflf Indonesia was asked to provide military 
bases for foreign countries, we would certain-
ly say: * Go to hell#f It should also be asked 
why Jee Kuan-yew asked for military presence 
in Thailand, not in his own country* f,82 
The Indonesian position on external military presence 
in the region maintains that foreign military bases must 
be "temporary*1 and should not be "intensified.11 After the 
Bangkok comment, when Singapore wanted to invite the 
Soviet Union to replace the American role in Southeast Asia, 
an anonymous Indonesian Defense Ministry official was quoted 
as saying that the "existence of a big power naval base in 
Singapore would obstruct the creation of a neutral South-
81 
east Asia*** ^  
On the whole, the Indonesian attitude toward the big 
powers is a realistic one, as Malik said in a San Francisco 
address recently: 
f,le are not that unrealistic as to assume to 
be able to eliminate all major -power interest 
or influence from our region* On the other 
hand, however, all sides must come to the 
realization that while the interests of 
the major powers may be important, they are 
not vital or of direct consequence to their 
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security, and certainly do not warrant direct 
intervention as was done in the past*f,84 
Singapore seems to be the most positive among the 
Southeast Asian countries in responding to the Malaysian 
proposal, though she has agreed with the other ASEAN mem-
bers to sign the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in 1971 • It is 
because of the separation from Malaysia in 1965 when Singa-
pore was forced by Kuala Lumpur to leave the Federation, 
and because being a Chinese populated city-state, that 
Singapore has been carefully watching the diplomatic move-
ments of Malaysia* Unlike the Indonesian position, Singapore 
is reluctant to support any self-help policy in Southeast 
Asia* The fact that she is the smallest state among the 
regional countries persuaded Lee Kuan-yew and his colleagues 
to seek external help to balance off the bigger regional 
and mainly ethnically Malay states* To the People*s Action 
Party, the neutralization plan is clear enough to imply a 
future domination of Southeast Asia by the bigger regional 
powers* Had Singaporefs population been of Malay origin, 
this fear ?#ould not exist at all. The history of the region 
shows that racial conflicts and their subsequent *fspill-
overfl have never been successfully checked* The remembrance 
of the May 1969 Mots in Malaysia is still fresh in the 
minds of the Singaporeans; the Peoplefs Action Party leaders 
are still worrying that one day Malaysia and Indonesia might 
join together to crash the young republic* 
Basically, Singapore wants the extra-regional powers 
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to station considerable military forces in the region, 
preferably in Thailand*. Lee is the one who advocated the 
"time-gain" theory during the I960*s, suggesting that if 
the United States could involve herself in Vietnam long enough 
to balance off the other powers1 involvement, then this 
would give time to the nations in the region to strengthen 
themselves politically, socially, and economically, and thus 
assist in the solution of their external and internal 
85 problems* J Ihen the Nixon Doctrine was proclaimed it 
forced Lee Kuan-yew to hold back his theory for a while, 
and as a result he started to shorn* more co-operative attitude 
to the regional states rather than maintaining that the 
United States must continue her presence in Vietnam* His 
recent rappoachement with Indonesia is an indication of 
his willingness to get closer with the regional countries* 
Following Leefs visit to Djakarta in 1973 and following 
Singaporefs support for Indonesia*s position on the Malacca 
Straits, both Singapore and Indonesia seem to agree to 
forget the painful history of Confrontation when Singapore 
was part of Malaysia. % e Singapore-Indonesia detente achiev-
in 1973 was another sign showing that Singapore would like 
to make use of the Indonesians to check the Malaysian 
ambition in the region* 
Contrary to the Malaysian concept of regional security, 
Singapore insists that it would be desirable to have more 
than one power1s military presence in Southeast Asia* Lee 
would like to see not only the Americans, but also Bussians, 
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Japanese, Europeans and Australians, to be present in the 
region*. In the words of Iteijaratnam, Singapore fs Foreign 
Minister, Singapore regards herself as the "global city,11 
a lfbrain center11 in Southeast Asia to function as ,fa spark 
plug11 for the economic and social well-being and better 
quality of life in Southeast Asia* To maintain this positionf 
she dislikes to give up her existing benefits gained from 
international contacts with the major extra-regional powers* 
The fact that the ideological content and label of ^neutra-
lization11 does not offer any substantial benefits to the 
young republic made the Singapore leaders turn a deaf ear to 
Bazak, and to mort their own way to prosperity* 
The recent relations of Singapore with Malaysia have 
not been good* ^irst, the jointMalaysia-Singapore Airlines 
(MSA) was split into separate national airlines in 1971* 
Second, the long history of interchangable currencies of both 
countries ended with the separation in 1973• Third, the Stock 
Exchange and the Straits Times were no more operating as 
unitary organisations by 1974* Most serious of all, the in-
vitation of the Israeli advisers to Singapore to build up 
its defense forces had antagonized the Muslim leaders in 
Kuala Lumpur, resulting in the cancellation of facilities 
and space for Singapore air force and jungle warfare training 
in Malaysia* All these recent events are enough to indicate 
why both Malaysia and Singapore are thinking differently 
toward the neutralization plan* 
Singapore*s position on the Kuala Lumpur plan is simple* 
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She does not want to follow wholeheartly the new f,ideolo-
gical label" of ifezak and thus permit a vaccum to emerge 
in Southeast Asia. Apparently she agrees with the Malaysians 
on the principle of neutralization, saying only that it is 
an "excellent idea.11 Besides this lip service, she has been 
playing the role of fldevil,s advocate,st acting as a ^trouble-
maker11 who is asking difficult and pointed questions on 
neutralization; and she insists that the terms must be clear-
ly defined and that hard analysis, not "vague and hopeful 
86 banalities,sl be the basis of decision. She even poured 
cold water on Sazak by asking indirectly the workability of 
the project: 
ffls not security more likely to be achieved by 
encouraging the countervailing presence of 
several big powers rather than by trying to ex-
clude them? i.e., through a balance of power 
rather than neutralization?f,87 
$o the People*s Action Party leadership, in sum, neu-
tralization is an excellent idea, and **what a good thing 
it would be if it could only be realized, and that one 
should hope for the best but plan for the worst.*1 Singapore 
prefers realistic means for security; she will not involve 
herself too much in the Malaysian proposal* 
The students of Ihai politics agree that Thai foreign 
policy has been consistently an expression of its: traditional 
ability of accommodation* Her policy of identifying herself 
with the United States for the containment of China during 
the 1950fs and 1960fs had a tremdous impact upon the other 
Southeast Asian countries which were not involved in the 
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Vietnamese War, She had long been regarded as an important 
member of the S1AT0, a vital piece in Dulles* "Domino 
Theory11 to resist the Communist aggression in Southeast 
Asia. And, indeed, the Thai leaders were doing well with 
the United States until 1969 > when the Nixon administration 
decided to make a drastic change in its foreign policy in 
Asia, determined to withdraw from the battlefield of Viet-
nam through the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. 
When the Malaysian proposal for neutralization was 
first announced Thanom Kittikachorn, the then Prime Minister 
of Thailand and his military junta were fairly hostile. The 
determining factor that changed the Thai leaders* attitudes 
was Peking's entrance into the United Nations in late 1971, 
and ever since this Thailand became accommodative by agreeing 
to accept the neutralization in principle * But this does not 
mean that Thailand would work hand-in-hand with the Malaysian 
Premier to realize the plan* dthough Thanat Ihoman rms one 
of the most energetic workers in bringing all ASIAN foreign 
ministers to sign the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in the end 
of 1971, he stress two years later when dismissed by 
Thanom that slhe did not consider himself supporting a view 
of neutralization or neutrality that would embrace non-
alignment, non-involvement, or not leaning on one side or 
the other*"89 
After Thanom Kittikachorn was forced by the students 
to give up the premiership and to leave his country later 
in 1973i the new Foreign Minister, Chatichai Ghoonhavan, 
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made a slight change in the attitude, affirming the Thai 
support for the Kuala Lumpur Declaration* But it should 
be understood that the change ftwas accompanied by some 
irritation on the part of the Thai opinion to the effect 
that the country was being pushed by its friends for their 
90 
own purposes.If Some ASIAN members, especially Singapore 
and Malaysia, were regarded by the Thai leaders as intending 
to make Thailand as a buffer-state against the Vietnamese 
Communists while they benefited by trading with them* 
Following the appearance of civilian government in 
early 1975 under the leadership of Irukit Promoj, Thailand 
further changed her policy by altering her image of China 
as a threat to her security. The new Thai Premier gradually 
came to believe that hostility of Peking to Thailand was 
not permanent, but was a product of the Thai alliance with 
Ql the United States* 
Whether and when the United States forces in Thailand 
would withdraw completely is another matter, but Michael 
Leifer saw the situation in 1974 in the following terms: 
11
 The Thai government, with its present civilian 
government and its current commitment to democratic 
institutions is certainly not willing to remove 
American military presence stationed in the 
country despite the uncertainty of countervailing 
power it affords and the significant, if not sub-
stantive, decline in its standing complement. 
There has also been no indication of any willing-
ness on the part of Thailand to repudiate the 
SEATO alliance, which in its bi-lateral Thai-
American interpretation of March 1962, serves as 
the institution vehicle for the fullfilment of 
American commitment to Thai land *,f*92 
Had the Thieu regime and Lon Nol rule not been defeated 
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in 1975> Michael Leiferfs prediction ma,de a year earlier 
would have been probably valid. Yet history is cruel# The 
recent unstable events in Thailand since the end of the 
Vietnamese War have shown that Thailand would at the end 
accommodate herself with the Communist regimes in both 
Cambodia and Vietnam* The recent dissolution of the SEATO 
has shown that the Thais will have a difficult time in 
seeking a new form of security arrangement in the region 
of Southeast Asia. 
Yet, whatever happens to Thailand from the new Communist 
regimes in Indochina, it would be naive to believe that 
Thailand would accept the Kuala Lumpur Declaration* To the 
Thai Government the Ifeizak proposal is tfa beautiful document 
but it has no teeth*"^ What the Thai leaders want is a new 
kind of security guarantee to hold the Vietnamese penetra-
tion* Krukit Promoj had established diplomatic ties with 
China in order to elicit help from the latter to restrain 
the Communist activities, but this is not enough* The Thais 
would be asking for more from the Malaysians, not being sati-
sfied with the absence of military commitment in their 
proposal on neutralization in the region* Although Thanat 
Ihoman is no more in the Thai Foreign Ministry, he is 
respected for his attitude toward neutralization* He argued 
that armed neutrality would be the best guarantee if South-
east Asia is to be neutralized: 
"Neutral nations are required by their neutrality 
to prohibit the establishment of foreign military 
bases on their soil* Bit shunning military allian-
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ces does not mean that the neutral nations should 
allow themselves to be caught militarily unpre-
pared completely* lf94 
As long as the new Thai civilian government is merely 
a care-taker government, and until the internal situation 
returns to normal, the neutralization would command a low 
poriority in the Thai foreign policy considerations* What 
seems to be more urgent to the Thai leaders is whether the 
Vietnamese would launch another attack on their territory; 
so far they are not much interested in the long-term argu-
ment whether Southeast Asia should be neutralized* 
Like Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, the Philippines 
has been giving only a tentative support to the Malaysian 
proposal, because of their own political quarrels with the 
Kuala Lumpur Government* 
Shortly after the formation of Malaysia in 1963, which 
included Sabah, Manila protested violently that Sabah was 
its own territory with the result that its unsuccessful 
claim over this land left a deep scar on the relations 
between the two countries* When the ASIAN foreign ministers 
gathered at Kuala Lumput* in November 1971, the Philippine 
Foreign Minister Bomnlo raised the issue by asking Bazak: 
flThe Philippines wants to know if the neutrali-
zation plan would fprejudice territorial 
boundaries1 * **ft95 
Not only the Sabah issue prevented the Philippines 
from supporting the neutralization project, there is also 
the alignment factor that hinders Manila from accepting 
the Bazak plan* Because the Philippines were one of the 
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most faithful members of the SEATO, it is difficult for the 
Manila Government to give up its ties with the United States 
suddenly, although the organisation has been disolved recent-
ly, 
But Karoos found it helpful to accept the neutralization 
plan in principle in order to win his political prestige at 
home* To ease down the harshness of the demand for the 
Americans to leave the country, he has to show signs that 
Manila is not totally ignoring the possibility of neutra-
lization in Southeast Asia* In 1973• for example, he started 
to indicate a more friendly attitude toward the Malaysian 
plan by saying that ffthe principal threat and danger to the 
stability of our government is internal subversion; there 
will not be, for the next ten years, 1 believe, external 
aggression.11^ His colleague, JSOSIUIO, followed by saying 
that ffthe elimination of the United States bases in the 
Philippines mill give the country a more flexible stand in 
97 the international relations with other countries* tf^f 
But there is no evidence of serious efforts from Marcos 
demanding the United States to withdraw her bases from the 
Philippines, fearing a financial loss from the closure of 
these military stations, including the Subic toy Naval Base 
and the Clark Air Force Base, two of the most important 
American armed stations in Western Pacific* The realistic 
calculation of Marcos ia that these military stations have 
been providing 26,000 jobs and spending some US1130 million 
a year in the Philippines. Certainly Manila would not like 
198 
to suffer the experiece of Singapore when the British 
withdrawal from its bases much worried the Lee Kuan-yew 
Government at the end of 1969* 
Manila would most likely continue to press on Malaysia 
over the sovereignty of Sabah, and continue to allow the 
United States to station her troops in the Philipines, 
though it might have to come to agree that the withdrawal 
should be gradual* Toward neutralization Manila has no dis-
agreement with the other three ASIAN members that the propo-
sal should be treated as a long-term objective or an "in-
tellectual11 arguement. In short, Manila is not so unrealis-
tic as to give up suddenly the existing benefits derived 
from the American bases in the country* Its view corresponds 
with the view of the other three ASIAN members^ except Malay-
sia, that balance of power is still the best policy for 
Southeast Asia. 
(ii) ATTITUDES OF THE GRBAT POWERS TOWARD NEUTRALIZATION: 
After Tun fezak replaced Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, the Soviet Union found an "unexpec-
Qg 
tedly sympathetic ear*'^  in Kuala Lumpur when the latter 
proposed neutrality and non-alignment* The Moscow leaders 
had been waiting for reactions of the Asians to their pro-
posal of the Collective Security System since its proclama-
tion in 1969y while Bazak fraited for response from the big 
powers on his neutralization project* Thus it was logical 
for the Soviet Union to perceive the Bazak plan as having 
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some common elements with her own Asian security scheme. 
Yet, the Malaysian Premier thought that under no 
circumstances would he like to relate his neutralisation 
plan to the Russian projectt One important reason for his 
visit in Moscow in late 1972 was to gain support from the 
Kremlin for his own neutralisation proposal* He failed* 
M s hope of receiving Russia's "sympathetic understanding" 
of his plan did not come to fruition,fl and instead the 
Russians advanced once again their own idea of "insuring 
collective security in Asia*11 These conflicting aspira-
tions of both parties were expressed in a joint communique, 
a document in which f,each side had expounded its own plan 
but gave no indication of any meeting of minds on the ques-
101 tion of neutralization*ft 
In spite of the disagreement between Kuala Lumpur and 
Moscow over the interpretation of the Collective Security 
System and the neutralisation plan, the Soviet Union did 
not reject the Razak plan totally. The reason is that the 
neutralist ^tendency1* of the Malaysian Premier did not 
contradict the Soviet socialist ideology aiming to promote 
non-alignment in foreign policy* The Kuala Lumpur Declaration 
was thought by the Russians to be nullifying the regional 
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security organisations of the Western powers* Moreover, 
the Russians were not eager to implement their own plan 
because "should the collective security proposal fail to 
gain acceptance, neutrality will be preferable in the 
Soviet view to a series of regional security alliances in 
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which the Western powers would play a marginal role#!t U J 
Not until 1974, when Malaysia established her diploma-
tic ties with Peking, had the Soviet Union worried too much 
that the Malaysian/ASEAN project might turn out against 
Moscow. However, the events that followed Barak's tour to 
Peking made the Russians uneasy, because even Thailand and 
the Philippinesconce the most anti-Peking pro-West countries 
in Southeast Asia, set up their diplomatic ties with China* 
3ven for the Russians 3azak*s proposal was not satis-
factory because it ?#as only tangentially connected with 
Moscow's concept of "positive neutrality*11 The fact that 
the Malaysian proposal was a vaguely worded document deli-
berately designed to provide a lowest common denominator 
for covering a wide range of preferred concepts of neutra-
lization, none of which could easily be reconciled with the 
Soviet style of collective security, would probably damper 
the aspirations of the Russians in the insular Southeast Asian 
area for the time being. Moscow might possibly continue to 
intensify its economic and cultural activities in this 
area and at the same time might turn her attention to In-
dochina where a bloody war has just ended* 
Turning now to the attitude of the United States, lashing-
ton disliked the ASIAN countries to name the United States 
as one of the big powers which might be involved in a 
••future rivalry11 in Southeast Asia* 
Moreover, Washington worried about the excessively 
neutralistic statement made by the ASIAN countries in No-
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vember 1971. Before the Kuala Lumpur meeting Ra^ak had visited the 
TTnited States but received from President Nixon no sympathy 
for his neutralization proposal* Jhe United States strategic 
considerations before the Declaration had been expressed 
by James Morgan in the Par Eastern Economic Review to the 
effect that ^neutralist declaration might be exploited by 
isolationist elements in the United States. •* fflt would,11 
some American diplomats in Southeast Asia argued, "strengthen 
the neo-isolationist lobby in the United States*and make it 
more difficult for the administration in Washington to con-
tinue to convince the Congress of the need to maintain forces 
and give material support to the noncommunist countries in 
Southeast Asia."105 
The official American position in this matter was to 
encourage regional initiatives concerning security, but as 
long as they were consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. She 
envisioned Southeast Asia as moving naturally toward some 
sort of collective non-alignment but saw the regional se-
curity and stability as a pre-condition, not as a product, 
1 A iZ 
of such an evolution* Thus any premature absence of 
military balance in the area would not be desirable by 
the United States* former American Secretary of State, 
Williams P* Rogers, expressed this in March, 1972; 
f,
*#* (The United States recognises neutralisation, Ed*) 
as a long-term goal,*** the area as a zone of peace, 
freedom, and neutrality*.* However, the effective-
ness of any plan ultimately to reach this objec-
tive will depend on the secure independence of 
Southeast Asian nations and on the attitudes of 
their neighbours*fl 107 
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Embassador filliam H. Sullivan, one of the most in-
fluenzal decision makers in the United States Department 
of State before his appointment to the Philippines, also 
maintained in 1973 that stit is * essential* for the United 
States to retain its military presence in the area so as to 
l AA 
reassure its friends that they were not abandoned*11 
Politically, the United States can be expected to 
continue to be counted upon as an anti-Communist ally by 
the ASEAN countries, and it would be idle to speculate that 
she would let them go Communist* Economically, to protect 
her investments in the area, United States sees any pre-
mature withdrawal of her forces from tha area as not prac-
tical* Returning from Peking at the end of 1975 President 
ford reaffairmed in Honolulu the so-called "New Pacific 
Doctrine11 to the effect that the United States will continue 
to consider the East Asia, including Southeast Asia, an im-
109 portant area of its economic and trade activities* ^ He 
recognized that the United States trade with this area had 
exceeded in 1975 her transactions with the European Economic 
110 
Community and was growing at over 30 per cent a year# 
To conclude, Malaysia's neutralization program is not 
the type of a security arrangement that the United States 
hopes to see in the present Southeast Asian situation* Al-
though President Pord promised Peking that "the Americans 
111 
share opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia,11 it 
does not mean that the Mericans would agree with the Razak 
plan and withdraw entirely xheir military presence from 
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Southeast Asia; 
11
 It is fairly clear from all this that the Americans 
are not unsympathetic toward the reasoning behind 
the Malaysian neutralization proposal. They would, 
however, undoubtedly prefer not to have the plan 
made so specific; they dislike the United States 
being placed equally with the Soviet Union and 
China as big powers whose actions in the region 
are harmful to the region, and they perhaps suffer 
from some unconscious resentment at the first 
major independent diplomatic initiative to be made 
in the modern period by a group of Asian countries 
usually regarded as friendly toward the United 
States.w112 
(iii) CHINA*S POSITION ON NEUTRALIZATIONS 
Turning now to Peking, it has been a customary prac-
tice of its leaders not to endorse any va.gue and airy scheme 
for resolution of regional or international conflicts until 
they fully understood its nature and how this could be used 
to isolate their major enemy in the diplomatic arena* In 
view of this, any security arrangement that would limit China1s 
freedom of manoeuvring in international or regional activi-
ties would receive a critical review from Peking, as the 
Russian Collective Security proposal experienced. 
Toward the Malaysian/ASEAN neutralisation proposal, 
China1s attitude has been more careful* Unlike her severe 
attack upon the Soviet Union*s security project, the People's 
Republic of China did not respond to the Malaysian scheme 
until 1973, when the developments seemed to favour the 
Chinese side. 
Because she is the weakest in terms of military capa-
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bility compared with the United States and the Soviet Union, 
China saw the Malaysian scheme as implying an "artificial 
exclusion11 of her role in the neutralization of Southeast 
Asia when this had been declared in Kuala Lumpur; 
"The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the 
neutralization arrangement places the guarantor 
powers on equal footing, thus artificially ex-
cluding China*#* from the workings of intra-
Asian diplomacy* lfU3 
In this sense, the Chinese reservation regarding the 
ASIAN Declaration seems to correspond with that of some lea-
ders in the ASEAN countries. As Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew 
remarked in Djakarta later in 1973• China as a guarantor of 
Southeast Asiafe neutralization should, as a pre-condition, 
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develop a strong naval force first* Whether Lee*8 state-
ment influenced the Chinese leaders1 determination to show 
her naval strength by fighting the South Vietnamese regime 
for the sovereignty of the Spartly Islands (Nan Sha Gh»un Tao) 
and the Paracel Islands (Hsi Sha difun Tao) in early 1974, 
must be only guessed* However, it is safe to assume that 
China would not be totally ignoring the ASEAN Declaration 
because it is the first security plan which was originiated 
by the countries of Southeast Asia themselves* Of course, 
Peking should give special treatment to the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration if it wishes to woo the Third World countries 
to her side and to be "self-reliant in the anti-hegemonic 
era.11 Acting ae the "natural leader11 of the Third florid, to 
use President Marcos* words, China does not want to show her 
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appetite explicitly and too early* Her position toward the 
Declaration has been more sophisticated than that of the 
other powers* 
Since Chinafs main concern in her diplomacy in the 1970*s 
has been the assessment of the Soviet Union1s intention on her 
periphery, she would not hesitate to woo the ASIAN countries 
if their neutralization scheme is not contradictory to her 
grand strategy of united front* Peking1s position on the 
matter was first expressed informally to a group of Japanese 
newsman in March 1973 when they talked with Liao Chfeng-chih, 
a senior adviser to the Chinese Foreign Ministry: 
11
 China supported the principle of neutrality featuring 
national independenceT^iplomacy, and peace which the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thai-
land have worked out. '4iese countries, however, some-
times ^ want to improve relations with China, but 
at other times they step back, saying they are afraid* 
We do not fret, rush, or threaten, and we will watch 
the development in regard to this situation* f|115 
This informal position was slightly changed in June 
1973, when Chen Ji-sheng, Mrector of Southeast Asian Affairs 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry, visited Bangkok accompanying 
a Chinese table-tennis team. The Thai Deputy Under-Secretary 
of State, Pan Vflannamethi, told the reporters after 
Chen Ji-sheng had talked with Ghatichai Ghoonhavan, the Thai 
Foreign Minister, that "China had welcomed the ASEAN de-
claration of peace, freedom, and neutrality for the region*11 
Chen was also quoted as saying that fl China did not wish to 
see any power dominating Southeast Asia but rather wished 
117 to see a region free from interference.11 
%ese pronouncements, however, should not be regarded 
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as an official attitude of Peking; at best they can be trea-
ted as appeasement given to the ASIAN countries who were 
muddling through to the exchanges of diplomatic ties with 
diina. Also, if China really supported neutralisation then 
why the Peking officials did not talk to the Malaysians 
directly during their many visits to Kuala Lumpur since 
1971, and instead were making hints to the Thais? It is clear 
that although the authorship of neutralisation rested with 
Bazak, Peking thought that by 1973 Thailand was more im-
portant than Malaysia in terms of strategic calculations, 
because the Thais were undecided since the Paris Accord of 
1973 whether to continue their policy of containment of 
China or normalize with her. As far as Malaysia was concerned, 
on the other hand, Peking was sure that the diplomatic ex-
change was a matter of time# 
Finally, China1s position became clear whan Malaysia, 
as the first member of the ASEAN countries, initiated the 
diplomatic relations with Peking in lay 1974* During Bazak*s 
visit in Peking Ghon Ba-lai referred sympathetically to 
neutralization when welcoming him: 
lfThe Malaysian Government 9s position for the 
establishment of a zone of peace and neutrality 
in Southeast Asia gives expression to the 
desire of the Southeast Asian people to shake off 
interference and has won support from many 
Third World countries* The Chinese people 
sincerely wish the Malaysian peoples still ..,« 
greater victories on their road of advance*" 
This statement was later quoted by Malaysian officials 
as a demonstration of China's "support and acceptance11 of 
neutralization. iJhe Malaysian officials also said that Chou 
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Eh-lai had privately "supported" neutralization, "provided 
11Q 
that the foreign bases*** were dismantled in good time*11 J 
It is understandable that the Malaysians were not too 
happy with the attitude of the Chinese towards neutralization 
of Southeast Asia because Bazak had already failed to gain 
support from the Kremlin, while the United States showed 
no intent of ?#ithdrawing its bases prematurely from the 
area. On the other hand, Peking did not wish Itetzak to re-
turn to Kuala Lumpur to tell his fellow members in the 
ASEAN that China does not support neutralization* Therefore, 
the careful statement of Chou Bn-lai might possibly be 
taken as a limited appeasement. Moreover, Chou only said 
that lfthe Chinese people sincerely wish*.*,** not the "diinese 
Government •** It is easy to understand the meaning of the 
phraseology because the Peking leaders clearly differentiate 
between the ^governmentf* and the "people*f* Secondly, instead 
of involving diina in the Malaysian plan, Chou only said 
that neutralization sthas won support from many Third World 
countries,*1 but there was no mention of the People's Bepublic 
of China# 
Nevertheless, China extended her sympathy to the 
Malaysian plan *fto shake off foreign interference,11 which 
tactically brought the plan to correspond with her ^anti-
hegemonic11 postures* 
4ie Peking leaders continued to denounce the Soviet 
Collective Security Proposal by quoting the ASIAN Declara-
tion of neutralization* The People1s Daily on May 20, 1975, 
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reported the foreign ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur 
which discussed the neutralization plan. Following the 
exchange of diplomatic ties with the Philippines and Thai-
land, Peking again maintained its position on the subject 
in a sympathetic way* In an article "Letting the Tiger 
Through the Back Door While Repelling the Wolf Through the 
Front Gate,11 the People*s Daily commented on July 29# 1975; 
f,The proposal on establishing a zone of peace and 
neutrality in Southeast Asia put forward by the 
Southeast Asian countries in recent years is in 
accord with the national interests of these 
countries and peoples to safeguard their sovereign-
ty and independence and to oppose the contention 
between the two hegemonic powers*,f120 
On August 15, the Peking tteview made another comment 
on the neutralization proposal by relating it to the Soviet 
Collective Security Proposal: 
"But now Moscow has changed its tune, chanting 
that the neutralization proposal is fconsonant1 
with its Asian Collective Security System*1 This 
is really ridiculous* 
The proposal for the neutralization of South-
east Asia and the *Asian Collective Security 
System* are two diametrically opposed ideas* 
There are no 9common points* or •consonance* 
between them* The Soviet Union1s design, in its own 
words, is to have the neutralization proposal 
•included* in the framework of the idea of an Asian 
Collective Security System* In fact, it is trying 
to bring Southeast Asian countries into the 
orbit of the Soviet Asian Collective Security 
System* f,121 
It is, therefore, clear that Peking's standpoint is 
to utilize the Malaysian scheme for its attacks upon hege-
monism in Asia, particularly that of the Soviet Union, 
Since the announcement of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 
Peking1s attitude has been consistent with its Third World 
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strategy to the effect that because the Soviet Union intends 
to "insure Collective Security in Asia," Peking quotes the 
neutralization proposal saying that the Southeast Asians 
do not welcome the Soviet project for they prefer their own 
security arrangement. But Peking cannot fully support the 
scheme because the Malaysian proposal is vague and not 
precise on how to achieve neutralization* Moreover, China 
does not wish to be a guarantor as the Soviet Union and the 
United States; she is weak in military capability; she does 
not think that the complete American withdrawal is desirable 
for the regional security, although she has been consistent-
ly "anti-hegemonistic;lf and, last of all, to act as a gua-
rantor would imply intervention in the domestic affairs of 
other countries, and of course she would be reluctant to 
accept the Malaysian invitation to act in such a role * 
To assess China1s position, perhaps she is lees negative 
than the Soviet Union and the United States* Her sympathy 
given to the proposal probably reflects the concerns of the 
Peking leaders to the effects that !ldiina would undoubted-
ly find it advantageous to be freed from concern over 
122 2,000 mile frontier with the states of Southeast Asia.11 
Of coursef the diinese Welcome11 neutralization in South-
east Asia, 
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CONCLUSION 
The materials presented in the preceding pages and 
analyzing the relations of the People*s Republic of diina 
with the ASIAN area of Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975 
leads us to the following main conclusions; 
The Nixon Doctrine, the termination of war in Indo-
china and the withdrawal of the American military presence 
from Southeast Asia have profoundly transformed the external 
environment of China on her southern border, eliminating 
thus what Peking leaders have considered the greatest threat 
to the security of their country during the last two de-
cades* 
The internal power struggle within the Communist 
Party of China in the aftermath of the Cultural Hevolution 
in 1969 propelled to power a group of moderate leaders, 
who understood this transformation and responded to it 
by a set of new and imaginative policies, which in turn 
aided this process* 
The essence of these new policies was an effort to 
enhance this newly won security of diina by entering into 
diplomatic relations, trade and other friendly ties and 
cultural contacts with the governments of states organized 
in the ASIAN* 
Seeing the decline of American power in Southeast Asia 
and the friendly postures emanating from Peking, several 
governments in the area reciprocated by a willingness to 
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enter into diplomatic, commercial and cultural ties with 
China* An important element in this decision was a hope 
that by entering into friendly relations with Peking China 
would stop supporting the insurgencies in their countries* 
or at least tone down her verbal and material support* 
The process of entering into the friendly ties with 
the governments of the area was greatly aided by the assu-
rances offered by Peking that it considers the question of 
the overseas Cliinese living in their countries as an in-
ternal matter, not to be interferred into* 
This process of raprochement was further aided by an 
adroit use by Peking of its ties with the revolutionary 
movements operating in these countries; the support to 
these movements was toned down in order to coax the govern-
ments into, or reward them for, friendly orientation towards 
Peking, while it was stepped up to met out punishment and 
coerce them to detach themselves from the American lfconnec-
tionn and start looking towards China* 
While the United States is no more considered by Peking 
the main enemy of China in Southeast Asia, this place has 
been now assigned to the Soviet Union who, Peking believes, 
is penetrating the area to replace the American presence 
and to confront China in the south and thus complete her 
encirclement* 
In view of this, Peking is making every effort to keep 
the Russians out of the area by deepening its relations 
with the local governments as well as by favourably res-
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ponding to the local schemes calling for neutralization 
of the region but without the participation of extra-
regional big powers in them* 
The major theme which is emerging from these efforts 
of Peking empasizes the contemporary relevance of the 
lfhistorical and traditional ties11 of China with the region; 
this emphasis then casts China into the role of a major 
power, an "older brother" and "natural leader11 who is 
entitled to respect and deference, and should be listened 
to by her smaller neighbours on her southern periphery. 
Thus the relations of China with the countries of 
the ASIAN countries underwent a complete metamorphosis 
between 1949 and 1975* While in the period following 1949 
Peking had placed more emphaaia upon the ideological factors 
in its relations with the area and unreservedly supported 
the armed insurgencies aimed at the overthrowing of the 
local governments by force, between 1969-1975 the national 
interest emerged as the main factor motivating its effort 
to build a sub-system of friendly, or neutral states, on 
her southern periphery through friendly contacts with 
their governments and at a partial expense of support to 
the insurgent groups* 
The Peking leaders thus attained between 1969-1975 
the reconciliation of the two opposing tendencies in their 
relations towards the region in a new equilibrium, in a 
new mix, in which the national interest outweigh the ideo-
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logical considerations* 'The pendulum thus swung across the 
spectrum to the other extreme, leaving the ideological 
motivations at the low level of activity, but as a forma-
dable potentiality* But this analysis is valid only until 
today, 
It is in this connection that we must never forget 
that because the foreign relations of China, as everything 
else, are based upon Mao's Theory of Contradiction, the 
equilibrium is not a static but a dynamic concept which 
implies that the relations between the two opposing ten-
dencies, in our case the mix between the national interest 
and ideology, is not permanently fixed but that it is in 
a flux, changing according to the new circumstances as 
they emerge. This operational code, in which change ie 
inherent, thus poses the question of the future relations 
of Qhina with that part of Southeast Asia which is organized 
into the ASIAN* 
In order to offer even some tentative answer to this 
question we must attempt an assessment of the direction 
of development of some central factors which inform and 
influence the foreign policy making process in diina towards 
the region of our study today* 
first to look at is the likelihood of a new power 
struggle in China which could propel to power a new leader-
ship, which in turn could initiate new policies towards 
the region* While it is true that the present policies, 
known as the Ohou Eh-lai Doctrine, came under severe fire 
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and criticism from the left radicals, this crisis has been 
solved early in April 1976 by the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-
ping and the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng to be the Premier 
and the first Yice-Ghairman of the party* There is every 
indication that while both wings of the party have been 
defeated by this new appointment—the left represented by 
fang Hung-wen and the Shanghai Group and the right wing 
by Teng Hsiao-ping and his followers—the new Premier is 
committed to the continuation of the moderate course in 
the spirit of the Ghon Eh-lai Doctrine# Thus continuity 
of the present policies and stability of the top leader-
ship in diina are going to be on the agenda for a foresee-
able future. 
The second factor to look at is the possibility of 
changes in the attitudes of the countries of the area 
towards Peking* It must be remembered that many countries 
of the region rushed to undertake the pilgrimage to Peking 
because of two reasons* First, the decline and withdrawal 
of American power from the area; and second, a hope that by 
entering into friendly ties with diina Peking would deny 
support to the local insurgencies* 
The recent developments, however, indicate that Peking 
itself is not interested in a complete withdrawal of the 
Americans and prefers, for its own security, the continua-
tion of their small but viable presence in the area* This 
then might slow down the march on Peking by the local govern-
ments who might read this as an essential weakness of 
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Peking*s strategic position, and that the ascendancy of 
China as a paramount power in the area is not inevitable
 # 
As far as the support of the local insurgencies is 
concerned, the governments of the area are much disturbed 
by the realisation that Peking can escalate its support to 
them anytime it is to its advantage, and fear that it would 
do it in the future if and when the conditions are right# 
In fact, there is a feeling of disappointment in Malaysia 
and Thailand over the continued though low support of 
Peking to the insurgencies in these countries, and over 
the question to what extent Peking can effectively res-
train them* Because of this, Thailand is showing good will 
towards Cambodia, ¥ietnam and Laos in the hope of being 
able to put the damper on the insurgent activities not through 
Peking but by direct relations with them. 
Thus while Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines 
feel that Peking got the better part of the bargain by 
winning their recognition and feeling let down by Peking's 
continued support to the insurgencies, Indonesia and Singa-
pore do not believe that it is possible to make China drop 
her support to these movements in exchange of diplomatic 
recognition* In view of this, their relations with Peking 
would remain in a limbo for the time being, particularly 
so because of the prospect of the complete collapse of 
the American porcer in the area did not come through and 
because the prospect of China immediately emerging as the 
dominant power in the area was grossly overestimated* 
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Turning now to the great power relations in the region 
as the third factor, it is certain that Peking mill continue 
insisting that the Americans must maintain a meaningful 
military presence in the area, and that the Soviet pene-
tration of the region would remain the dominant concern 
of Peking1s policy planners* In view of this, Peking will 
be making every effort to minimize Kremlin1s influence in 
the region by deepening its ties with the local governments 
through diplomatic, trade, cultural and other means* In 
this connection the Chinese ethnical press* in the area would 
be harnessed to spearhead the propaganda attacks upon the 
Soviet Union, and there is every possibility that Peking would 
attempt to turn some sections of the overseas diinese into 
pressure groups to exert themselves with their governments 
in order to keep the j^ issians at bay# 
It is in this area of the great power relationship that 
Peking would encounter two serious contradictions• The first 
contradiction is inherent in Peking1s insistence that the 
Americans have to maintain their military presence in the area 
in the sense that this insistence compromises Peking1s moral 
leadership of the revolutionary movements because Peking is 
"colluding" with an "imperialist power11 and is therefore not 
better than Moscow and its detente with the Americans* Thus in 
the eyes of the revolutionary leaders in the jungles of South-
east Asia Peking1s image of an uncompromising fighter against 
lfhegemonism and imperialism** is seriously tarnished* 
The second contradiction which will emerge for Peking 
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is inherent in its competition with the Soviet Union over 
the leadership and direction of the revolutionary movements 
in the area* Peking1s efforts to cultivate the governments 
of the region, for strategic reasons, and at the expense 
of support to the revolutionary movements places it on 
the same footing with the Kremlin, whom Peking is charging 
precisely with the same crime of subordinating the interests 
of the local revolutionary movements to the national interest 
of the Soviet state• Thus to differentiate itself from the 
Kremlin, Peking would have to maintain a more revolutionary 
stance in its relations with the local insurgencies• We must 
not also discount the possibility that the Kremlin itself, 
in its competition with Peking, might take initiative in 
this respect by making use of North Vietnam, where the Krem-
lin had scored against Peking and where it is firmly entrench-
ed, for supporting the insurgencies in the area, particularly 
in Thailand, by proxy so to say* 
Looking now at the assessment of the fourth factor 
at play, Peking1s relations with the revolutionary movements 
in the area, it is important to understand that it is not 
selling them down the river in exchange of the state-to-
state relations* Since 1969$ Peking has been toning them 
down in order to make use of them as tools to affect the 
state-to-state relations, but at the same time keeping their 
potential ready for a bloody revolution when the situation 
might demand so* The latter contingency is not on the agenda 
for the time being, as Peking has to entrench itself more 
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firmly on the diplomatic front. However, the competition 
with the Soviet Union over the leadership of these movements 
imbues this factor with a very uncertain character* More-
over, these movements have a logic and will of their own 
which might seriously reduce the manipulative power of both 
the Kremlin and Peking over them, and prompt the movements 
to act on their oTwn* 
The last factor to look at is the prospect of neutra-
lization of the area* While we have seen that all members 
of the ASSAN are in favour of the proposal in principle, 
the project is in a state of stalement because of lack of 
concerted policies on its implementation, And it is most 
unlikely that any significant progress shall be made on 
this score in the near future, which suits Peking well, 
Peking would not like to see the Soviet influence being 
institutionalized in the area under the cover of the local 
security arrangement sponsored by the major powers, or 
?/itness a re-introduction of large scale American military 
power under the same guise. 
To summarize, because of the factors explained above 
we can expect that for a foreseeable future China is going 
to continue on her present course towards the area, i#e*, 
deepening her diplomatic, trade, cultural and other relations 
with its countries, while toning down the physical activities 
of the insurgent movementsbut keeping their revolutionary 
potential in the state of readiness. How long the present 
period of smiles is going to last, and what policies might 
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replo.ce it, is impossible to say. 
o^uld China develop into a Communist power of the 
Soviet style, which ruthlessly subordinates the interests 
of the fraternal parties and revolutionary movements on 
th/* alter of national interest of the Russian state? Z'ould 
China sccumb uo "Che pulls of her national tradition, 
casting herself into a role of the Middle Kingdom, Tvhich 
leaves the states on her southern periphery to exist on 
their own and without interference as lone as they do not 
permit their territories to be used by any power hostile 
to China as staging area? Or would China reassert her comit-
ment to the revolutionary ideology and to her role of a 
revolutionary base in Asia and plunge he*-id on into an acti-
vity of revolutionary fundamentalism in the area, as in 1949, 
and then under the influence of the Cultural devolution 
between 1966 and 1969, at whatever cost? 
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APPENDIX 
founding Declaration,of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), August 1967 
(Press ttelease No* 16 of the Permanent Mission of 
Thailand to the United Nations, August 8, 1967) 
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister 
of foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philip-
pines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand? 
Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common 
problems among the countries of Southeast-Bast Asia and 
convinced of the need to strength further the existing bonds 
of regional solidarity and cooperations 
Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common 
action to promote and thereby contribute towards peace, 
progress and prosperity in the regions 
Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, 
the* cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and 
economic well-being are best attained by fostering good 
understanding, good beighbourlinass and meaningful co-
operation among the countries of the region already bound 
together by ties of history and culture: 
Considering that the countries of South-last Asia 
221 
share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic 
and social stability of the region and insuring their peace-
ful and progressive national development, and that they are 
determined to manifestation in order to preserve their 
national identities in accordance with the ideals and 
aspirations of their peoples: 
Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and 
remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries 
concerned and are not intended to be used directly or 
indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom 
of states in the area or prejudice the orderly processes 
of their national developments 
Do hereby declare: 
£irst, the establishment of an association for regional 
cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be 
known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association 
shall be: 
1* To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region through joint 
endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership 
in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous 
and peaceful community of South-East Asian nations: 
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2* To promote regional peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relation-
ship among countries of the region and adherence to 
the principles of the United Nations Charter: 
3* To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance 
on matters of common interest in the economic, social, 
cultural, technical, scientific and administrative 
fields: 
4# To provide assistance to each other in the form of 
training and reasearch facilities in the educational, 
professional, technical and administrative spheres: 
5* To collaborate more effectively for the greater utili-
zation of their agriculture and industries, the expan-
sion of their trade, including the study of the pro-
blems of international commodity trade, the improve-
ment of their transportation and communicant ion facilities 
and the raieing^of the living standards of their peoples: 
6* To promote South-East Asian studies: 
7* To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with 
existing international and regional organisations with 
similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for 
even closer cooperation among themselves* 
Third, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the 
following machinery shall be established: 
Am Annual meeting of foreign ministers may be convened 
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as required 
B* A standing committee, under the chairmanship of the 
foreign minister of the host country or his represen-
tative and having as its members the accredited 
ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry 
on the work of the Association in between meetings of 
foreign ministers 
C* Ad hoc committees and permanent committees of specia-
lists and officials on specific subjects 
D# A national secretariat in each member country to carry 
out the work of the Association on behalf of that 
country and to service the annual or special meetings 
of foreign ministers, the standing committee and such 
other committees as may hereafter be established 
Fourth, that the Association is open for participation 
to all States in the South-Bast Asian region subscribing to 
the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes: 
Fifth, that the Association represents the collective 
will of the nations of South-last Asia to bind themselves 
together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint 
efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for 
posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity. 
Done in Bangkok on August 8, 1967 
For Indonesia: 
For Malaysia: 
For the Philippines: 
For Singapore: 
For Thailand: 
(Signed) Adam Malik 
Presidium Minister of Political 
Affairs, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
(Signed) Tun Abdul Bazak 
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister 
of Defence 
and Minister of National Development 
(Signed) Narciso Bamos 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
(Signed) S* Bajaratnaii 
Minister for Poreign Affairs 
(Signed) Thanat Ihoman 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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